Shan Kovaly v. Tulsidas Kurvanka, M.D. and Ikedinobi U. Eni, M.D. ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-15-00350-cv
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
12/3/2015 2:59:35 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
01-15-00350-CV
______________________________________
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS 12/3/2015 2:59:35 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
______________________________________
Clerk
SHAN KOVALY
Appellant
v.
TULSIDAS KURUVANKA, M.D., ET AL., AND
IKEDINOBI U. ENI, M.D., ET AL.,
Appellees.
______________________________________
On Appeal from the 113th Judicial
District Court of Harris County, Texas
APPELLEES’ BRIEF
EDWARDS & ASSOCIATES
JAMES B. EDWARDS
SBN: 06453600
jbe@malpracticedefense.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES STACY T. GARCIA
TULSIDAS KURUVANKA, M.D. SBN: 24085323
AND NORTHWEST HOUSTON stg@malpracticedefense.com
CARDIOLOGY, P.A. 12603 Southwest Freeway, Suite 200
Stafford, Texas 77477-3809
Phone: 281-277-4940
Fax: 281-277-4974
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
01-15-00350-CV
______________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
______________________________________
SHAN KOVALY
Appellant
v.
TULSIDAS KURUVANKA, M.D., ET AL., AND
IKEDINOBI U. ENI, M.D., ET AL.,
Appellees.
______________________________________
On Appeal from the 113th Judicial
District Court of Harris County, Texas
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS
In accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a),
Appellees certify the following is a complete list of the parties, attorneys, and other
persons with an interest in the outcome of the lawsuit:
Shan Kovaly, Plaintiff/Appellant
by and through his trial and appellate counsel of record:
Steven R. Davis
Davis & Davis
440 Louisiana St., Suite 1850
Houston, Texas 77002
steve@davis-davislaw.com
Phone: 713-781-5200
Fax: 713-781-2235
Appellant’s Trial Counsel
ii
Iain Simpson
Simpson, P.C.
1333 Heights Blvd., Suite 102
Houston, Texas 77008
iain@simpsonpc.com
Phone: 281-989-0742
Fax: 281-596-6960
Appellant’s Appellate Counsel
Tulsidas S. Kuruvanka, M.D. and Northwest Houston Cardiology, P.A.,
Defendants/Appellees
by and through his counsel of record:
James B. Edwards
Stacy T. Garcia
Edwards & Associates
12603 Southwest Freeway, Suite 200
Stafford, Texas 77477-3809
jbe@malpracticedefense.com
stg@malpracticedefense.com
Phone: 281-277-4940
Fax: 281-277-4974
Ikedinovi U. Eni, M.D and Ikedinovi U. P.A., Defendants/Appellees
by and through his trial and appellate counsel of record:
Joel Sprott
Kristin Blanchard
Sprott, Newsom, Lunceford, Quattlebaum & Messenger
2211 Norfolk Street
Houston, Texas 77098
sprott@sprottnewsom.com
Phone: (713) 523-8338
Fax: (713) 523-9422
Appellees’ Trial Counsel
Diana L. Faust
Cooper & Scully, PC
900 Jackson Street, Suite 100
Dallas, Texas 75202
iii
Diana.faust@cooperscully.com
Phone: (214) 712-9500
Fax: (512) 712-712-9540
Appellees’ Appellate Counsel
The following are parties interested in the trial court proceeding but are not
parties to this appeal:
The Honorable Michael Landrum, Judge Presiding
Judge of the 113th Judicial District Court
201 Caroline, 10th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: 713-368-6113
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS ……………………………..ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ………………………………………………………….v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …….………………………………………………vii
APPELLANT’S BRIEF ……………………………………………………………1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ……………………………………………………2
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT …………………………………………3
STATEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION ………………………………………4
APPELLANT’S ISSUE PRESENTED ……………………………………………5
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ………………..…………………………………6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ……………………………………………8
ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES …………….……………………………………9
I. Standard of Review …….…………………………………………9
II. Reply Issue Number One ………………………………………….9
A. C.P.R.C. Chapter 74 Requires Pre-Suit Notice And a Valid
Medical Authorization to Toll the Statute of Limitations ..….10
B. The Pre-Suit Medical Authorization Mr. Kovaly Gave to A
Non-Party Does Not Satisfy The Requirements of Chapter 74
To Toll the Statute of Limitations ...………………………..12
C. Pre-Notice Was Not Given to Any Party In This Case ………13
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER …………………………………………………15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE …………………………………………………..17
v
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ……………………………….……………18
APPENDIX ………………………………………………………………………19
vi
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bocken v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc.,
197 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2006). ………..………………….9
Carreras v. Marroquin,
339 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2011). …………………………………10, 11, 12
De Checa v. Diagnostic CenterHosp., Inc.,
852 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1993).………………………………………….13, 14
Gibbs v. General Motors,
450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. 1970) ………………………………………..…9
Mitchell v. Methodist Hospital,
376 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
denied). ………………………………………………………….8, 11, 12, 13
Montgomery v. Kennedy,
669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1984) ……………………………………….9
Moore v. K Mart Corp.,
981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) ……….9
Nicholson v. Shinn,
2009 WL 3152111 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)...8, 12, 13
Rhòne-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel,
997 S.W.2d 217, 224 (Tex. 1999). …………………………………………9
STATUTES
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.051 …………………………………………….8, 10
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.052 …………………….………………………….11
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.251(a) …………………………………………….8
Tex. R. Civ. Pro. § 166a(c) ………………………………………………………9
RECORD
Clerk’s Record (CR)
vii
01-15-00350-CV
______________________________________
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
______________________________________
SHAN KOVALY
Appellant
v.
