Erick Hernandez v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                 ACCEPTED
    07-14-00388-CR
    SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    AMARILLO, TEXAS
    5/28/2015 12:02:27 PM
    Vivian Long, Clerk
    NO. 07-14-00388-CR
    STATE REQUESTS
    ORAL ARGUMENT
    FILED IN
    7th COURT OF APPEALS
    ONLY IF   APPELLANT
    AMARILLO,  TEXAS
    REQUESTS    ARGUMENT
    5/28/2015 12:02:27 PM
    VIVIAN LONG
    IN THE                        CLERK
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE
    SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AMARILLO, TEXAS
    ******************************************************************
    ERIC HERNANDEZ,
    APPELLANT,
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE
    ******************************************************************
    ON APPEAL FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT
    CAUSE NO. 67,846-A
    POTTER COUNTY, TEXAS
    HONORABLE DAN SCHAAP, PRESIDING
    ******************************************************************
    STATE’S BRIEF
    ******************************************************************
    RANDALL SIMS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    JOHN L. OWEN, SBN 15369200
    ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
    501 S. FILLMORE, SUITE 5A
    AMARILLO, TEXAS 79101
    (806) 379-2325
    jackowen@co.potter.tx.us
    ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    PAGE
    TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………i
    LIST OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………….... ii
    THE CASE IN BRIEF…………………………………………………………...…1
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE…………………………………………………….2
    STATE’S RESPONSIVE POINT ……………………………………………… 3
    (ADDRESED TO APPELLANT’S SOLE “ISSUE PRESENTED”)
    Upon the evidence before it, the trial court had the discretion to deny
    appellant’s suppression motion.
    FACT STATEMENT ……………………………………………                                             4
    RESPONSIVE POINT RESTATED…………………………………                                       7
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER……………………………………………                                       13
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE……………………………………………                                       14
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE…………………………………………… 14
    i
    LIST OF AUTHORITIES
    Page
    Cases
    Delijevic v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 606
    , 608 (Tex.App. - - Amarillo 2010, no pet.) 12
    Garcia v. State, 
    43 S.W.2d 527
    , 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) ........................... 
    11 Hughes v
    . State, 
    334 S.W.3d 379
    , 383 (Tex.App. - - Amarillo 2011, no pet.) 10, 12
    Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d. 391-92 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991 .................. 10
    State v. Dixon 
    206 S.W.3d 587
    590 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) ............................ 10
    State v. Patterson, 
    291 S.W.3d 121
    , 123 (Tex.App. - - Amarillo 2009, no pet.) 11
    State v. Story, 
    445 S.W.3d 729
    , 732 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) ........................... 10
    Romero v. State, 
    800 S.W.2d 539
    , 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) ......................... 10
    Valtierra v. State, 
    310 S.W.3d 442
    , 447 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) ........................... 10
    Whren v.United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 810, 
    116 S. Ct. 1769
    , 1772, 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 89
    (1996) .............................................................................................................. 11
    Statutes
    Tex. Health & Safety Code. Ann. Sec. 481.115 (d)(West 2010) ............................ 2
    ii
    NOS. 07-14-00388-CR
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE
    SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AMARILLO, TEXAS
    ******************************************************************
    ERIC HERNANDEZ,
    Appellant,
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee.
    ******************************************************************
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
    COMES NOW the State of Texas, appellee in the above entitled and
    numbered appeal, and submits its brief in response to the brief of appellant, Eric
    Hernandez. Appellant was convicted in the 47TH Judicial District Court of Potter
    County, Texas of possessing four or more, but less than two hundred, grams of a
    controlled substance, methamphetamine, enhanced by a previous felony
    conviction.
    THE CASE IN BRIEF
    THE CHARGE                     POSS. C/S, >4 GM. <200 GM, ENH.
    THE PLEA                       GUILTY
    VERDICT                        GUILTY
    PUNISHMENT (COURT )            18 YEARS TDCJ-ID
    1
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant bring this appeal from his conviction of possessing four or more,
    but less than two hundred, grams of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. See
    Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. Sec. 481.115 (d)(West 2010). He here complains
    of the trial court’s methodology in evaluating the evidence at the suppression
    hearing.
