Michael Anthony Flores v. State ( 2008 )

i i i i i i
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-08-00416-CR
Michael Anthony FLORES,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-CR-4571W
Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2008
AFFIRMED
In 2002, defendant Michael Anthony Flores pled no contest to injury to a child and was
placed on deferred adjudication. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to enter adjudication of guilt
and revoke community supervision. After hearing testimony from several witnesses, the trial court
revoked defendant’s community supervision and sentenced defendant to five years’ confinement.
On appeal, defendant complains the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was
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insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he violated a condition of his community
supervision. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
In its motion to revoke, the State alleged defendant violated condition number one of his
community supervision agreement by committing the offense of burglary of a habitation. Defendant
argues on appeal the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed the offense. On a motion to
revoke community supervision, the State bears the burden to prove its allegations by a preponderance
of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). The State
meets its burden when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the
defendant violated a condition of his community supervision. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “It is the trial court’s duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to
determine whether the allegations in the motion to revoke are true or not.” Garrett v. State,
619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). We review the trial court’s order
revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763.
We indulge all inferences in a light favoring the trial court’s ruling, Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419,
421 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979), and sustain the order of revocation if the evidence
substantiates a single violation. Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978).
Here, the State was required to show that defendant, without the consent of the owner,
entered a habitation with the intent to commit a theft, actually committed a theft, or attempted to
commit a theft. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 30.02(a)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2003). During the
revocation hearing, the State presented the testimony of James Zaccaria, the owner of the home
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defendant was accused of burglarizing. Zaccaria testified that when he returned home from vacation
he discovered his apartment “in disarray” and personal property missing. While attempting to call
the police, Zaccaria saw the back door to his apartment begin to open and defendant walk inside.
It is not disputed that defendant entered Zaccaria’s apartment without permission. After defendant
saw Zaccaria in the apartment, he shoved Zaccaria and began to run away. Zaccaria yelled for help
and two men stopped defendant from fleeing. The police arrived at the scene and defendant was
arrested. Defendant had Zaccaria’s pocket knife, wallet and credit cards in his possession, and he was
wearing Zaccaria’s shirt.
Defendant contends the evidence presented at the hearing was insufficient to prove he
burglarized Zaccaria’s home because there was no evidence to establish a “felony, theft, or an
assault” when defendant entered the apartment. However, the unexplained personal possession of
recently stolen property may constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See Chavez v.
State, 843 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Possession of stolen property will support an
inference of guilt of the offense in which the property was stolen. Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73,
76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). To warrant an inference of guilt based solely on the possession of stolen
property, the State must establish the possession was personal, recent, and unexplained. Grant v.
State, 566 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). If the defendant offers an
explanation for his possession of the stolen property, the record must demonstrate the account is
false or unreasonable. Adams v. State, 552 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Whether a
defendant’s explanation for possession of recently stolen property is true or reasonable is a question
of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact. Dixon v. State, 43 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
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Defendant explained during the revocation hearing that he had not stolen Zaccaria’s personal
property, but that he found the items on the street. As the sole trier of fact, the trial court is charged
with the responsibility of deciding whether the defendant’s explanation for possessing the stolen
goods was unreasonable or untrue. Akbar v. State, 190 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Here, the trial court chose not to believe defendant’s explanation. We
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant burglarized Zaccaria’s apartment based on his personal, recent, and unexplained
possession of Zaccaria’s property. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining the evidence was sufficient to support the revocation.
CONCLUSION
We overrule defendant’s issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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