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392 S.W.3d 662, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, whether any rational factfinder could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v. State,
340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence. See Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the factfinder's responsibility to fairly resolve or reconcile conflicts in the evidence.
Id. We drawall reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict.
Id. Analysis Appellantchallenges his conviction on the basis that it amounts to "pure speculation." Appellant cites Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), Winfrey v. State,
323 S.W.3d 875, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), and Gross v. State,
380 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), in support of his argument the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. 16 The Winfrey court held that if the evidence at trial raises only a suspicion of guilt, even a strong one, the evidence is insufficient.
Winfrey, 232 S.W.3d at 882. Winfrey is distinguishable from the case at bar because in that case there was no evidence placing the defendant at the murder scene. By contrast, appellant, by his own admission, was inside the house at the murder scene. The defendant in Gross was convicted under the law of parties, and the evidence established another person was the shooter. The court concluded the conviction "was based on pure speculation" because there was no evidence of a prior or contemporaneous plan between the defendant and the shooter to commit the murder. In the case at bar, appellant was convicted as the principal actor. Because there is evidence appellant was the only person present in the house when Wiebke suffered her fatal injuries, the factfinder's conclusion that appellant caused those injuries is hardly "pure" speculation. In Hooper, the court recognized the trier of fact is not permitted to find guilt based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. See Hooper v. State,
214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The Hooper court stated: To correctly apply the Jackson standard, it is vital that courts of appeals understand the difference between a reasonable inference supported by the evidence at trial, speculation, and a presumption. A presumption is a legal inference that a fact exists if the facts giving rise to the presumption are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tex. Penal Code § 2.05. ... In contrast, an inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them. Speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. A conclusion reached by speculation may not be completely unreasonable, but it is not sufficiently based on facts or evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 17
Id. at 16(footnote omitted). The trier of fact is permitted "to draw multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence (direct or circumstantial), but they are not permitted to draw conclusions based on speculation."
Id. The Hoopercourt provided a hypothetical to illustrate this point that is analogous to the case at bar. A woman is seen standing in an office holding a smoking gun. There is a body with a gunshot wound on the floor near her. Based on these two facts, it is reasonable to infer that the woman shot the gun (she is holding the gun, and it is still smoking). Is it also reasonable to infer that she shot the person on the floor? To make that determination, other factors must be taken into consideration. If she is the only person in the room with a smoking gun, then it is reasonable to infer that she shot the person on the floor. But, if there are other people with smoking guns in the room, absent other evidence of her guilt, it is not reasonable to infer that she was the shooter. No rational juror should find beyond a reasonable doubt that she was the shooter, rather than any of the other people with smoking guns. To do so would require impermissible speculation. But, what if there is also evidence that the other guns in the room are toy guns and cannot shoot bullets? Then, it would be reasonable to infer that no one with a toy gun was the shooter. It would also be reasonable to infer that the woman holding the smoking gun was the shooter. This would require multiple inferences based upon the same set of facts, but they are reasonable inferences when looking at the evidence. We first have to infer that she shot the gun. This is a reasonable inference because she is holding the gun, and it is still smoking. Next, we have to infer that she shot the person on the floor. This inference is based in part on the original inference that she shot the gun, but is also a reasonable inference drawn from the circumstances.
Id. at 16. By his own admission in his interview with Coleman, appellant was the only person in the house with Wiebke after Cox left; and according to appellant, Wiebke was alive at that time. There is no evidence that anyone else was in the house that night. In accordance with the reasoning in Hooper, the trial court's 18 finding that appellant caused the fatal injuries to Wiebke is therefore a reasonable inference, not an impermissible speculation. Moreover, other evidence gives rise to reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. A number of witnesses testified that appellant's appearance belied his claim that when he awakened, the house already was full of smoke. Leaving aside the clean shirt, which the evidence indicates was given to appellant sometime after he exited the house, the record contains testimony that appellant had no soot on his face, around his nose, or his neck. There is no evidence that appellant washed after exiting the house. Rios provided contrary evidence, testifying that appellant's skin appeared covered in soot. It was within the trial court's purview to resolve or reconcile this conflicting evidence. See
Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. Two of the arson investigators testified there was a delay from the start of the fire until the placement of the 9-1-1 call. Specifically, the record reflects neighbors did not call 9-1-1 until after the explosion, which the evidence showed occurred after the fire started. There is no evidence that appellant called 9-1-1. Appellant's claim that he was asleep until the fire was well under way would explain his failure to call. Even so, as the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence, the trial court was not required to accept appellant's version of events in light of the testimony that appellant did not appear to have been in the house when it filled with smoke. See
id. Two ofthe investigators testified that had appellant been sitting in the recliner when the oxygen canister exploded, he would have been injured. Under appellant's version of events, he could have fled the house after the fire started but before the canister exploded, thus explaining his lack of injury. But, appellant said he did not hear the canister explode, even though it was loud enough to wake the 19 neighbors and rattle the house next door. It was for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See
id. We donot disagree with appellant's argument that Cox's behavior was suspicious. Yet, any evidence that Cox also may have been involved does not necessarily exculpate appellant. Conclusion Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment. /s/ Kem Thompson Frost Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Yates. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). 4Senior Justice Leslie Brock Yates sitting by assignment. 20 c zr- > 1- o c I -_/ >r O _. 0 o _ N
Document Info
Docket Number： PD-1415-15
Filed Date： 12/11/2015
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/30/2016