    The Potter County grand jury on April 30, 2014 indicted appellant for the
    offense, which was alleged to have occurred on or about September 22, 2013. CR:
    13. Included in the indictment was a punishment-enhancing allegation appellant
    had previously been convicted of a felony. Aided by counsel, appellant filed a
    motion to suppress as evidence the contraband made the subject of the prosecution.
    CR: 17. Following an adverse ruling on his suppression motion, and pursuant to a
    bargained punishment recommendation, appellant on October 20, 2014 pled guilty
    to the indicted offense; appellant reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s order
    denying his suppression motion. CR: 73. Accepting the plea bargain, the court
    found appellant guilty as alleged, assessed his punishment at eighteen (18) years
    imprisonment, and imposed sentence accordingly. CR: 73.
    Appellant timely, on October 27, 2014, filed a notice of appeal. CR: 68.
    2
    STATE’S RESPONSIVE POINT
    (ADDRESSED TO APPELLANT’S SOLE “ISSUE PRESENTED”)
    Upon the evidence before it, the trial court had the discretion to deny
    appellant’s suppression motion.
    3
    FACT STATEMENT
    The methamphetamine which was the subject of the prosecution was seized
    in a traffic stop of appellant. Appellant filed a motion to suppress that evidence.
    CR: 17. Alleged in the motion were that the traffic stop was unreasonable and a
    pretext, and that the pat-down search of appellant was not warranted by reasonable
    suspicion he was armed. At the hearing on the motion, the arresting officer,
    appellant’s girlfriend, and appellant himself testified.
    Amarillo police officer Ricky Mathews testified that the night of September
    22, 2013 he noticed a 1997 Chevrolet being driven in the 400 block of Prospect
    Street with the taillights not on. RR: 11-12. In his patrol car, Matthews followed
    the pickup two blocks, through three turns. RR: 12, 13. As Matthews followed, the
    pickup driver applied the brake to activate the brake lights; after the driver stopped
    braking, the taillights were on. RR: 12. Matthews then effected a traffic stop. RR:
    14.
    The driver, appellant, was the pickup’s sole occupant. RR: 15. The
    registration sticker on the pickup windshield was altered to appear current, though
    the registration in fact had expired. Appellant could not immediately find his
    identification when Matthews asked for it. RR: 16. From the way appellant had
    positioned his leg, Matthews suspected appellant was concealing a weapon; those
    circumstances prompted Matthews to have appellant exit the pickup. RR: 17.
    4
    Matthews directed appellant to walk to the front of the patrol car. Appellant
    consented to Matthew’s frisking of him for weapons RR: 20. In the pat-down,
    Matthews found a baggie of suspected methamphetamine. RR: 20.
    The patrol car’s in-car video recorded from a point thirty seconds before the
    overhead lights were engaged, Matthews testified. The video recording was played
    for the court; throughout the entire recording leading to the stop, the pickup’s
    taillights were on. RR: 14, 24, 27. The pickup’s headlights shone from when
    Matthews first observed the pickup. CR: 12, 40.                                  When a driver turns on a
    vehicle’s headlights, the taillights also come on, Matthews acknowledged. RR: 29.
    But, he noted, light will emit from the headlights of vehicles equipped with
    running lights whenever the engine is running, when the headlights have not been
    turned on; in that circumstance, the taillights will not be on. CR: 26-27. Matthews
    perceived that appellant rode the brake to give the appearance the tail lights were
    on, until he engaged the switch to turn on the headlights and taillights. RR: 34-35.
    Appellant’s girlfriend Jenna Ortiz (“Jenna”) testified in support of the
    suppression motion. According to Jenna, appellant came to her residence in the
    pickup with Francisco Reyes, the pickup’s owner. RR: 43, 44. When Francisco and
    appellant left in the pickup, with Francisco driving, the taillights were on.1 RR 46.
    1
    Specifically, “all necessary lights were on, “Jenna emphasized. RR: 46, 47, 48.
    5
    Testifying in his own behalf, appellant recounted the events of the evening
    in question. After leaving Jenna’s house, he and Francisco went to “the slots 2i” on
    Amarillo Boulevard, near the intersection of Western Street, appellant related. RR:
    55. Francisco went inside the slots, leaving the pickup with appellant. RR: 55.
    Before leaving the area in the pickup, he did a “walk around” the pickup, as was
    his practice, to ensure the lights were functioning, appellant stated; the taillights
    were on. RR: 55. Appellant acknowledged he had consented to officer Matthews’
    searching his pocket. RR: 58. He asserted, though, that he was unaware he could
    withhold consent. RR: 60.
