argonaut-insurance-company-and-argonaut-great-central-insurance-company-v ( 2015 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-13-00619-CV
    Argonaut Insurance Company and Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company,
    Appellants
    v.
    Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas; and Ken Paxton,
    Attorney General of the State of Texas, Appellees
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. D-1-GN-11-001584, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Argonaut Insurance Company and Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company
    (jointly Argonaut) appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Glenn Hegar,
    Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of the State
    of Texas (jointly the Comptroller).1 Argonaut filed suit in Travis County to recover taxes paid under
    protest. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 112.001, .051, .052. The parties filed competing motions for
    summary judgment. The trial court granted the Comptroller’s motion, denied Argonaut’s motion,
    and rendered judgment that Argonaut take nothing by its claims. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    1
    We substitute Glenn Hegar, in his official capacity, as successor to Susan Combs as
    Comptroller of Public Accounts and Ken Paxton, in his official capacity, as successor to Greg Abbott
    as Attorney General. See Tex. R. App. 7.2(a).
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Argonaut provided insurance to the Texas Association of Public Educators Interlocal
    Agreement Self-Insurance League (TAPE) and the Texas Association of Political Subdivisions
    Interlocal Agreement Self-Insurance League (TAPS). TAPE and TAPS are self-funded risk pools
    created by political subdivisions under the authority of Chapter 172 of the Local Government Code.
    See generally Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 172.001–.015 (providing for uniform group benefits
    programs for employees of political subdivisions). Political subdivisions, including counties and
    school districts, may establish risk pools or enter into interlocal agreements with other political
    subdivisions to establish risk pools. 
    Id. §§ 172.003(3),
    .005; see generally Tex. Gov’t Code
    §§ 791.001–.035 (authorizing local governmental units to contract with one another); see also Tex.
    Loc. Gov’t Code § 119.002 (authorizing county governments to create risk management pool).
    TAPE and TAPS were formed under interlocal agreements to pool the self-insured risks of the
    participating political subdivisions and provide insurance to participating members. They are
    organized as tax exempt civic leagues for the promotion of the common governmental interests of
    their members under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code and are not companies licensed
    by the Texas Department of Insurance. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). TAPE and TAPS provide several
    types of coverage, including general liability, automobile liability, property damage, and inland
    marine. They collect premiums from the members and are directly liable to the members for
    covered losses.
    TAPE entered into a contract with Argonaut Insurance Company entitled Texas
    Association of Public Educators Reinsurance Program; likewise, TAPS entered into a contract with
    2
    Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company entitled Texas Association of Political Subdivisions
    Reinsurance Program. Under the terms of the contracts, Argonaut agreed to indemnify TAPE and
    TAPS for losses under certificates, or policies, issued to participating members under the interlocal
    agreements. TAPE and TAPS agreed to cede to Argonaut 100% of the premiums received on
    policies issued to their members. For accounting purposes, Argonaut booked all premiums, losses,
    and expenses associated with the agreements with TAPE and TAPS as reinsurance income and
    expense. While premiums received for direct insurance are taxable, certain premiums received for
    reinsurance are excluded from the determination of an insurer’s taxable premium receipts. See Tex.
    Ins. Code §§ 221.002 (governing property and casualty insurance), 222.002 (governing life, health,
    and accident insurance).
    The Comptroller has the authority to administer the insurance taxes at issue. See Tex.
    Ins. Code § 201.051 (comptroller shall administer and enforce provisions of Insurance Code and
    other insurance laws that relate to administration, collection, and reporting of taxes and fees imposed
    under Insurance Code or other insurance law); Tex. Tax Code §§ 111.0021 (Chapter 111 of Tax
    Code concerning collection procedures applies to tax or fee comptroller is required to collect under
    a law not included in this title), 111.0022 (this subtitle (Enforcement and Collection) and subtitle
    A of this title (General Provisions) apply to administration, collection, and enforcement of other
    taxes fees and charges comptroller is required or authorized to collect or administer under other law).
    Between January 2006 and December 2009, the Comptroller conducted an audit of Argonaut and
    disallowed Argonaut’s classification of the premiums received from TAPE and TAPS as reinsurance
    premiums on the ground that under Comptroller Rule 3.831, for premiums to qualify as paid
    3
    for reinsurance, the transaction must occur between two licensed insurance companies. See
    34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.831(1)(A)(iii) (Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Gross Premium
    Definitions for Property and Casualty; Life, Accident, and Health; Health Maintenance
    Organizations; and Title Insurance Companies; and Clarification of the Taxation on the Distribution
    of Title Premiums). The Comptroller reasoned that because TAPE and TAPS are not licensed
    insurance companies, the premiums they paid to Argonaut were not reinsurance but were to directly
    insure risks. Consequently, the Comptroller assessed additional premium taxes against Argonaut
    Insurance Company in the amount of $318,704.00 and additional maintenance taxes in the amount
    of $55,011.29, plus penalties and interest, for a total of $443,312.46. The Comptroller assessed
    additional premium taxes against Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company in the amount of
    $490,448.00 and additional maintenance taxes in the amount of $79,807.16, plus penalties and
    interest, for a total of $714,275.87.
