James Spencer v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
13-15-00101-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
12/22/2015 9:10:53 AM
Dorian E. Ramirez
NO. 13-15-00101-CR
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
12/22/2015 9:10:53 AM
DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
JAMES SPENCER, Clerk
Appellant,
v.
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
Appellee
12/22/2015 9:10:53 AM
DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
Clerk
STATE’S BRIEF
STEVEN E. REIS ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
State Bar No. 16757960 State Bar No. 16523700
sreis@co.matagorda.tx.us rramsey@langleybanack.com
LINDSAY K. DESHOTELS Trinity Plaza II, Suite 900
State Bar No. 24069608 745 E. Mulberry
1700 7th Street, Room 325 San Antonio, Texas 78212
Matagorda County Courthouse Telephone: (210) 736-6600
Bay City, Texas 77414 Telecopier: (210) 735-6889
Telephone: (979) 244-7657
Telecopier: (979) 245-9409
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
THE STATE DOES NOT REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
Appellant: James Spencer
Trial Counsel: Robert Swofford
5225 Katy Freeway, Suite 605
Houston, Texas 77007
Appellate Counsel: Robert Swofford
5225 Katy Freeway, Suite 605
Houston, Texas 77007
Joe Gonyea
2118 Smith Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Appellee: State of Texas
Trial Counsel: Steven Reis, District Attorney
Lindsey Deshotels, Assistant District Attorney
Matagorda County District Attorney’s Office
1700 7th Street, Room 325
Bay City, Texas 77414
Appellate Counsel: Steven Reis, District Attorney
Lindsey Deshotels, Assistant District Attorney
Matagorda County District Attorney’s Office
1700 7th Street, Room 325
Bay City, Texas 77414
Robinson C. Ramsey
745 E. Mulberry Ave., Suite 900
Trinity Plaza II
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Craig Estlinbaum
130th Judicial District Court
Matagorda County, Texas
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES .................................................................. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................. 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................ 3
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT......................................... 4
ISSUE PRESENTED ..................................................................................... 4
The trial court correctly refused Spencer’s request
for a jury instruction on self-defense.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT............................................................... 11
ARGUMENT................................................................................................ 13
PRAYER ...................................................................................................... 19
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................... 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE....................................................................... 20
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Dyson v. State,
672 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ............................................. 11, 13
Halbert v. State,
881 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) ........... 18
Hamel v. State,
916 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ........................................... passim
Lane v. State,
957 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d) .......................... 13, 18
Statutes
TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31 (West 2011).................................................. 11, 12, 14
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a felony criminal case in which a jury, on February 17, 2015,
found Appellant James Spencer guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon and recommended punishment of six years in prison plus a ten-
thousand-dollar fine. 6 RR 39-43; 7 RR 127-29; CR 104-06. He filed his
notice of appeal on that same date. CR 102.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not believe that oral argument would materially assist
this court in reaching its decision. Therefore, the State waives oral
argument.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The trial court correctly refused Spencer’s request
for a jury instruction on self-defense.
4
STATEMENT OF FACTS
“[W]e were drinking beer,” Jay Howell recalled. “There was a young
man, there, but I didn’t know his name.” 4 RR 156.
His name was Jared Maxwell. 4 RR 174.
Maxwell, Howell, James Spencer, and Paul Stillwell were doing “a
little drinking” during a cookout on Spencer’s porch. 4 RR 173-75.
“Mr. Spencer and that kid was drinking beer and whiskey,” Howell
said. “I never seen nothing coming; but the next thing I knew, the kid was
sliding down the wall.” 4 RR 156.
“Did you hear commotion or anything behind you?” the prosecutor
asked. 4 RR 157.
“Just whenever he hit it.” 4 RR 157.
“Do you know how the kid hit the wall?” 4 RR 157.
“Yeah. James throwed him up against it.” 4 RR 157.
“He shoved him back to a door,” said Stillwell, “and then he just kind
of melted into the concrete.” 4 RR 178.
That was after Maxwell had hit Spencer in the nose—twice. 4 RR 175.
“Never did know why,” Stillwell said. 4 RR 175.
Maxwell could not remember either. 4 RR 131.
“Whenever you see the kid hit the wall,” the prosecutor asked Howell,
“is he conscious or unconscious at that point?” 4 RR 157.
