Lloyd Morgans v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •                                        In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ________________
    NO. 09-21-00320-CR
    NO. 09-21-00322-CR
    NO. 09-21-00323-CR
    NO. 09-21-00324-CR
    ________________
    LLOYD MORGANS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 221st District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause Nos. 19-02-01628-CR, 19-02-01630-CR, 19-02-01631-CR and
    19-02-01632-CR
    ________________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant pleaded “guilty” to four counts of possession or promotion of child
    pornography. 
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.26
    (a). He was sentenced to two
    consecutive four-year prison terms and two concurrent ten-year terms of community
    supervision. In a single appellate point, Appellant contends the trial court abused its
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    discretion in excluding the recording of his interview with law enforcement
    authorities. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    I. Background
    Appellant admitted to possessing and viewing multiple pornographic images
    of children, but during the trial, he attempted to reduce the gravity of his behavior
    by disputing Detective Fruchtnicht’s characterization of the statement he gave to
    authorities. We summarize the testimony relevant to Appellant’s issues below.
    1. Detective Fruchtnicht’s Testimony
    Detective Max Fruchtnicht, an employee of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s
    Office, described his background and experience in law enforcement. When the trial
    occurred, he was assigned to the Special Victims Unit, tasked with investigating
    complaints of child abuse, sexual offenses against children, and claims alleging
    similar crimes.
    On the day of Appellant’s arrest, Fruchtnicht interviewed Appellant at the
    Sheriff’s Office. Fruchtnicht recalled that although Appellant initially denied having
    viewed child pornography on his computer, he admitted it after seeing a signed
    search warrant and understanding that his electronic devices would be searched.
    Early in Fruchtnicht’s testimony, Appellant objected, noting that the
    recording, itself, was the best evidence of his interview. The trial court, however,
    overruled the objection. When Fruchtnicht’s testimony continued, during which the
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    Detective covered Appellant’s longtime addiction to child pornography, Appellant
    neither renewed his objection, nor requested that the trial court grant him a running
    objection. Later in the trial, Appellant attempted to introduce into evidence the
    entirety of his interview without editing the recording to remove inadmissible
    material or lengthy gaps in the recording of the interview. The trial court did not
    admit the recording, and Appellant did not make an offer of proof or object.
    2. Appellant’s Testimony
    Appellant testified that he had been downloading child pornography for
    approximately six or seven years, disputing Fruchtnicht’s testimony that Appellant
    had been downloading child pornography for about twenty years. He further denied
    masturbating while viewing these images as Fruchtnicht claimed he said during his
    interview, explaining “[i]t wasn’t anything sexual.” In addition, Appellant denied
    having told the investigating detectives that he collected child pornography, and also
    denied stating that he preferred certain types of images, particularly those with a
    “back story[.]”
    3. Additional Testimony
    The jury also heard testimony explaining how Appellant came to be
    apprehended, and how computer forensics experts identified the pornographic
    material on Appellant’s electronic devices. Appellant’s wife, children, and
    children’s childhood friends testified that Appellant always gave the impression of
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    being a normal father, and that they never thought Appellant had the potential to
    abuse a child. For that reason, Appellant’s son asked the jury to sentence Appellant
    to probation.
    The jury also was shown the four specific images relevant to the indictment
    on which Appellant’s conviction is based.
    II. Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s decision admitting evidence in the punishment phase
    of a trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Beham v. State, 
    559 S.W.3d 474
    ,
    478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Davis v. State, 
    329 S.W.3d 798
    , 803 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2010). We will not disturb the trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of
    discretion. Beham, 
    559 S.W.3d at 478
    ; McGee v. State, 
    233 S.W.3d 315
    , 318 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision lies outside
    the “‘zone of reasonable disagreement.’” Beham, 
    559 S.W.3d at 478
    ; Davis, 
    329 S.W.3d at 803
    . If a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct on any applicable theory
    of law, we uphold that decision. De La Paz v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 336
    , 344 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2009).
    A trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error
    subject to a harm analysis pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
    44.2(b). See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); see also Taylor v. State, 
    268 S.W.3d 571
    , 592
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Unless non-constitutional error affects the substantial rights
    4
    of the defendant, we must disregard it. See Taylor, 
    268 S.W.3d at 592
    ; see also Tex.