    Argonaut paid the total amounts assessed under protest and filed this suit pursuant
    to Chapter 112 of the Tax Code to recover the amounts paid under protest. See Tex. Tax Code
    §§ 112.051, .052. Argonaut and the Comptroller filed competing motions for summary judgment.
    The trial court denied Argonaut’s motion, granted the Comptroller’s motion, and rendered judgment
    that Argonaut take nothing by its claims. This appeal followed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Because the parties do not dispute the relevant facts, this is a proper case for summary
    judgment. See City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 
    22 S.W.3d 351
    , 356 (Tex. 2000). We
    review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 
    315 S.W.3d 860
    ,
    4
    862 (Tex. 2010). When the trial court does not specify the grounds for granting the motion, we must
    uphold the judgment if any of the grounds asserted in the motion and preserved for appellate review
    are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 
    128 S.W.3d 211
    , 216 (Tex. 2003).
    When both parties move for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of 
    Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 356
    ; Abbott v. Dallas Area
    Rapid Transit, 
    410 S.W.3d 876
    , 879 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). When both parties move
    for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other,
    we consider the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determine all questions
    presented, and if we determine that the trial court erred, render the judgment the trial court should
    have rendered. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 
    164 S.W.3d 656
    , 661 (Tex. 2005) (citing
    FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 
    22 S.W.3d 868
    , 872 (Tex. 2000)).
    Argonaut’s issues concern statutory construction, a question of law that we review
    de novo. See Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water,
    
    336 S.W.3d 619
    , 624 (Tex. 2011). Our primary concern in construing a statute is the express
    statutory language. See Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 
    290 S.W.3d 863
    , 867 (Tex.
    2009). Words that are not defined are given their ordinary meanings unless a different meaning is
    apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Marks v. St. Luke’s
    Episcopal Hosp., 
    319 S.W.3d 658
    , 663 (Tex. 2010). “We generally avoid construing individual
    provisions of a statute in isolation from the statute as a whole.” Texas 
    Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 628
    .
    “Taxing statutes are construed strictly against the taxing authority and liberally for the taxpayer.”
    Morris v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    388 S.W.3d 310
    , 313 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam). If the statutory
    5
    language or agency rule is ambiguous, we may defer to an administrative agency’s construction of
    its own statutory authority and rules as long as the construction is reasonable and does not conflict
    with the language of the statute or rule. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 
    340 S.W.3d 432
    ,
    438 (Tex. 2011); Texas 
    Citizens, 336 S.W.3d at 624
    ; Texas Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs v. Texas
    Med. Ass’n, 
    375 S.W.3d 464
    , 475 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. denied). “However, agency
    deference does not displace strict construction when the dispute is not over how much tax is due but,
    more fundamentally, whether the tax applies at all.” TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Commission on State
    Emergency Commc’ns, 
    397 S.W.3d 173
    , 182 (Tex. 2013).
    DISCUSSION
    In two issues, Argonaut argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for
    summary judgment and granting that of the Comptroller. Its arguments are premised on the
    contention that the contracts between Argonaut and TAPE and TAPS are agreements for reinsurance.
    The Comptroller agrees that the central issue is whether the premiums received by Argonaut from
    TAPE and TAPS are premiums received from another insurer for reinsurance; however, the
    Comptroller asserts that TAPE and TAPS are not “insurance companies” or “insurers,” and
    accordingly, the premiums are not reportable as reinsurance. Based on our reading of the applicable
    statutory provisions, we ultimately agree with the Comptroller.
    Argonaut focuses on the nature of its contracts with TAPE and TAPES, insisting that
    they embodied all the characteristics of reinsurance and arguing that governmental risk pools are
    authorized to purchase reinsurance. Argonaut further argues that the fact that TAPE and TAPS are
    not licensed insurance companies is not dispositive. In light of the plain language of the applicable
    6
    statutes, we cannot agree. While a risk pool is expressly authorized to purchase reinsurance, it is also
    expressly declared not to be insurance or an insurer. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 172.008 (risk pool
    may purchase reinsurance to insure pool against losses), .014 (“A risk pool created under this chapter
    is not insurance or an insurer under the Insurance Code and other laws of this state, and the State
    Board of Insurance does not have jurisdiction over a pool created under this chapter.”); see also
    Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 119.005(e) (county government risk management pool may purchase
    reinsurance for risks covered by pool), .008 (county government risk management pool created under
    chapter 119 is not insurance for purposes of Insurance Code and laws); Texas Dep’t of Ins.
    v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 
    410 S.W.3d 843
    , 848 (Tex. 2012) (employers who self fund employee
    health benefit plans perform service similar to that of insurance companies and “operate much like
    insurers” but “are clearly not insurance companies”).