TULSIDAS KURUVANKA, M.D., ET AL., AND
IKEDINOBI U. ENI, M.D., ET AL.,
Appellees.
______________________________________
On Appeal from the 113th Judicial
District Court of Harris County, Texas
BRIEF OF APPELLEES, TULSIDAS KURUVANKA, M.D. AND
NORTHWEST HOUSTON CARDIOLOGY, P.A.
TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
Come now, TULSIDAS KURUVANKA, M.D. AND NORTHWEST
HOUSTON CARDIOLOGY, P.A. (“Dr. Kuruvanka”), Appellees herein and
submit this Brief. In support of their request that this court affirm the trial court’s
order granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, Appellees
respectfully show the Court the following:
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is a healthcare liability claim governed by Chapter
74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that involves medical care
rendered to Shan Kovaly at Houston Northwest Medical Center by Drs. Kuruvanka
and Eni, respectively. (CR 5-6). Mr. Kovaly sued Dr. Kuruvanka, and other
healthcare providers, claiming negligent care by them caused him harm. (CR 7)
Trial Court Proceedings. Mr. Kovaly filed suit on November 11, 2014 in
Harris County, Texas. (CR 3-10) In February 2015, Dr. Kuruvanka filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment claiming Mr. Kovaly’s suit was barred by the Statute of
Limitations. (CR 35-45) The trial court granted Dr. Kuruvanka’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as well as a similar motion by the Eni defendants. (CR 103)
Mr. Kovaly then filed this appeal. (CR 108-109)
2
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 39.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees
Tulsidas Kuruvanka, M.D. and Northwest Houston Cardiology, P.A. respectfully
request an oral argument in this case.
3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The appeal of this case is from a final order that disposes of all of Mr.
Kovaly’s claims against Dr. Kuruvanka and Northwest Houston Cardiology, P.A.,
pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dr. Kuruvanka and
Northwest Houston Cardiology, P.A. and granted by the trial court. Notice of
appeal was filed in accordance with Tex. R. App. P. § 25 and § 26.
4
APPELLEES’ ISSUE PRESENTED
Reply To Issue Number One
Whether the trial court correctly granted Dr. Kuruvanka’s Motion for
Summary Judgment when Mr. Kovaly failed to file suit against Dr. Kuruvanka
within the two year statute of limitations after failing to provide the adequate pre-
suit notice and medical authorization that would have tolled the statute of
limitations for seventy-five days?
5
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case involves medical negligence allegations against Dr. Kuruvanka
and the Eni appellees for the care and treatment received by Shan Kovaly, while a
patient at Houston Northwest Medical Center from August 28, 2012 through
August 30, 2012. (CR 5) Mr. Kovaly was admitted to Houston Northwest
Medical Center on August 28, 2012 complaining of chest pain. Id. Mr. Kovaly
was thought to have suffered a myocardial infarction and underwent cardiac
catheterization with angioplasty and stenting in the cardiac catherization lab. Id.
