Jacob Lane Rowan v. State ( 2015 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 2, 2015
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-01310-CR
JACOB LANE ROWAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 063943
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Francis
Jacob Lane Rowan appeals his convictions for six counts of possession of child
pornography. After the jury found him guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years in
prison and a $250 fine for each offense. The trial court ordered the first five sentences to run
consecutively and the last ten-year sentence (assessed for count 6) to run concurrent with the ten-
year sentence assessed for count 5. In two issues, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions and the trial court erred by allowing an expert witness to testify. We
affirm.
When fifteen-year-old S.H received a sexually explicit text and photograph on her cell
phone, she told her father who immediately took the phone to the Dennison police. They
obtained a search warrant and determined the phone belonged to appellant’s stepmother but was
used by appellant. After appellant’s arrest, a forensic examination of his cell phone revealed
nearly 400 sexually explicit images of people, about 100 of which were children. Appellant was
then charged with possession of child pornography.
In his first issue, appellant claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
convictions. Under this issue, appellant argues the State failed to prove exhibits 4 and 5 depicted
under-age girls masturbating because they are still photographs which are “incapable of
illustrating masturbation, since masturbation requires movement.” Likewise, he claims the State
failed to prove the other four photographs (exhibits 6 through 9) were lewd.
In a legal sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The
jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony and
therefore, is free to accept or reject any or all evidence presented by either side. See Lancon v.
State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We do not engage in a second evaluation of
the weight and credibility of the evidence but “determine whether the necessary inferences are
reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly possesses visual material
that visually depicts, and he knows it visually depicts, a child younger than eighteen years of age
at the time the image of the child was made and the child in the visual material is engaging in
sexual conduct, including masturbation and lewd exhibition of the genitals. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 43.25(a)(2), 43.26(a) (Vernon 2011 & Supp. 2014). In determining whether a visual
depiction of a child is lewd, courts should consider whether (1) the focal point of the visual
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depiction is the child’s genitalia, (2) the place or pose of the child in the photograph is sexually
suggestive, (3) the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or inappropriate attire, (4) the child is
fully or partially clothed or nude, (5) the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a
willingness to engage in sexual activity, or (6) the visual depiction is intended or designed to
elicit a sexual response in the viewer. See Alexander v. State, 906 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.
App.―Dallas 1995, no pet.). In determining whether a visual depiction of a child depicts
masturbation, we rely on the plain meaning of the words used and consider whether the
photograph depicts a child stimulating or manipulating genitals by manual or bodily contact
exclusive of sexual intercourse. See Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 140, 146 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (when penal code does not define word, we “turn to the common, ordinary meaning of that
word”); WEBSTER’S 3RD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1391 (1993).
The indictment stated and the jury charge provided that appellant intentionally and
knowingly possessed visual material that visually depicted a child younger than 18 years at the
time the image was made engaging in sexual conduct, namely masturbation and actual lewd
exhibition of genitals. With regard to the State’s exhibit 4 and 5, the first color photograph
depicts a young girl from her head to her knees. In the photograph, the girl is nude except for a
bead bracelet and cloth necklace, and she looks directly into the camera. The image, taken from
an area below her knees, focuses on her genitalia. Her right middle finger appears to be touching
her clitoris. The second color photograph is a close up photograph depicting the hands of a
young female, also manipulating her genitals. The jury viewed these photographs and concluded
they depicted young girls engaging in sexual conduct, specifically masturbation.
The State’s exhibits 6 through 9 are also color photographs. The focal point of each
image is the young female’s genital area. None of these four photographs shows the child’s face.
In each image, the portion of the child visible in the photograph is nude. Each child is an
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unnatural or inappropriate pose, often squatting over a camera. The images are not artistic or
inadvertent; rather, they are clearly intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.
After viewing these photographs, the jury concluded they depicted young girls engaging in
sexual conduct, specifically the lewd exhibition of genitals.
We have reviewed the State’s exhibits 4 through 9 and considered appellant’s arguments
on appeal. After doing so and after considering the applicable law, we conclude a rational jury
could find that the six images are pornographic and that appellant is guilty of possession of child
pornography as alleged in the indictment and set out in the jury charge. In reaching this
conclusion, we reject appellant’s argument that the still photographs are incapable of depicting
masturbation because such action “requires movement.” Photographs of race horses crossing the
finish line, swimmers competing in a swimming meet, or marathon runners during a race clearly
depict movement although they are still photographs. We likewise reject appellant’s argument
that the images are not lewd because the State failed to prove who took the photographs and
what the person’s intent was. The four images contained in the State’s exhibits 6 through 9
depict nude children, in unnatural poses, and the focal point of the each image is the child’s
genitalia. The jury considered this and necessarily concluded the photographs were intended or
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. We conclude appellant’s arguments lack
merit. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing the State’s expert
witness, Catherine Strain, to testify that the children depicted in the six photographs were
younger than eighteen years of age at the time the photographs were taken. He claims Strain’s
testimony was irrelevant and could not have benefited the jury because he did not challenge the
State’s assertion that the girls depicted in the six photographs were minors. This complaint
differs from the one he raised at trial; after the State offered Strain as an expert witness, appellant
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objected because Strain was “not qualified” and her opinions were “unreliable.” If a party
asserts a different complaint on appeal than was made by objection at trial, the issue is waived.
Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Jones v. State, 111 S.W.3d 600,
604 (Tex. App.―Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d). Because appellant’s complaint on appeal does not
comport with his objection below, he has waived this issue. We overrule appellant’s second
issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) /Molly Francis/
141310F.U05 MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JACOB LANE ROWAN, Appellant On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District
Court, Grayson County, Texas
No. 05-14-01310-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 063943.
Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang-Miers and Whitehill
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered June 2, 2015.
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