    R. App. P. 44.2(b). A proper harm analysis must consider unchallenged evidence
    that proves the same fact as the challenged evidence. Leday v. State, 
    983 S.W.2d 713
    , 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (improper admission of evidence is not reversible
    if the same facts are shown by other evidence which is unchallenged). “[O]verruling
    an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence was
    received without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling.” 
    Id. at 718
    .
    III. Analysis
    In order to complain on appeal of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings,
    Appellant was required to lodge a timely and specific objection to the evidence in
    question. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Enlow v. State, 
    46 S.W.3d 340
    , 346 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2001, pet ref’d) (per curiam). Moreover, he needed to reurge his
    objection each time the State presented the material he complains about on appeal
    in the trial. See Hinton v. State, No. 09-19-00134-CR, 
    2021 WL 194916
    , at *5 (Tex.
    App.—Beaumont Jan. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Although Appellant did object
    when the State initially elicited Fruchtnicht’s testimony about Appellant’s interview,
    Appellant did not object to Fruchtnicht’s remaining testimony, which concerned the
    same or similar statements Fruchtnicht said Appellant made during his interview.
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    For that reason, Appellant failed to preserve his complaint about the alleged
    erroneous admission of Fruchtnicht’s testimony on the same subject. 
    Id.
    During the trial, the Appellant also objected based on the best evidence rule.
    See Tex. R. Evid. 1002. But “[a]n objection that evidence is not the ‘best evidence’
    asserts that a copy or reproduction of a writing, recording, or photograph is
    inadequate and should be replaced by the original” and that was not the gist of
    Appellant’s objection, so the trial court was correct to overrule it. Menefee v. State,
    
    928 S.W.2d 274
    , 278 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.); see also Sharp v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (noting that “[t]he best evidence rule does
    not apply when the item in question is not admitted into evidence to prove its
    contents.”)
    When Appellant later attempted to introduce a recording of his interview into
    evidence, he failed to properly preserve his appellate complaint by failing to make
    an offer of proof of what is in the recording. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). We
    therefore have nothing to review and are unable to determine whether the trial court’s
    ruling excluding the recording was erroneous or harmful. See Reyna v. State, 
    168 S.W.3d 173
    , 176-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Garrett v. State, No. 08-19-00024-CR,
    
    2020 WL 4381609
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 31, 2020, pet. ref’d) (not
    designated for publication).
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    Even had Appellant properly preserved his complaint about the trial court’s
    ruling excluding the recording of the interview, he has not shown the trial court
    abused its discretion and he has not shown he was harmed. See Tex. R. App. P.
    44.2(b); See Davis v. State, 
    203 S.W.3d 845
    , 848-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Thorpe
    v. State, No. 03-18-00070-CR, 
    2019 WL 2237883
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May
    24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). An abuse of discretion
    is shown when the trial court’s evidentiary ruling “falls outside the ‘zone of
    reasonable disagreement[.]’” Ellis v. State, 
    517 S.W.3d 922
    , 928 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth 2017, no pet.) (quoting Mai v. State, 
    189 S.W.3d 316
    , 320 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth 2006, pet. ref’d)). In this case, there can be no realistic question of reasonable
    disagreement, because the trial court’s ruling on Appellant’s “best evidence”
    objection was correct. See Menefee, 
    928 S.W.2d at 278
    . Additionally, he has not
    shown that the allegedly erroneous evidentiary ruling resulted in a longer sentence
    than he would have received had the evidence been admitted. In the case before us,
    we note that although the State requested the jury to impose a ten-year prison
    sentence, the jury responded with two four-year terms and two terms of probation.
    Even considering the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive prison sentences,
    the total eight-year sentence is appreciably less than the maximum sentence sought.
    We do not view this sentence as an indication of harm, particularly in light of
    Appellant’s failure to present any argument regarding harm resulting from the
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    court’s ruling. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Cardenas v. State, 
    30 S.W.3d 384
    , 393-
    94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that failing to address alleged harm results in
    waiver due to inadequate briefing). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole point
    of error.
    IV. Conclusion
    Because Appellant failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review, and
    because he likewise failed to demonstrate either an abuse of discretion or harm from
    the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    CHARLES KREGER
    Justice
    Submitted on September 22, 2022
    Opinion Delivered October 19, 2022
    Do Not Publish
    Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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