Mr. Kovaly was discharged by Dr. Eni on August 30, 2012 with multiple
prescriptions, for Lopressor, Pravachol, aspirin, Plavix, and Lisinopril, some of
which were allegedly prescribed by Dr. Kuruvanka. Id. Each of the prescriptions
contained the necessary information to allow the prescribed medication to be
dispensed except for the quantity of tablets to dispense. Id. Mr. Kovaly presented
the prescriptions as written to a Wal-Mart pharmacy on August 31, 2012; at which
time, the pharmacy informed him they would be unable to dispense the medication
because the quantity was not indicated on the prescription. Id. There is some
discrepancy between the parties as to the availability of the defendants/appellees to
clarify the omission over the next few days but records indicate on September 4,
2012, the Wal-Mart pharmacy dispensed Mr. Kovaly’s medication. (CR 36) That
same day, Mr. Kovaly was readmitted to Houston Northwest Medical Center with
6
an apparent subsequent heart attack and clotting in his stent. (CR 6)
Mr. Kovaly filed suit on November 11, 2015 and has alleged Dr. Kuruvanka
was negligent and grossly negligent in his care and treatment of Mr. Kovaly on
August 30, 2012 in failing to write a valid prescription for medically necessary
medication and failing to contact the pharmacy or Mr. Kovaly to correct the
prescription. (CR 6-7) On December 5, 2014, Dr. Kuruvanka filed his First
Amended Answer pleading the affirmative defense that the suit was barred by the
statute of limitations. (CR 15-20) On February 26, 2015, Dr. Kuruvanka filed a
Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that Mr. Kovaly’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations, similar in substance to the one filed by the
Eni defendants on February 20, 2015. (CR 21-28, 35-45) On March 20, 2015,
Judge Michael Landrum, of the 113th District Court, signed an order granting Dr.
Kuruvanka’s (and the Eni defendants’) Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing all of Mr. Kovaly’s claims. (CR 103) Mr. Kovaly now seeks appellate
review of this issue.
7
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This suit is a health care liability claim governed by Chapter 74 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code in which Mr. Kovaly seeks to recover damages for the
development of a subsequent heart attack allegedly caused by his inability to obtain
his medications resulting from Dr. Kuruvanka’s alleged failure to provide a valid
prescription.
Mr. Kovaly’s suit is barred by the Statute of Limitations because:
1. The statute of limitations for a Chapter 74 claim is 2 years. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a)
2. Limitations can be tolled for 75 days only with proper notice and a
statutorily compliant authorization. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
74.051
3. Plaintiff failed to provide pre-suit notice and in the alternative failed to
provide a statutorily compliant authorization with his pre-suit notice and
therefore failed to toll the limitations. (CR 35-45)
4. Plaintiff filed his lawsuit after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
(CR 3-9)
Therefore, Dr. Kuruvanka was entitled to summary judgment on all claims
asserted by Mr. Kovaly. Mitchell v. Methodist Hospital, 376 S.W.3d 833 (Tex.
App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); Nicholson v. Shinn, 2009 WL
3152111 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). The trial court did not
err in granting Dr. Kuruvanka’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.
8
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment is reviewed de
novo. Bocken v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App. –
Beaumont 2006). When reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment on appeal,
the court looks at whether the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of
law that there is no genuine issue of fact as to one or more of the essential elements
of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Gibbs v. General Motors, 450 S.W.2d 827, 828
(Tex. 1970); see Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App. – San
Antonio 1998, pet. denied). The movant for summary judgment has the burden of
showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11
(Tex. 1984); TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 166a(c).
A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of
statute of limitations has the burden to establish the following:
(1) Conclusively prove when the cause of action accrued; and,
(2) Conclusively negate the application of any tolling provision
pled by the Plaintiff.
See Rhòne-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 224 (Tex. 1999).
II. Reply to Issue Number One
The trial court did not err when it granted Dr. Kuruvanka’s Motion for
9
Summary Judgment. Mr. Kovaly failed to comply with Texas Civil Practices and
Remedies Code § 74.051 by failing to provide adequate pre-suit notice with the
required medical authorization resulting in him not being entitled to a tolling of the
statute of limitations for seventy-five days. Therefore, his suit is barred by the
statute of limitations and was appropriately dismissed by the trial court.