    Insofar as the record reflects, no findings of fact and conclusions of law
    were requested or entered.
    2
    What “the slots” is was not developed in the record; this writer presumes it is a gaming establishment.
    6
    STATE’S RESPONSIVE POINT
    (ADDRESSED TO APPELLANT’S SOLE “ISSUE
    PRESENTED”)(RESTATED)
    Upon the evidence before it, the trial court had the discretion to deny
    appellant’s suppression motion.
    I.     The Trial Judge’s Remarks Underlying Appellant’s Complaint Here
    At the close of evidence on the suppression motion, the court entertained the
    parties’ argument. Relevant to appellant’s grievance on appeal, the trial judge
    interjected as follows:
    . . . But I think I have to take the officer’s observations at face value,
    absent evidence that this vehicle could not have done what the officer
    surmised it did because of what he observed. And his surmise in that
    regard is that the headlight switch was not engaged and that it had its
    front beams on because it was turned on and it was running with those
    as we have seen vehicles coming down the road in the middle of the
    day with their headlights on. We call them headlights because that’s
    what we see. And those lights are automatic. No one has to, quote,
    unquote, turn them on. And so that’s sort of where it boils down to me
    - - for me here is, is do we have evidence that what the officer is
    suggesting is not possible?
    7
    MR. TERRY [appellant’s trial counsel]: Well - -
    THE COURT: I don’t hear the evidence that says it’s not possible.
    I’m going to have to take what he says at face value. And that means
    that I think he had a reasonable basis to make the stop and I think your
    client consented to the search.
    The judge’s expressions highlighted above are the core of appellant’s appeal.
    II.    Appellant’s Complaint
    Appellant centers his appeal on the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence
    relating to the reasonableness, or not, of the traffic stop itself. He does not contest
    the legality of the pat-down search yielding the contraband.
    As the State understands appellant’s argument, he is not contending that the
    trial court arrived at the wrong conclusion about the traffic stop’s reasonableness.
    Rather, he condemns as flawed the process by which the court made its ruling.
    Brief for the Appellant, p. 21. Specifically, appellant sees the court as having
    disregarded its obligation to evaluate all witnesses’ credibility, instead accepting
    the officer’s testimony “at face value.” Had the court required the State to prove
    the reasonableness of the traffic stop, instead of in effect requiring him to disprove
    8
    reasonableness, the court conceivably would have granted the suppression motion,
    appellant proposes. Brief for the Appellant, p. 21.
    Appellant acknowledges the plausibility of officer Matthew’s suspicion
    appellant was riding the pickup’s brake, as he turned on the lights to conceal the
    traffic infraction. Brief for the Appellant, p. 22. But, Matthews’ delay in stopping
    appellant after following him undermines that officer’s credibility, appellant urges.
    Brief for the Appellant, p. 23. Appellant faults the court for allegedly not giving
    due consideration to the evidence countervailing against Matthews’ testimony. He
    asks that the conviction be vacated and a new trial ordered. Brief for the Appellant,
    p. 24.
    III.   Summary of the State’s Response
    Appellant takes the judge’s isolated comments out of context. Seen from the
    record as a whole is that the court chose to believe officer Matthews’ testimony
    and discount the contrary evidence; that was the court’s prerogative.
    9
    IV.    Argument and Authority
    A. Standard of Review
    An appellate court should review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
    for an abuse of discretion. State v. Story, 
    445 S.W.3d 729
    , 732 (Tex.Crim.App.
    2014); State v. Dixon, 
    206 S.W.3d 587
    , 590 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). The record
    should be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, and
    the judgment should be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or ‘outside the
    zone of reasonable disagreement.’ 
    Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732
    , citing Montgomery
    v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 391-92 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). The reviewing court
    should uphold the judgment if it is correct on some theory of law applicable to the
    case, even if the trial judge made the judgment for a wrong reason. 
    Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732
    , citing Romero v. State, 
    800 S.W.2d 539
    , 543 (Tex.Crim.App.
