Eric Joel Aleman v. State ( 2008 )

i i i i i i
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-06-00845-CR
Eric Joel ALEMAN,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas
Trial Court No. B06-17
Honorable Emil Karl Prohl, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 27, 2008
AFFIRMED
A jury convicted Eric Joel Aleman of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on Philip
Garcia and sentenced him to ten years and one day in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice –
Institutional Division. Aleman timely appealed, raising three issues – sufficiency of the evidence,
juror bias, and the trial court’s refusal to admit certain evidence. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
04-06-00845-CR
BACKGROUND
On the evening of October 29, 2005, Katrina Gray and Monica Castorena were on their way
to a party at their friend Eric Dash’s house when they stopped for gas at a convenience store in
Kerrville, Texas. While Gray was pumping gas, two men, later identified as appellant and his brother
Michael Aleman, tried to engage Castorena in conversation and expressed a desire to “party” with
the women. Gray testified the men made her uncomfortable, so the women left the store. The men
followed them in a small sport utility vehicle. Both women testified the driver of the sport utility
vehicle, later determined to be Michael Aleman, tried to “run them off the road” several times. Gray
became more frightened as she drove to Dash’s house. She drove to a parking area behind Dash’s
residence where both women jumped out of the vehicle and ran into the house yelling that two men
were following them. Gray also set off the vehicle’s alarm.
A number of people were standing outside the Dash residence and saw Gray and Castorena
arrive. Three of the individuals, Philip Garcia,1 Julian Garcia, and Joseph Aguilar, each testified he
saw a car follow the women into the parking area behind the residence, turn around, and start to
leave. The three men began to chase the car and exchanged words with the occupants of the vehicle
– the Aleman brothers. The Aleman brothers stopped their car and got out. A fight ensued. When
it was over, Philip Garcia, Joseph Aguilar, and Julian Garcia had each received knife wounds.
Roxanna Molina testified she was inside the house when Gray and Castorena ran inside and
exclaimed they were being followed by two men. When Molina went outside, both Joseph Aguilar
and Julian Garcia ran past her with injuries they apparently sustained in the fight. Molina then saw
Philip Garcia lying on the ground and two men “stabbing and kicking” him. She originally testified
1
Philip Garcia testified his given name is Felipe Antonio Garcia and this name is used in the indictment.
However, throughout the trial and in his testimony, he was referred to as “Philip” and we will continue that convention
in this opinion.
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she saw a knife, but admitted on cross-examination she did not. By way of explanation, she stated
she was not close enough to see what was in the assailant’s hand, but she did see “a lot of blood all
over Philip.” When Molina ran toward the men and told them the police were on the way, they got
into their car and drove away. Molina was able to see the last three digits of the license plate and
later gave that information to the police. The three victims, Joseph Aguilar, Julian Garcia, and
Philip Garcia, were taken to the hospital in Molina’s car.
Two days later, based on the partial license plate number, Kerrville police officers located
a silver sport utility vehicle driven by Michael Aleman. When the police searched Michael Aleman,
they found two “lock-blade” knives in the open position in his pockets. In his oral statement to
police, which was admitted into evidence, Michael Aleman admitted he and his brother Eric
“followed some girls” to a residence in Kerrville. Michael admitted he was driving the car. He told
police that when he parked the car and started to get out, a group of people attacked him and Eric.
Michael said the group was armed with a bat and beer bottles and someone pulled Eric out of the
car and hit him in the head with a beer bottle. Michael Aleman claimed he and Eric acted in self
defense and the only weapon they had was a knife Michael took from one of the attackers.
Michael and Eric Aleman were indicted separately. The indictment against Eric Aleman
alleged he “intentionally and knowingly use[d] a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, that by the manner
of its use and intended use was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury and did then and
there intentionally and knowingly cause bodily injury to Felipe Antonio Garcia, by cutting the top
of his head.”
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04-06-00845-CR
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Aleman first challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, contending there
is insufficient evidence he used a knife, that any fight or assault was the “result of a [his] conscious
choice,” or that he knowingly joined an assault as a party.
Standard of review
When we review the evidence for legal sufficiency, we look at all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 729-
30 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 962 (2005). We resolve any inconsistencies in the
testimony in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When
reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we look at the evidence in a neutral light, while
giving almost complete deference to the jury’s determinations of credibility. Lancon v. State, 253
S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We will reverse only if the evidence supporting the
verdict is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or if the evidence
supporting the verdict is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Watson
v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Discussion
Julian Garcia, Philip Garcia, and Joseph Aguilar all testified Philip began exchanging
punches with the passenger – Eric Aleman – as soon as the group reached the car. Julian testified
he saw Philip knocked to the ground several times and saw Eric kicking Philip in the face. Julian
testified he ran to help Philip and started to hit Eric. Aguilar testified that when he saw the
passenger “attacking” Julian, Aguilar started hitting the passenger. Aguilar testified that at that
point, “all I felt was was [sic] just he come around me. Got me.” Aguilar felt a sharp pain, saw he
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was bleeding, and ran to the house. Although Aguilar did not see the weapon the passenger used
on him, he testified he was treated for a stab wound that caused injuries to his stomach, small
intestine, and pancreas. This evidence, coupled with the evidence Eric Aleman was the passenger
in the car, places a weapon capable of cutting and causing internal injuries consistent with those
caused by a knife in the hands of Eric Aleman.