A. C.P.R.C. Chapter 74 Requires Pre-Suit Notice And a Valid Medical
Authorization to Toll the Statute of Limitation
The Civil Practice and Remedies Code specifies that “Any person or his
authorized agent asserting a health care liability claim shall give written notice of
such claim by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each physician or health
care provider against whom such claim is being made at least 60 days before the
filing of a suit in any court in this state based upon a health care liability claim.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.051(a)(emphasis added). This notice must be
accompanied by a medical authorization form for the release of protected health
information and shall toll the applicable statute of the limitations period for up to
75 days. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.051(a)(c)(emphasis added); Carreras
v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that “[f]or the statute of
limitations to be tolled in a health care liability claim pursuant to Chapter 74, a
plaintiff must provide both the statutorily required notice and the statutorily
required authorization form”). The authorization and tolling provision serves an
important purpose: it allows the defendant to procure the plaintiff’s records from
10
plaintiff's current treating healthcare providers and those five (5) years prior to
defendant's treatment in order to assess whether the claim has merit and whether
the defendant should consider early, pre-suit resolution. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §74.052; see also Carreras, at 68.
Section 74.052 further mandates the form of the medical authorization which
must accompany the notice of a health care claim under Section 74.051. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.052(c). In section 74.052(c), the Legislature directed the
use of a specific form for authorizing health care providers to both obtain and
disclose protected health information for the purpose of investigating, evaluating,
and defending against health care liability claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
74.052(c) [providing that medical authorization “shall be” in the given form and
then setting forth the form beginning with “I ____, (name of patient or authorized
representative), hereby authorize ____ (name of physician or other health care
provider to whom the notice of health care claim is directed) to obtain and disclose
(within the parameters set out below) the protected health information described
below”]. Without such an authorization the statute of limitations is not tolled and
therefore plaintiff’s petition must be filed within two years of the alleged breach.
Carreras, at 73; Mitchell, at 837 (holding that the HIPAA-compliant form
provided deviated from the section 74.052(c) form because it did not specifically
identify Methodist as an entity authorized to obtain protected health information
11
and was thus inadequate to trigger the tolling period); Nicholson, at *5 (holding
that the medical authorization forms deviated from section 74.052 in that they
failed to authorize the health care provider to obtain and disclose protected health
information. The failure to comply meant the claimant had not substantially
complied with sections 74.051 and 74.052, and therefore the limitations period was
not tolled). A statutorily required authorization must accompany the Notice or the
Notice does not comply with Chapter 74 and the tolling provision does not apply.
See Carreras, at 73.
B. The Pre-Suit Medical Authorization Mr. Kovaly Gave to A Non-Party
Does Not Satisfy The Requirements of Chapter 74 To Toll the Statute of
Limitations
In this case, like the claimants in Mitchell and Nicholson, Mr. Kovaly did
not furnish a medical authorization to obtain medical records and the seventy-five
day tolling period was not triggered. On July 23, 2013, Mr. Kovaly, through his
counsel, sent Wal-Mart, the dispensing pharmacy, a Notice of Claim with an
accompanying authorization. It should be noted that Wal-Mart is not, and never
has been, a party to this suit. Neither Dr. Kuruvanka nor the Eni defendants, in the
present case, received a Notice of Claim letter or any medical authorization. That
form only granted Wal-Mart the authority to obtain and disclose Mr. Kovaly’s
protected health information. Therefore, because the authorization did not provide
Dr. Kuruvanka or the Eni defendants in the present case with authority to obtain
12
protected health information pursuant to §74.052(c)(A), the authorization did not
comply with the statutory requirements and, accordingly, Mr. Kovaly’s “notice”
did not serve to toll the limitations period as to Mr. Kovaly’s claims against Dr.
Kuruvanka. See Mitchell, at 837; Nicholson, at *5. As such, Dr. Kuruvanka was
not afforded the opportunity to access Mr. Kovaly’s medical records in order to
ascertain whether the claim had merit and/or whether they should consider pre-suit
resolution. The purpose of the statutory requirement is not fulfilled if the potential
parties to the lawsuit are deprived of the opportunity to investigate and evaluate
and/or potentially settle the claim. Nicholson, at *5
C. Pre-Notice Was Not Given to Any Party In This Case
Kovaly is relying on the De Checa v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp. case to argue
adequate pre-suit notice was provided in this matter; however, that reliance is
misplaced. In De Checa, the plaintiffs served pre-suit notice of their claim on
other health care providers who were not involved in the proceeding within two
years of accrual and served pre-suit notice on the defendant physicians within two
years and seventy-five days. In De Checa, pre-suit notice was given to a co-
defendant in the case. De Checa v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 852 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.
1993). In De Checa, the plaintiffs served pre-suit notice of their claim on other
health care providers who were not involved in the proceeding within two years of
accrual and served pre-suit notice on the defendant physicians within two years
13
and seventy-five days. Id. at 937. However, this case is distinguishable because in
De Checa case, the defendants actually received pre-suit notice and here they did
not.
