in Re Orlando Deonte Pierce ( 2019 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-19-00288-CR
No. 10-19-00291-CR
IN RE ORLANDO DEONTE PIERCE
Original Proceeding
OPINION
In two separate petitions for writ of mandamus, relator, Orlando Deonte Pierce,
challenges the trial court’s orders on motions to enforce a plea bargain in both
proceedings. Specifically, relator contends that the trial court unlawfully rescinded a
plea-bargain agreement; that the trial court had a ministerial duty to approve a plea
bargain in these cases to remedy a violation of effective counsel; and that a prior trial
judge would have accepted the plea before a second attempt at rescission by the State.
For the reasons outlined below, we deny relator’s petitions for writ of mandamus.
I. BACKGROUND
In these proceedings, relator was charged by indictment with the offenses of
aggravated assault and violation of a protective order, family violence. As indicated in
relator’s mandamus petitions, on August 27, 2018, the Robertson County District
Attorney’s Office conveyed a plea offer to relator’s court-appointed counsel. According
to relator, the offer was, in exchange for his plea of guilty to both felonies, relator would
receive punishment of fifteen years’ prison time for the aggravated-assault allegation and
ten years’ prison time for the violation of a protective order, family violence, allegation
with the sentences to be served concurrently. The prosecutor indicated that the plea offer
was available only for one week. During the following week, relator spoke with his
appointed counsel and expressed a desire to accept the plea offer. However, appointed
counsel did not convey relator’s acceptance of the plea offer until a day after the
prosecutor’s deadline for accepting the offer passed. Prior to appointed counsel’s attempt
to accept the plea offer, the prosecutor informed appointed counsel, via facsimile, that
the offer had been withdrawn and that any attempt to accept at this time was too late.
The prosecutor replaced the aforementioned plea offer with one of forty years’ prison
time in exchange for relator’s plea of guilty to both felony allegations.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2019, relator moved the trial court to “enforce the plea
agreement,” arguing that the trial court should enforce the plea offer made by the
prosecutor for fifteen years’ and ten years’ prison for the two charges with the sentences
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to run concurrently. Relator argued that he “should not be punished more severely,
solely due to the failure of defense counsel to convey defendant’s acceptance of the plea
agreement to the District Attorney in a timely fashion.” The trial court initially granted
the request to reopen the plea negotiations and further stated that any plea agreement
reached between the prosecutor and relator would be considered by the court at a later
date. The trial court did not accept or reject any plea at this time.
After the trial court’s ruling, relator tried again to accept the prosecutor’s original
offer of fifteen years’ and ten years’ prison time for the two charges with the sentences to
run concurrently. However, before the purported agreement could be approved by the
trial court, the State revoked the plea, stating that the withdrawal was due to “newly
discovered evidence” that relator committed a new offense of violation of a protective
order on or about February 26, 2019. Subsequently, the trial court denied relator’s motion
to enforce the plea agreement, stating that there was no agreement to “specifically
perform.” The mandamus record does not contain a certified or sworn copy of this order,
which is the basis of these original proceedings.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a criminal mandamus, the relator must show that he has no adequate remedy
at law and what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act. Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805,
810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Appeals,
236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). An act is ministerial if relator can show a
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clear right to the relief sought. Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810. A clear right to relief is shown
when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision under “unequivocal,
well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly
controlled legal principles.” In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). Mandamus is not available to compel a discretionary act as distinguished from a
ministerial act. See State ex rel. Holmes v. Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984). However, a “discretionary” act can become “ministerial” when the facts and
circumstances dictate but one rational decision. In re State of Tex., 162 S.W.3d 672, 675
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding) (citing Buntion v. Harmon, 827 S.W.2d 945,
948 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
III. ANALYSIS
“A plea agreement is a contractual arrangement. Until all of the necessary parties
agree to the terms of the contract, the agreement is not binding.” Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d
102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
A plea bargain consists of three parts: a plea of guilty, the consideration for it, and
the approval by the court of the agreement. The bargain is the consideration
exchanged to the defendant for the plea of guilty. In order for the contract to
be binding, the trial judge must approve and accept both aspects of it. When
presented with a plea bargain, the court has the right to accept or reject it;
however, it may not hold the defendant to his plea of guilty while rejecting
the benefit the defendant was to receive. If the court does not approve the
entire agreement, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea of
guilty.”
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Ortiz v. State, 885 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994), aff’d, 933 S.W.2d 102
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (emphasis added).
“The trial court’s only role in the plea-bargain process is to advise the defendant
whether it will accept or reject the plea bargain.” State v. Villarreal, 418 S.W.3d 920, 925
(Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). “If the court accepts the plea bargain, the State cannot
withdraw its offer, and the parties are entitled to specific performance of the bargain.”