Philip Garcia testified he was running after the sport utility vehicle when the passenger
jumped out and they began to fight. Garcia testified about the injuries he received, including a stab
wound to the head, and testified he received “staples and stitches” for his injuries. Although Garcia
could not identify Eric Aleman as his assailant, Aguilar, Julian, and Philip Garcia all testified Philip
was fighting with the passenger, Eric. Finally, Molina testified she saw the Aleman brothers standing
over Philip Garcia as he lay prone on the ground and both were “stabbing” and kicking Philip.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and drawing
reasonable inferences from that evidence, there is legally sufficient evidence to support the
conviction. And, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say the verdict is against the
“great weight and preponderance” of the evidence nor is the evidence so weak that the verdict is
clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.2
2
Aleman contends the evidence is also insufficient to demonstrate his culpability as a party. Because we
conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to sustain his conviction as a principal, we do not address this
issue. Aleman does not explain his complaint that the evidence is insufficient to prove he made a “conscious choice”
to commit the assault. There is no evidence his actions were somehow “involuntary.” If Aleman is referring to the issue
of self-defense, the jury rejected the defense, and Aleman’s brief contains no argument about sufficiency of the evidence
with regard to self-defense. This complaint is therefore inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. See Busby
v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(e), (h).
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DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Aleman next contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial
because one of the seated jurors was a registered sex offender. Aleman’s trial attorney filed an
affidavit in support of the motion in which he stated he first learned of the juror’s status after the
evidence closed and the jury was deliberating. The motion for new trial included proof the juror was
a registered sex offender, but no proof the juror had been convicted of, or was under indictment or
other legal accusation for, a felony. Rather, the motion alleged the juror “received deferred
adjudication for a sex offense and ostensibly successfully completed it.” The motion was overruled
by operation of law. On appeal Aleman contends that although the juror “was not technically
disqualified,” reversal is required because the juror’s status as a registered sex offender puts him
“under constant scrutiny by law enforcement” thus making him “presumptively biased as a matter
of law.”
A juror who has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant may be challenged
for cause. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(9) (Vernon 2006). However, it is not an
absolute disqualification, and a “challenge for cause is forfeited if not made. Failure to question the
jurors on that subject constitutes a forfeiture of the right to complain thereafter.” Webb v. State,
232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Neither party asked questions during voir dire that
would have been likely to elicit this information from the juror. “It is incumbent upon counsel to
specifically ask questions which will determine whether they have a right to challenge the venire
member.” Id. at 113. When, as here, counsel fails to do so, he forfeits the right to complain the juror
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should have been excused. Id. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial.3
EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
In his final ground for review, Aleman contends the trial court erred “in not allowing
evidence of Joseph Aguilar’s prior assaultive behavior.” We disagree.
When the defendant claims the alleged victim of an assault was the first aggressor, prior
specific acts of violence may be admissible to show the victim’s state of mind. Torres v. State,
117 S.W.3d 891, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 845-46
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); TEX. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Before such evidence is admissible, there must
be some evidence of aggression by the victim during the events that gave rise to the current charges.
Torres, 117 S.W.3d at 895. The predicate for admission of a prior specific violent prior act of the
victim “is some act of aggression that tends to raise the issue of self-defense, which the violent act
may then help clarify.” Torres, 117 S.W.3d at 895.
Aleman argues the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection when he asked Katrina
Gray whether “Joseph beat up Monica” because evidence of Aguilar’s extraneous acts of violence
was admissible to show Aguilar was the first aggressor. Aleman does not present any argument as
to why prior acts of violence by Joseph Aguilar –someone other than the complaining witness – are
admissible under Rule 404(a)(2). But we need not decide this question because, even if the rule
applies to evidence of Aguilar’s prior acts of violence, the predicate for the admission of such acts
had not been laid when counsel asked Gray the question. Katrina Gray was the State’s first witness.
3
Our conclusion would be the same if the juror were found to have been absolutely disqualified because he was
“under indictment or other legal accusation” for a felony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 35.16(a)(3), 35.19
(Vernon 2006). Because counsel learned of the ground for disqualification before the verdict was entered but failed to
raise it, the judgment may not be reversed on that ground. See id. art. 44.46; Nelson v. State, 129 S.W.3d 108, 112-13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
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When defense counsel asked her whether Aguilar had previously beaten Monica, the only evidence
before the jury about Aguilar was Gray’s testimony that he was one of the people in the rear
driveway area when she and Castorena arrived at the Dash house, that Gray did not see Aguilar with
a bat or any kind of weapon, and that Castorena dated Aguilar. Because no evidence of any act of
aggression by Aguilar during the event giving rise to the current charges had been offered, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.
Aleman next complains the trial court erred in preventing him from questioning Monica
Castorena about “her volatile relationship” with Aguilar. We again disagree. During Aleman’s
cross-examination of Castorena, counsel asked her if she and Aguilar broke up some time after
October 29, 2005. She responded that they had their “ups and downs,” they would argue, then make
up and get together again. After this response, the State asked for a bench conference. The
prosecutor stated he thought Aleman was going to ask Monica about specific acts of conduct and
wanted a ruling from the court. Defense counsel responded: “I’m going to ask if they broke up
because – he thinks that these girls set this thing up.” The court ruled the question called for
speculation. When defense counsel responded, “Not if he told her that,” the State objected the
question would then call for hearsay and the trial court sustained the objection. On appeal, Aleman
does not address either the trial court’s speculation or hearsay rulings. Rather, he argues generally
that “the jury had the right to know about [Aguilar’s] violent propensities.” However, Aleman did
not attempt to ask Castorena any other questions about “her volatile relationship” with Aguilar or
Aguilar’s “violent propensities,” nor did the trial court rule on the admissibility of such evidence.
We therefore overrule Aleman’s third ground for review.4
4
We note the court’s charge instructed the jury self defense was an affirmative defense and incorrectly assigned
the burden of proof to Aleman. Aleman did not object to the charge at trial and does not complain of the error on appeal.
However, after examining the record and reviewing the issue as unassigned error, we conclude Aleman did not suffer
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The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Do not publish
egregious harm resulting from this charge error. See Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 120-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
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