The only pre-suit notice that can be purported to be given in this case is the
notice Mr. Kovaly’s counsel sent to Wal-Mart on July 23, 2013. Neither Dr.
Kuruvanka nor the Eni defendants had any involvement in that case and Wal-Mart
has had no involvement in this present case. No party to the present case ever
received a Notice of Claim letter; thus, Mr. Kovaly is likely relying on the Notice
of Claim provided to Wal-Mart as notice to the defendants in this case. Although
notice to one has been repeatedly held to be notice to all parties of a suit, Mr.
Kovaly seeks to extend this concept to parties of independent lawsuits. The notice
Mr. Kovaly provided to Wal-Mart was in an entirely separate and independent suit
than the present suit; therefore, that notice is not sufficient to provide constructive
notice to Dr. Kuruvanka. Mr. Kovaly litigated that matter through to conclusion at
the trial court level and never attempted to join or include Dr. Kuruvanka in that
suit, as a party. Should Dr. Kuruvanka have been joined to the Wal-Mart suit, he
does not dispute that the notice requirement (but not the medical records
authorization requirement) would have been satisfied; however, that is not how Mr.
Kovaly chose to proceed. Instead, he filed a separate and independent suit that did
not include Wal-Mart and failed to provide any of the defendants in the present suit
14
with any pre-suit notice.
Because Mr. Kovaly failed to provide pre-suit notice to any defendants in
this case, the statute of limitations was not tolled.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The trial court did not err in granting Dr. Kuruvanka’s Motion for Summary
Judgment because Mr. Kovaly’s suit is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The
statute of limitations for a Chapter 74 claim is 2 years. Limitations can be tolled for
75 days only with proper notice and a statutorily compliant authorization. Mr.
Kovaly failed to provide a statutorily compliant authorization with his pre-suit notice
and therefore failed to toll the limitations. Mr. Kovaly filed his lawsuit after the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, Dr. Kuruvanka was entitled to
summary judgment on all claims asserted by Mr. Kovaly.
Wherefore, Appellees Tulsidas Kuruvanka, M.D. and Northwest Houston
Cardiology, P.A. pray this Court AFFIRM the Trial Court’s order granting
Appellees Motion for Summary Judgment, grant Appellees costs of appeal and
grant them all other appropriate relief.
15
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARDS & ASSOCIATES
__/s/ James B. Edwards_____________
James B. Edwards
SBN: 06453600
jbe@malpracticedefense.com
Stacy T. Garcia
SBN: 24085323
stg@malpracticedefense.com
12603 Southwest Freeway, Suite 200
Stafford, Texas 77477-3809
Phone: 281-277-4940
Fax: 281-277-4974
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
TULSIDAS KURVANKA, M.D. AND
NORTHWEST HOUSTON
CARDIOLOGY, P.A.
16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify the foregoing instrument has been sent to all counsel of record in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, on this 3rd day of December,
2015.
Steven R. Davis Joel Sprott
Davis & Davis Kristin Blanchard
440 Louisiana St., Suite 1850 Sprott, Newsom, Lunceford,
Houston, Texas 77002 Quattlebaum & Messenger
steve@davis-davislaw.com 2211 Norfolk Street
Phone: 713-781-5200 Houston, Texas 77098
Fax: 713-781-2235 sprott@sprottnewsom.com
Appellant’s Trial Counsel Phone: (713) 523-8338
Fax: (713) 523-9422
Iain Simpson Appellees’ Trial Counsel
Simpson, P.C.
1333 Heights Blvd., Suite 102 Diana L. Faust
Houston, Texas 77008 Cooper & Scully, PC
iain@simpsonpc.com 900 Jackson Street, Suite 100
Phone: 281-989-0742 Dallas, Texas 75202
Fax: 281-596-6960 Diana.faust@cooperscully.com
Appellant’s Appellate Counsel Phone: (214) 712-9500
Fax: (512) 712-712-9540
Appellees’ Appellate Counsel
____/s/ James B. Edwards_________
James B. Edwards
17
Certificate of Compliance
I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellant’s Brief is computer generated,
that those portions required to be counted by Rule 9.4(i)(1), Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure, contain _3,633___ words according to the word-count
function of the application used to create it, and that it complies with the word-
count requirements of Rule 9.4, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is printed
in 14-point typeface, except for the footnotes, which are in 12-point typeface.
___James B. Edwards_________________
James B. Edwards
18
APPENDIX
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