5
“He passed out.” 4 RR 157.
“What happened next?” 4 RR 157.
“James went to kicking him in the groin and then put his foot on his
throat.” 4 RR 157.
“He was still out cold the whole time?” 4 RR 158.
He was. 4 RR 158.
“So, what happened next?” 4 RR 158.
“Paul drug him over across the street.” 4 RR 158.
Meanwhile, Maxwell was still breathing, but remained unconscious.
4 RR 158.
“James brought a five-gallon bucket of water and throwed it on the
kid,” Howell said. “And that’s when me and Paul left and went over to get
my cell phone at Paul’s house so I could call 911.” 4 RR 158.
When Captain Ronald Ballenger arrived in response to the 911 call, he
found Maxwell lying in the street unconscious with a “[p]retty bloodied
face” and “a good deal of blood draining onto the pavement.” 3 RR 30-32.
Lieutenant Douglas Pruitt, who joined Captain Ballenger shortly
thereafter, also described Maxwell as being “in pretty bad shape,” with
“facial injuries, severe swelling and bleeding from his facial area.” 3 RR 66.
“[He was] unconscious, nonresponsive,” Lt. Pruitt recalled. “And they
were preparing to life-flight him out.” 3 RR 66.
6
“[D]o you know about this?” Captain Ballenger asked Spencer, whose
house was a short distance away from where Maxwell was lying near some
garbage dumptsters outside the Poco Playa Restaurant. 3 RR 28, 67, 175.
Spencer, who was not in custody at the time, admitted that he had
fought with Maxwell and had thrown him off his property. 3 RR 28.
In addition, DNA testing confirmed to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty that Maxwell's blood was on Spencer's clothing. 3 RR
153-59; SX 28, 29.
When Lt. Pruitt went to speak with Maxwell at the hospital, he
learned that Maxwell “was stable but had severe head trauma and facial
fractures.” 3 RR 87.
“Did you ever see the victim regain consciousness?” the prosecutor
asked. 3 RR 100.
“No, ma’am,” said the lieutenant, “I never did.” 3 RR 100.
Bobby Nelson, the floor manager at Poco Playa Restaurant, had been
driving by his place of business when he saw a body lying on the ground. 3
RR 172, 176-77.
“I caught a glimpse of just a blood bath,” he described the scene. “The
man was very bloodied.” 3 RR 177.
7
Later, when Nelson reviewed the restaurant's surveillance video
footage, he realized that part of the bloody beating had been caught on
camera. 3 RR 179-85; SX 1.
Revered Richard Lewis and his wife had also seen Maxwell lying in a
heap when they drove by the restaurant that same day. 3 RR 201-05.
“There’s a body in the road,” Ms. Lewis told her husband. 3 RR 205.
“I couldn't believe that would be the case,” the reverend recalled, “but
as it turned out, that’s what it was.” 3 RR 205.
“He was totally out,” Ms. Lewis said. “I never did see him move that
day at all.” 4 RR 40.
“When you saw him at that time,” the prosecutor asked, “did he
appear bloody or anything like that?” 4 RR 40.
“No,” she said. “I didn’t see a mark on him.” 4 RR 40.
“He was just out cold, though?” 4 RR 40.
“Right.” 4 RR 40.
“I thought he was inebriated,” said Reverend Lewis. “I wasn’t overly
concerned too much because stuff like that happens, and there was people
tending to him.” 3 RR 207.
“[W]e figured, well, the guy has help,” Ms. Lewis added, “and, so,
they’re probably going to call an ambulance, and, so, we just started to
leave.” 4 RR 41.
8
Still, things “didn’t look right” to the reverend. 3 RR 208.
“I smelled a rat,” he said. “I didn’t feel at ease with the situation we
had left on the side of the road.” 3 RR 210.
His level of unease elevated when he saw in his rearview mirror that
the two men who had been tending to the injured man had “left him to his
own demise, no one around him, no one taking care of him.” 3 RR 210.
“[W]e were kind of surprised that they just left the body there,” said
Ms. Lewis. 4 RR 41.
“I just felt like there was something wrong,” Reverend Lewis said,
“and that it deserved us taking another look.” 3 RR 211.
So they turned back. 3 RR 211-13.
