Andrew Jaramillo v. State ( 2008 )


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  •                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-07-00701-CR
    Andrew JARAMILLO,
    Appellant
    v.
    STATE of Texas,
    Appellee
    From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2006-CR-0759C
    Honorable Mary Roman, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Alma L. López, Chief Justice
    Sitting:          Alma L. López, Chief Justice
    Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
    Rebecca Simmons, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: June 18, 2008
    AFFIRMED
    Andrew Jaramillo was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to fifteen
    years imprisonment. Jaramillo contends his counsel was ineffective by failing to discover Jaramillo
    had prior convictions in New Mexico and allowing the details of those convictions to be introduced
    during the punishment phase of the trial through Jaramillo’s own testimony. We affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    04-07-00701-CR
    BACKGROUND
    Ron McKinney was walking home from the River Center Mall. A gold car, in which
    Jaramillo was a passenger, circled McKinney several times then parked behind a building. Two men
    exited the car and approached McKinney on foot. Both men demanded McKinney’s belongings
    while one of the men pointed a gun at McKinney. McKinney surrendered his wallet, his jewelry,
    and the wallet and mobile phone of a friend, then fled the scene on foot. After McKinney reported
    the robbery, the 911 operator broadcast McKinney’s description of the suspects. Patrol officers
    spotted a gold car matching the description given by McKinney, and a chase ensued. Eventually,
    the gold car stopped, and Jaramillo was taken from the backseat at gunpoint and arrested.
    McKinney’s wallet was found in the car, and his silver cross was found in Jaramillo’s pocket.
    McKinney identified Jaramillo as the one of the two men who robbed him.
    Before trial, Jaramillo signed a Written Sworn Motion for Community Supervision
    “indicating that he had never been convicted of a felony in this or any other state.” At trial, the jury
    convicted him of aggravated robbery. After conferring during the punishment phase, the State and
    defense counsel stipulated to an affidavit evidencing two prior felony convictions against Jaramillo
    in New Mexico. At that point, Jaramillo asked to testify so he could explain to the jury that he
    thought the convictions had been removed from his record because he completed the requirements
    of his plea bargain. Because the convictions were still on his record, Jaramillo abandoned his
    application for community supervision. Following Jaramillo’s testimony, the judge explained to the
    jury that the range of “punishment for aggravated robbery is confinement in the Texas Department
    of Criminal Justice Institutional Division for life or any term of not more than 99 years or less than
    5 years.” The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years confinement.
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    04-07-00701-CR
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under both the United States and
    Texas Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
    ANN. art. 1.051 (Vernon Supp. 2007). To prove ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal, an
    appellant must show: (1) counsel’s assistance fell below an objective professional standard; and (2)
    counsel’s actions thereby prejudiced appellant’s defense. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    687-88, 692 (1984); Thompson v. State, 
    9 S.W.3d 808
    , 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Appellant must
    prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that but for counsel’s error, the outcome of his trial
    would have been different. Jackson v. State, 
    973 S.W.2d 954
    , 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
    In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we consider the totality of counsel’s
    representation in light of the particular circumstances of the case and presume that counsel acted
    competently and made decisions based on a reasonable trial strategy. See Ex parte Welborn, 
    785 S.W.2d 391
    , 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). To rebut this presumption, the basis for any allegation
    of ineffectiveness must be affirmatively founded in the record. 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    .
    Counsel for the defendant has a duty to prepare a defense by independently investigating the facts
    of the case as well the pertinent law. Butler v. State, 
    716 S.W.2d 48
    , 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
    “This duty includes investigating a defendant’s prior convictions.” Ex parte Langley, 
    833 S.W.2d 141
    , 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Although defense counsel may determine certain investigation
    is strategically unnecessary, “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
    reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s
    judgments.” 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691
    .
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    04-07-00701-CR
    It is very difficult for an appellant to establish ineffective assistance when the record does
    not specifically mention counsel’s reasons for his actions, and appellant does not develop an
    evidentiary record through a hearing on a motion for new trial. See Gibbs v. State, 
    7 S.W.3d 175
    ,
    179 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). Therefore, a “substantial risk of failure
    accompanies an appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.” 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    . However, “when no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s
    conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of
    law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons for
    acting as she did.” Andrews v. State, 
    159 S.W.3d 98
    , 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Even if appellant
    is able to prove trial counsel’s performance was deficient, appellant must also affirmatively prove
    that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812
    . Appellant must
    demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if
    trial counsel had acted professionally. 