    The tax exclusion at issue applies, for purposes of the property and casualty insurance
    premium tax, to “premium receipts received from another authorized insurer for reinsurance,” see
    Tex. Ins. Code § 221.002(c)(3) (emphasis added), and, for purposes of the life, health, and accident
    insurance premium tax, to “premiums received from an insurer for reinsurance,” see 
    id. § 222.002(c)(3)
    (emphasis added). Comptroller Rule 3.831, promulgated pursuant to authority under
    Insurance Code section 201.051 and Tax Code sections 111.0021 and 111.0022, is consistent with
    these statutory provisions. See Tex. Ins. Code § 201.051; Tex. Tax Code §§ 111.0021, .0022;
    34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.831(1)(A)(iii) (excluding from premium tax “premiums received from
    other licensed companies for reinsurance” for property and casualty insurance) (emphasis added),
    7
    (2)(A)(iii) (excluding from premium tax “premiums that an insurance carriers [sic] receives from
    another insurance carrier for reinsurance) (emphasis added).
    Although they vary slightly, there is no substantive difference between the key terms
    used in sections 221.002 and 222.002 and Rule 3.831—“authorized insurer,” “insurer,” “licensed
    company,” and “insurance carrier.” None of the terms is defined in Chapter 221 or 222; however,
    their ordinary meanings and definitions of some of the terms provided elsewhere in the Insurance
    Code all generally refer to a company that sells insurance and is regulated by the Texas Department
    of Insurance. “Insurance company” is ordinarily defined as “a corporation or association that issues
    insurance policies.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 925 (10th ed. 2014). Chapter 822 of the Insurance
    Code, concerning incorporation and regulatory requirements for “each company or organization that
    proposes to engage in any kind of insurance business other than a life, health, or accident insurance
    company,” refers to formation of “a company for the purpose of engaging in the business of
    insurance.” See Tex. Ins. Code §§ 822.001, .051(a). Similarly, Chapter 841, concerning life, health,
    and accident insurance companies, defines “insurance company” and “company” as “all corporations
    engaged as a principal in the business of life, accident, or health insurance.” See 
    id. § 841.001(8).
    “Carrier” is defined as an “insurer,” see Black’s Law Dictionary at 256–57, and “insurer” is defined
    in Chapter 101, concerning unauthorized insurance, as
    (A) a corporation, association, partnership, or individual engaged as a principal in the
    business of insurance;
    (B) an interinsurance exchange or mutual benefit society; or
    (C) an insurance exchange or syndicate.
    8
    Tex. Ins. Code § 101.002(1). “Licensed” means “having permission to do something, usu. as
    evidenced by a written certificate,” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1061; similarly, “authorize” means
    “to give legal authority; to formally approve; to sanction.” See 
    id. at 159.
    By definition, then, these
    terms all describe regulated entities that are authorized or licensed to conduct the business of
    insurance. Thus, all four provisions require that for premiums to be excluded from the premium tax,
    they must be received from an insurer subject to regulation by the Texas Department of Insurance.
    See Tex. Ins. Code §§ 221.002(c)(3), 222.002(c)(3); 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.831(1)(A)(iii),
    (2)(A)(iii). Because TAPE and TAPS are organized as nonprofit civic leagues that are not engaged
    in the business of insurance and are statutorily declared not to be insurers and not subject to the
    jurisdiction of the State Board of Insurance, see Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 172.014, premiums
    Argonaut received from them were not received from “another authorized insurer” or “an insurer”
    as required by sections 221.002 and 222.002 and are thus not covered by the plain language of the
    statutory exclusion. See Tex. Ins. Code §§ 221.002(c)(3), 222.002(c)(3); 
    Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 663
    .
    We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the Comptroller’s motion for
    summary judgment and denying Argonaut’s motion and overrule Argonaut’s two issues.2
    CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Argonaut’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    2
    Although the parties join issue on whether the product Argonaut sold to TAPE and TAPS
    was reinsurance, because we conclude that TAPE and TAPS are not insurers under the relevant
    statutes, we do not reach their arguments on this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
    9
    _____________________________________________
    Melissa Goodwin, Justice
    Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field
    Affirmed
    Filed: June 24, 2015
    10