Upon returning, the Lewises saw James Spencer beating the inert
body of a man who they later learned was Jared Maxwell. 3 RR 213; 4 RR
41.
“I saw James on top of the body that was laying there,” said Reverend
Lewis, “and he was pummeling him fast and furious.” 3 RR 213.
“And at that point, what were you seeing?” the prosecutor asked. 3
RR 215.
“A body that was in a fetal position, unrecognizable,” the reverend
said. “[I] wouldn’t have known who it was if I had known them—bleeding
9
from the ears, nose, eyes, head. The face was—I’ve never seen anybody that
beaten.” 3 RR 215.
“And was he conscious at all?” 3 RR 215.
“Oh, no. No. ... He was just barely breathing.” 3 RR 215.
“Since that time, have you had anything to do with Mr. Maxwell?” 3
RR 218.
“He came to our church one day to thank us ... he said for saving his
life.” 3 RR 218.
Dr. Brijesh Gill, who treated Maxwell at the hospital, confirmed the
severity of the injuries. 4 RR 47, 53-54, 70-71.
“[H]e had a number of lacerations on his head,” the doctor related.
“He had swelling and discoloration, bruising round both eyes. Both of the
eyes were swollen almost shut. He also had bleeding within one of his eyes.”
4 RR 53-54.
“What can be the cause of that?” the prosecutor asked. 4 RR 54.
“Overwhlemingly the cause is traumatic injury,” Dr. Gill informed
him. 4 RR 54.
“And were there any fractures of his face or head that you
determined?” 4 RR 54.
“Yes. By CAT Scan of his head and face, there [were] multiple
fractures, particularly around the left eye, including the wall of the eye … on
10
the outside of the face, and as well as multiple fractures of the bones
underneath the left eye. And the nose is also broken.” 4 RR 54.
The jury agreed that these injuries were serious and that Spencer had
inflicted them: they found him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon (his fists), and recommended punishment of six years in prison
plus a ten-thousand-dollar fine. 6 RR 39-43; 7 RR 127-29; CR 104-06.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To be entitled to a self-defense instruction, “there must be some
evidence to show that appellant reasonably believed that use of deadly force
was immediately necessary to protect himself against [the] use or
attempted use of unlawful force.” Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460, 463
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Spencer claims that, after he had beaten Maxwell into submission,
and after others had carried Maxwell off Spencer’s property, Spencer feared
for his life when Maxwell was finally able to stand up, because Maxwell had
said earlier that he needed to get his keys so he could get a weapon to kill
Spencer. Appellant’s Br. at 3. But “[t]he use of force against another is not
justified … in response to verbal provocation alone.” TEX. PENAL CODE §
9.31(b)(1) (West 2011).
Furthermore, the use of force against another is not justified unless the
actor “reasonably” believes that “the force is immediately necessary to
11
protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force.”
TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). Spencer’s professed belief that Maxwell’s merely
standing up posed an immediate threat of unlawful force is not reasonable,
because Maxwell, who was not in Spencer’s immediate presence at that
time, made no concurrent verbal threat or threatening physical move
toward Spencer—nor was there any evidence of circumstances that would
prevent Spencer from retreating before Maxwell could find his keys, get a
weapon, and return to inflict the damage that Spencer claims to have
feared. Therefore, there is no evidence “that would support a belief that
retreat was not a reasonable option.” Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 494
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Maxwell’s alleged earlier threat to kill Spencer is also missing the
element of immediacy because, at the time Maxwell supposedly said this, he
made no physical move to follow through on this claimed threat.
Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.
By the time that Maxell finally recovered enough to stand up, the first
fight, at Spencer’s house, was already over, as Spencer himself admitted.
Appellant’s Br. at 4. Therefore, his splicing together these two separate
events, neither of which by themselves support the submission of an
instruction on self-defense, does not justify his request.
12
The evidence here does not show that the victim “took any physical
actions against appellant that would have warranted [him] in believing that
deadly force was immediately necessary to protect [himself].” Lane v. State,
957 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d) (citing Hamel v.
State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
Because the evidence here shows, at most, “nothing more than verbal
threats made to appellant,” it “did not raise the issue of self-defense.” Lane,
957 S.W.2d at 586. Accordingly, “the trial judge did not err in refusing
appellant’s requested charge.” Id.