    1990). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of any
    witnesses’ testimony and the weight to be assigned to that testimony. Hughes v.
    State, 
    334 S.W.3d 379
    , 383 (Tex.App. - - Amarillo 2011, no pet.) citing Valtierra
    v. State, 
    310 S.W.3d 442
    , 447 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Because the trial court is the
    sole trier of fact, the appellate court should give almost total deference to the trial
    court’s determination of historical facts. 
    Story, 445 S.W.3d at 732
    , citing State v.
    
    Dixon, supra
    , 206 S.W.3d at 590. The trial court’s application of the law to those
    facts is reviewed de novo.
    10
    B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
    in Denying the Suppression Motion
    A traffic violation can constitute a reasonable basis for a detention. State v.
    Patterson, 
    291 S.W.3d 121
    , 123 (Tex.App. - - Amarillo 2009, no pet.), citing
    Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 810, 
    116 S. Ct. 1769
    , 1772, 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 89
    (1996). Further, reasonable suspicion for the stop does not require absolute
    certainty an offense was committed. Garcia v. State, 
    43 S.W.3d 527
    , 530
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).
    In his colloquy with appellant’s trial counsel as counsel was concluding his
    argument on the stop’s legality, the judge revealed his thoughts on the proper
    evaluation of the evidence. Appellant portrays the remarks highlighted above as
    signifying the judge’s belief he was constrained to believe the officer’s testimony.
    Appellant’s interpretation is not well-taken.
    In total context, the judge’s commentary is properly seen as an explanation
    of how he was weighing the witnesses’ credibility. In the State’s view, the judge’s
    explanatory remarks can be paraphrased as follows:
    - officer Matthews was unwavering in his testimony the pickup’s
    taillights were not on when appellant passed by his position;
    11
    - unknown was whether the 1997 Chevrolet pickup was equipped
    with running headlights which would shine even when the
    taillights were not on - - therefore, any inference the taillights
    necessarily were on because the headlights were on would be
    speculative; and,
    - officer Matthews was more credible as a witness on that issue than
    was appellant or Jenna.
    RR: 67-69.
    By his remarks, the judge communicated only that he chose to believe
    officer Matthews’ description of the traffic infraction made the basis of the stop.
    Such was authorized under the evidence here, and was not an abuse of discretion.
    See and compare Hughes v. 
    State, supra
    , 334 S.W.3d at 384 (at suppression
    hearing, officer testified that the accused while driving made a wide turn, but the
    accused testified he did not make a wide turn; in upholding the trial court’s denial
    of suppression, the appellate court would not second guess the trial court about a
    matter turning on witness credibility); and, Delijevic v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 606
    ,
    608 (Tex.App. - - Amarillo 2010, no pet.)(reasonable minds could have concluded
    that driver committed traffic violations in the officer’s presence; denial of the
    suppression motion was upheld).
    12
    By his “Issue Presented,” appellant advances no persuasive reason to disturb
    the judgment of conviction. The Court should decide the issue in favor of the trial
    court’s judgment.
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, the State prays that the judgment and sentence be affirmed.
    Respectfully submitted,
    RANDALL SIMS
    District Attorney
    Potter County, Texas
    __/s/ John L. Owen___
    John L. Owen
    Assistant District Attorney
    Potter County Courts Bldg.
    Suite 5A
    501 S. Fillmore
    Amarillo, Texas 79101
    (806) 379-2325
    FAX (806) 379-2823
    SBN 15369200
    jackowen@co.potter.tx.us
    Attorneys for the State
    13
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that on this 2th day of May, 2015, a true copy of the
    foregoing State’s brief was served on appellant’s attorney, John Bennett, at P.O.
    Box 19144, Amarillo, Texas 79114, by email and by depositing the same in the
    United States Mail, postage prepaid.
    __/s/ John L. Owen______
    Assistant District Attorney
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    In accordance with Tex.R.App.P. 9.4 (i)(3), I hereby certify that the
    foregoing brief contains, as reflected in the computer program word count, 2,611
    words. That count includes words in portions of the brief which, under the Rule,
    are excluded from the prescribed word limit.
    __/s/ John L. Owen___
    Assistant District Attorney
    14