    Id. A reasonable
    probability is a probability sufficient to
    undermine confidence in the trial’s outcome. 
    Id. DISCUSSION Because
    Jaramillo did not file a motion for new trial, there is no record disclosing the reasons
    trial counsel made the decisions he did. Consequently, counsel’s ineffectiveness, if any, is not
    firmly founded in the record. See 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    (indicating allegation must be firmly
    founded in the record). Because we may not speculate about the reasons for counsel’s trial strategy,
    Jaramillo has failed to rebut the presumption that counsel made trial decisions based on sound
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    professional judgment.1 See Hernandez v. State, 
    198 S.W.3d 257
    , 270-71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2006, pet. ref’d). Although the silent record defeats the ineffective assistance claim raised by
    Jaramillo, we briefly address how his claim fails because the record fails to establish either deficient
    performance or prejudice. This brief analysis should not, however, preclude Jaramillo from
    pursuing his claim through a writ of habeas corpus where a more complete record could change the
    analysis and, possibly, the result. See 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814-15
    .
    Jaramillo’s counsel filed a Motion In Limine on October 6, 2007, asking the court to require
    the State to refrain from commenting on any extraneous offenses not included in the indictment
    unless and until a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. About a year later and
    approximately two months prior to trial, Jaramillo signed an affidavit requesting community
    supervision “indicating that he had never been convicted of a felony in this or any other state.” No
    prior convictions were introduced during the guilt-innocence phase of trial pursuant to the motion
    in limine filed by Jaramillo’s counsel. During the recess between the guilt-innocence phase and the
    punishment phase of trial, Jaramillo’s counsel learned about Jaramillo’s prior convictions from the
    State. Jaramillo’s counsel conferred with the State and decided to stipulate to evidence of two prior
    felony convictions in New Mexico. Following this stipulation, Jaramillo voluntarily testified “I just
    hope you realize that I voluntarily bring this, you know what I mean—into evidence, because it’s
    not something that I tried to hide from nobody. It’s just that I wasn’t real proud of that and I really
    thought it had been taken off of my record.” Jones v. Barnes, 
    463 U.S. 745
    , 751 (1983). Although
    1
    Jaramillo makes a vague claim that his trial counsel should have filed a motion in limine to exclude any
    information regarding Jaramillo’s civil trial against a San Antonio police officer. The basis for any allegation of
    ineffectiveness must be affirmatively founded in the record. 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    . We agree with the State that
    “[t]he record demonstrates that when the State elicited testimony regarding the suit[, trial] counsel objected and the
    objection was sustained, which would have been required [even] with a motion in limine.” Jaramillo’s claim of
    ineffectiveness, therefore, is not founded in the record. 
    Id. -5- 04-07-00701-CR
    Jaramillo also described the two offenses to the jury, he twice apologized for his participation in
    them. The jury assessed punishment at the lower end of the permitted range.
    Jaramillo contends his trial counsel should have investigated his criminal record to prevent
    Jaramillo from “lying” in his affidavit requesting community supervision; however, there is no
    evidence in the record that Jaramillo’s counsel had any reason to disbelieve Jaramillo regarding his
    prior convictions. Although “ordinarily counsel should not blindly rely on the veracity . . . of his
    client’s version of the facts,” McFarland v. State, 
    928 S.W.2d 482
    , 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996),
    cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1119
    (1997),
    [t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or
    substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.
    Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic
    choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.
    In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically
    on such information. . . . And when a defendant has given counsel reason to
    believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even
    harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be
    challenged as unreasonable.
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691
    . Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Jaramillo’s own act of
    signing a sworn affidavit indicating he had no prior convictions would have given his defense
    counsel reasonable grounds for determining no further investigation into Jaramillo’s criminal record
    was needed. Consequently, counsel’s ineffectiveness, if any, is not firmly founded in the record.
    See 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813
    .
    Even assuming the evidence of Jaramillo’s prior convictions influenced the jury, we cannot
    conclude that counsel’s failure to investigate Jaramillo’s criminal record resulted in prejudice to
    Jaramillo. 
    Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812
    . Given that Jaramillo was convicted of aggravated robbery
    and was, in fact, not eligible for community supervision, the jury’s assessment of punishment at the
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    lower end of the applicable range was commensurate with Jaramillo’s crime, and there exists no
    reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if trial counsel had investigated
    Jaramillo’s criminal history. 
    Id. CONCLUSION For
    the reasons provided above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Alma L. López, Chief Justice
    DO NOT PUBLISH
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