Id. “If the court rejects the plea bargain, the defendant has the right to withdraw his guilty
plea, and then the State has the right to withdraw its offer.” Id. “The trial court has no
authority to participate in plea-bargain negotiations.” Id.
In these proceedings, there is nothing in the mandamus record indicating that the
trial court approved any proposed plea agreement between relator and the prosecutor.
As such, any purported agreement between relator and the prosecutor was not binding.
See Ortiz, 933 S.W.2d at 104. Thus, relator is not entitled to specific performance of the
purported plea agreement. See Villarreal, 418 S.W.3d at 925.
Furthermore, the case law mentioned above demonstrates that the trial court
exercises discretion in accepting or rejecting a purported plea agreement between the
State and a particular defendant. See Ortiz, 885 S.W.2d at 273; see also Perkins v. Court of
Appeals for Third Supreme Judicial Dist., 738 S.W.2d 276, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (noting
that mandamus relief is available to compel performance of ministerial or mandatory
duties; however, “it is not be to used to force a particular result, or to change a result, the
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determination of which involves an exercise of judicial or discretionary authority”).
Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court, in these proceedings, had a ministerial duty to
accept the original plea agreement. The decision to either approve or reject the proposed
agreement rests within the sole discretion of the trial court. Pursuant to Perkins,
mandamus relief is not available to compel a particular result, such as the acceptance of
the original proposed plea agreement here, when the determination of which involves
the exercise of judicial or discretionary authority to accept or reject the purported plea
agreement. See 738 S.W.2d at 284.
Moreover, because the original plea agreement had been withdrawn by the State
before the trial court approved of it, there is nothing in the law that requires: (1) the trial
court to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement; and (2) the trial court to accept the
re-offered plea agreement. To require this would be to inject the trial court in the plea-
bargain negotiations, which is prohibited. See Villarreal, 418 S.W.3d at 925. Accordingly,
we conclude that the relator has failed to identify and establish a true ministerial duty
that the trial court violated in this case. See Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810; see also State ex rel.
Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210.
In addition to the foregoing, we note that the majority of relator’s mandamus
petition advances an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim against relator’s appointed
counsel in failing to timely accept the State’s original plea offer. This argument mirrors
those which were contained in relator’s motion to enforce the plea agreement. In any
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event, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim can be brought on direct appeal or by an
application for writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., In re Bledsoe, No. 06-14-00215-CR, 2014
Tex. App. LEXIS 13507, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 18, 2014, no pet.) (orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.) (“Although habeas corpus is usually a preferable avenue for
raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims may be raised on direct
appeal; therefore, mandamus is not appropriate.”). Therefore, relator has failed to
establish entitlement to mandamus relief in these proceedings for ineffective assistance
of counsel because he has an adequate remedy at law. See Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810; see
also State ex rel. Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210.
Furthermore, in his prayer, relator seeks to be “returned to the position he
occupied on May 13, 2019, that being an accepted plea bargain for 15 years prison time
on the Aggravated Assault allegations, to be served concurrently with a 10-year prison
sentence on the Violation of a Protective Order charge.” As stated above, that plea offer
was withdrawn by the prosecutor. The effect of granting this relief to relator would
require us to mandamus the prosecutor to re-offer the plea offer desired by relator. We
lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a prosecutor to make such an offer.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2018) (providing that an appellate
court has the power to issue writs of mandamus to protect its jurisdiction or against
certain judges); see also In re Bailey, No. 10-13-00117-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 5539, at *8
(Tex. App.—Waco May 2, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting that an appellate
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court lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against a prosecutor). Moreover,
because the trial court cannot participate in plea-bargain negotiations, the trial court
cannot require the State to re-offer the plea either. See Villarreal, 418 S.W.3d at 925. As
such, based on the facts in these proceedings, there is nothing in the law that allows for
this Court or the trial court to effectuate the requested relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we deny relator’s petitions for writ of mandamus. 1 See
Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810; see also State ex rel. Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210.
JOHN E. NEILL
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting with an opinion)
Petition denied
Opinion delivered and filed October 2, 2019
Publish
[OT06]
1 We are also not persuaded by relator’s contention that a prior trial judge in the 82nd Judicial
District Court of Robertson County, Texas, would have accepted this purported plea agreement. As
mentioned earlier, trial judges are vested with discretion to accept or reject plea agreements. That a prior
trial judge would have accepted the purported plea agreement is supposition and irrelevant, especially
considering the 82nd Judicial District Court is now occupied by a different trial judge who has his own
discretion to accept or reject plea agreements.
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