ARGUMENT
A defendant is not entitled to an instruction on self-defense unless it
is “raised by the evidence.” Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984). Here, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Spencer, the evidence does not raise that issue. Id. (“If such
testimony or other evidence viewed in a favorable light does not establish a
case of self-defense, an instruction is not required.”).
To be entitled to a self-defense instruction, “there must be some
evidence to show that appellant reasonably believed that use of deadly force
was immediately necessary to protect himself against [the] use or
attempted use of unlawful force.” Dyson, 672 S.W.2d at 463; see also
Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In addition,
13
there must be evidence “that a reasonable person in appellant's situation
would not have retreated.” Id.
Spencer claims that, after he had beaten Maxwell into submission,
and after others had carried Maxwell off Spencer’s property, Maxwell
shouted that he needed his keys so that he could come back and kill
Spencer. Appellant’s Br. at 3. But “[t]he use of force against another is not
justified … in response to verbal provocation alone.” TEX. PENAL CODE §
9.31(b)(1) (West 2011).
According to Spencer, there was more than mere verbal provocation
because, after others had dragged Maxwell across the street, he later
managed to stand up, which Spencer interpreted as a sign that Maxwell
intended to try to locate a weapon to kill Maxwell. Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.
But the use of force against another is constrained by the requirement that
the actor must “reasonably” believe that “the force is immediately necessary
to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful
force.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). Spencer’s professed belief that Maxwell’s
standing up posed an immediate threat of unlawful force is not reasonable.
Appellant’s Br. at 3.
Standing up does not create any threat, much less an immediate one,
particularly when Maxwell was not in Spencer’s immediate presence at that
time and made no concurrent verbal threat or threatening physical move
14
toward Spencer—nor was there any evidence of circumstances that would
prevent Spencer from retreating before Maxwell could find his keys, get a
weapon, and return to inflict the damage that Spencer claims to have
feared. Therefore, unlike Hamel, there is no evidence “that would support
a belief that retreat was not a reasonable option.” 916 S.W.2d at 494.
Spencer says he went to his car to get his phone to call the police.
Appellant’s Br. at 3. If so, he could have gotten in his car and driven to the
police if, as he claims (but the evidence does not support) they could not
have arrived within thirty minutes.
In Hamel, unlike here, the victim’s alleged verbal threat “did not
stand alone.” 916 S.W.2d at 494. His move “toward the car was the physical
act that rendered his conduct more than a mere threat” because the
appellant had been told that there was a knife in the car, which was within
the victim’s immediate reach. Id. Here, there was no such move toward the
victim’s car, which Spencer speculates would furnish the transportation to
find a weapon. The car was not “within the victim’s immediate reach,” nor
was there a weapon in the car, whose keys he did not even have on his
person. Appellant’s Br. at 3.
The victim in Hamel “was far closer to his car than appellant was to
the back door of the house, and appellant did not think he could take a
chance on being caught in the back yard with only a pocket knife if [the
15
victim] had a gun.” 916 S.W.2d at 494. In contrast, there is no evidence that
Maxwell was so close to a weapon that he could use it before Spencer could
flee. Appellant’s Br. at 3. According to Spencer’s own account, Maxwell
would first have to find his keys, leave, get the weapon, then return to
Spencer’s house. Appellant’s Br. at 3-4. Therefore, the absent weapon that
Spencer professedly feared was nowhere near Maxwell nor Spencer at the
time.
Spencer’s claim that he felt he needed to use further physical force on
Maxwell to keep him down until the police arrived is also unreasonable.
According to Spencer, he could not wait for the police because it would take
them thirty minutes or more to respond to an emergency call. Appellant’s
Br. But there is no evidence in the record to support that time estimate.
There is also no evidence of how long it would take Spencer to locate a
weapon, assuming he could ever locate his keys. Nor is there any evidence
that if, as Spencer claims, the police could not make it to his house in thirty
minutes, he could not have retreated to the police station—or anywhere
else—before Maxwell left and returned to Spencer’s house. As a result,
Spencer’s professed fears of a phantom attack rest solely on his own self-
serving speculation, not on any actual facts.
Even indulging in the dubious fiction that Maxell’s purpose in
standing up was to attack Spencer, any such alleged act was not immediate
16
because Maxwell’s standing up was unaccompanied by any concurrent
verbal or physical threat. Appellant’s Br. at 3. According to Spencer’s own
version of events, Maxwell, who was across the street at the time, did not
approach Spencer—just the opposite: Spencer confronted Maxwell and re-
beat him up. Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.
