Stephen Shaquille Brooks v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed April 6, 2015
    S   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-14-00210-CR
    STEPHEN SHAQUILLE BROOKS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 416-82826-2013
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Whitehill
    Opinion by Justice Francis
    A jury convicted Stephen Shaquille Brooks of two counts of sexual assault and assessed
    punishment at ten years in prison on both counts but recommended the sentence in the first count
    be suspended and appellant be placed on community supervision.          The trial court ordered
    appellant’s prison sentence to begin immediately and his ten-year community supervision to
    begin in five years. In one issue, appellant asserts he did not receive effective assistance of
    counsel. In a cross-issue, the State requests that we modify the judgment in count one to reflect
    that the sentences run concurrently. We overrule appellant’s issue and sustain the State’s cross-
    issue. We affirm the judgment in count two and affirm the judgment as modified in count one.
    In August 2012, fifteen-year-old Jenny Choctaw (a pseudonym) sneaked out of her
    parents’ house around midnight and met four male friends. The group rode around for a while
    before ending up at the home of the then-eighteen-year-old appellant. Appellant provided the
    group with alcohol and marijuana. Jenny drank vodka and wine and became intoxicated. At one
    point, she was lying on the floor spitting up. Her friends became concerned she would not be
    able to sneak back into her house and decided to leave her with appellant. Jenny said that after
    her friends left, appellant sexually assaulted her vaginally and anally.
    In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues defense counsel did not provide effective
    representation because he failed to object to an improper closing argument by the State.
    Specifically, he asserts the prosecutor mentioned a tattoo on appellant’s arm that read, “Treat
    Bitches Like Bitches,” even though photographs of the tattoo were excluded from evidence. The
    complained-of argument was as follows:
    And you know what kind of person he is. You heard about his tattoos. You heard
    about the “Treat bitches like bitches.” That gives him some attitude about how he
    feels for girls. They’re just there for him, and if they’re too drunk, if there’s a
    drunk little girl, too bad for her.
    To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge, an appellant must
    show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2)
    the deficient performance prejudiced him; that is, but for the deficiency, there is a reasonable
    probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Rylander v. State, 
    101 S.W.3d 107
    , 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Proper jury argument must fall within one of four
    general areas: summation of the evidence, reasonable deduction from the evidence, answer to
    argument of opposing counsel, and pleas for law enforcement. Brown v. State, 
    270 S.W.3d 564
    ,
    6750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A prosecutor may not use closing argument to present evidence
    that is outside the record. Freeman v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 717
    , 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
    The record shows that although photographs of appellant’s tattoos were excluded during
    the guilt-innocence phase of trial, a video recording of appellant’s interview with the police was
    admitted into evidence. The recording shows that at the end of the interview, the detective
    –2–
    mentioned appellant had “cool tattoos” and asked what they all said. As appellant explained his
    tattoos, the detective leaned forward, lifted appellant’s sleeve, and asked about one above his
    elbow that read, “Treat Bitches Like Bitches.” Appellant said he was “sorry,” explained he got
    the tattoo a year and a half ago when he was “young,” and said he would get it removed.
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that evidence of the tattoo was not outside the
    record, and the prosecutor’s argument regarding it was not only a proper summation of the
    evidence but a reasonable deduction. As such, it was not objectionable and appellant cannot be
    ineffective for failing to object. See Weinn v. State, 
    281 S.W.3d 633
    , 641 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
    2009), aff’d on other grounds, 
    326 S.W.3d 189
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We overrule the sole
    issue.
    In its cross-issue, the State asks that we modify the judgment in count one to reflect a
    commencement date of December 20, 2013 instead of December 20, 2018. At the time the judge
    accepted the jury’s verdict and assessed punishment on both cases, he asked both the prosecutor
    and defense counsel for their positions on whether the sentences should run concurrently or
    consecutively. Defense counsel urged the former while the prosecutor urged the latter. The
    judge then ordered appellant’s ten-year prison sentence in count two to begin immediately and
    his ten-year community supervision in count one to begin in five years. Both judgments provide
    that “confinement ordered shall run concurrently,” but the judgment for the first count provides
    that appellant’s sentence will commence in 2018.
    In these cases, the trial court was authorized to order concurrent or consecutive sentences.
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2014). The State, however, asserts it
    has found no authority to support a “delayed, partial stacking” and further asserts that all parties
    involved previously reached an agreement that appellant’s sentences would run concurrently.
    Given the State’s assertion of an agreement, we modify the judgment in count one to reflect a
    –3–
    commencement date of December 20, 2013, such that appellant’s two sentences run
    concurrently. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment in count two and affirm the judgment in
    count one as modified.
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)                            /Molly Francis/
    140210F.U05                                        MOLLY FRANCIS
    JUSTICE
    –4–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    STEPHEN SHAQUILLE BROOKS,                         On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District
    Appellant                                         Court, Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 416-82826-2013.
    No. 05-14-00210-CR        V.                      Opinion delivered by Justice Francis;
    Justices Lang-Miers and Whitehill
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                      participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment on Count 2 is AFFIRMED.
    The judgment on Count 1 is MODIFIED as follows:
    To reflect December 20, 2013 as the Date Sentence Imposed and Date Sentence to
    Commence.
    As MODIFIED, the judgment on Count 1 is AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered April 6, 2015.
    –5–