The element of immediacy is also missing from Maxwell’s earlier
alleged threat to kill Spencer, because, at the time of this purported
utterance, Maxwell made no physical move to follow through on this
claimed threat. Appellant’s Br. at 3-4. The State did not, as Spencer
asserts, “concede” that this alleged verbal threat “[gave] rise to self-defense
by [appellant].” Appellant’s Br. at 7-8 (citing 5 RR 8). The prosecutor
argued only that extraneous evidence of other alleged violence by the victim
was not admissible because the alleged act here was unambiguous, not that
it was sufficient to support a self-defense instruction. 5 RR 7-8.
By the time that Maxell finally recovered enough to stand up across
the street, the first fight, at Spencer’s house, was, by Spencer’s own
admission already over. Appellant’s Br. at 4 (“Appellant agreed that the
fight was over.”). According to Spencer himself, the two beatings were
separate in time and purpose. Therefore, he cannot bridge the factual gap
in his self-defense theory by splicing together two separate events, neither
of which by themselves support the submission of an instruction on self-
17
defense. See Lane v. State, 957 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997,
pet. ref’d) (rejecting the defendant’s reliance “only on the verbal threats”
the victim allegedly made several hours before the defendant shot him,
because “verbal threats alone do not justify the use of force against
another”).
Here, as in Lane, “[t]here is no evidence that [the victim] took any
physical actions against appellant that would have warranted [him] in
believing that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect [himself].”
957 S.W.2d at 586 (citing Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996)). Therefore, the evidence here shows, at most, “nothing more
than verbal threats made to appellant … the evidence did not raise the issue
of self-defense.” Lane, 957 S.W.2d at 586.
Like the appellant in Lane, Spencer “cites Hamel for the proposition
that self-defense can be used to protect oneself from apparent danger as
well as from real danger.” 957 S.W.2d at 586. But “the facts of Hamel also
show that, in addition to verbal threats, the deceased made a physical act
(i.e., walking towards a car where the deceased said he had a gun) before
the defendant stabbed the deceased.” Id. Therefore, Hamel “stands for the
proposition that the use of force is not justified in response to verbal
provocation alone.” Id. (citing Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 494); see also Halbert
v. State, 881 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet.
18
ref'd) (in which the evidence supporting the submission of a self-defense
instruction included not only verbal threats, but also the deceased’s having
physically advanced toward the defendant).
Here, not only was there no physical threat or circumstance
accompanying a verbal threat, there was not even a verbal threat at the time
of the second beating. Therefore, the trial court correctly refused Spencer’s
request for an instruction on self-defense. Hamel, 957 S.W.2d at 586.
PRAYER
For these reasons, the State asks this court to:
• affirm the judgment and sentence in all respects;
• deny all relief that Appellant has requested; and
• grant the State all other relief to which it is entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN E. REIS
State Bar No. 16757960
sreis@matagorda.tx.us
LINDSAY K. DESHOTELS
State Bar No. 24069608
Matagorda County Courthouse
1700 7th Street, Suite 325
Bay City, Texas 77414
Telephone: (979) 244-7657
Telecopier: (979) 245-9409
19
/s/ Robinson C. Ramsey
ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
State Bar No. 16523700
rramsey@langleybanack.com
Trinity Plaza II, Suite 900
745 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telephone: (210) 736-6600
Telecopier: (210) 735-6889
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
OF TEXAS
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
The State certifies that the number of words in the State’s Brief,
including its headings, footnotes, and quotations, is: 3233.
/s/ Robinson C. Ramsey
ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on
counsel for Appellant:
Robert Swofford Joe Gonyea
State Bar No. 00791765 State Bar No. 24062749
SWOFFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC GONYEA, PLLC
5225 Katy Freeway, Suite 605 2118 Smith Street
Houston, Texas 77007 Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: 281.772.8976 Telephone: 713.554.4564
Telecopier: 713.782.5226 Telecopier: 713.554.4567
Email: rob@swoffordlaw.com Email: jgonyea@gonyea-law.com
on December 22, 2015.
/s/ Robinson C. Ramsey
ROBINSON C. RAMSEY
20