Eric Raye Rieger v. Ashley Nicole Ramsey ( 2015 )

979-864-1316
I ll E. Locust, Suite. 500 979-388-1316
ADgletou, TX n515 281-756-1316
www.br:tzori:``~ountt.t'om
FILED IN
RHONDABARCHAK 14th COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
DISTRICT CLERK
BRAZORIA COUJ\'TY 11/10/2015 10:29:48 AM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT ON A RESTRICTED APPEAL
11/10/2015
TO: FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
RE: Cause No. 82302-CV, in the 412th District Court
Style; ASHLEY NICOLE RAMSEY VS. IRONMAN EXPRESS LLC, ET AL
**************************************
CASE INFORMATION:
DATE OF APPEALABLE ORDER/JUDGMENT: 11/3/ 15 & 7/ 1/ 15
NOTICE OF APPEAL: 11/9/ 15
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL: 8/26/ 15
ORDER OVERRULING MOT NIT N/A
REQUEST FOR FINDING OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FILED NO
REQUEST FOR CLERK'S RECORD: NO
REQUEST FOR REPORTERS RECORD FILED: NO
METHOD OF DELIVERY: T AMES PORTAL
JUDGE PRESIDING: W. EDWIN DENMAN
COURT REPORTER: JILL FRIEDRICHS
***************************************
APPELLANT: ERIC RAYE RIEGER
ATTORNEY(S) FOR APPELLANT: JEFFRY P O'DEA
TEL.: 713-650-8700
FAX: 713 -655-8383
EMAIL ADDRESS: jodea@tx-couusel.com
TEXAS BAR NO. 15192400
Fi ed for Record
8/26/2015 12:18:25 PM
Rhonda Barchak, District Cieri<
Brazoria County. Texas
82302-CV
Kim Mire, Deputy
NO. 82302-CV
ASHLEY NICOLE RAMSEY, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Plaintiff §
§
v. §
§
§ BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
ERIC RAYE RIEGER, and §
IRONMAN EXPRESS, LLC §
§
Defendants § 412th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL M'D MOTION FOR REMITTITUR
TO THE HONORABLE COURT:
Defendants, IRONMAN EXPRESS, LLC and ERIC RAYE RIEGER, file this Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment, Motion for New Trial, and Request for Remittitur, respectfully
requesting the Court to set aside the July 1, 2015, default judgment (and the J\Ule 12, 2015,
interlocutory default judgment) entered in favor of Plaintiff and, in the interest of justice and
fairness, grant a new triaL Defendants show the following:
EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
Exhibit 1: Affidavit of Matthew Garrett, Defendant Ironman's agent for service of
process
Exhibit2: Affidavit of Eric Raye Rieger
Exhibit3: Affidavit of Logan Batlle, licensed insurance agent
Exhibit4: File copy of July 10, 2015 notice letter from district clerk
INTRODUCTION
- "It is a basic tenet of jurisprndence that the lcnv abhors a
default because equity is rarely served by a default"- 1
Plaintiff; Ashley Nicole Ramsey ("Ramsey") filed suit on January 15, 2015, alleging that
fo\U' Defendants- Dustin Ray Conchy, Jorg Conchy, Eric Raye Rieger, and Ironman Express,
LLC- were liable to her for personal injuries stenuning from two separate April10, 2015 auto
accidents on southbound SH 288. According to her petition, Ramsey alleges she was completely
stopped in traffic on southbound SH 288, which had become backed-up due to a rear-end
collision ahead of her involving Rieger and Ironman. Separately, during the time Ramsey was
stopped in traffic, her vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle owned by Jorg Conchy and
operated by Dustin Conchy. Ramsey alleges that Dustin Conchy failed to timely apply his brakes
to avoid striking her car.
Ramsey alleged that all fo\U' Defendants were negligent. She also alleged that Rieger's
and Ironman' s conduct proximately caused her claimed injuries, even though her car was struck
by Conchy, not Rieger. The vehicle Rieger was driving was no where near Ramsey at the time
Conchy hit Ramsey's vehicle. (See also Ex. 1, ~ 4; Ex. 2, ~ 3). The first accident- which
involved Rieger and another driver, Seyda (the "Seyda accident")--occ\U'red well before, and
quite a distance away from, the Conchy-Ramsey accident2
Neither Rieger nor Ironman timely flied answers in the instant proceeding. As explained
more fully below, Defendants' fail\U'e to file an answer was the result of a simple, yet regrettable,
mistake by Ironman' s ins\U'ance agent. Ramsey then filed a Motion for Default Judgment. Upon
Titan Indem. Co. v. Old Sauth Ins., 221 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App.-san Antonio 2007, no
pet.).
2
Rieger and Ironman were sued as a result of the Seyda accident. (Ex. 1,"'
3; Ex. 2, "' 2).
Both Rieger and Ironman forwarded the suit papers to the ins\U'ance agent. Id. The suit
was defended and ultimately settled. Id.
2
infonnation and belief, the Court granted an interlocutory default judgment against Rieger and
Ironman on June 12, 2015. The Court later severed Ramsey' s claims against Rieger and
Ironman into a new lawsuit, No. 82302-CV. On July 1, 2015, the Court signed a Final Judgment
against Rieger and Ironman, awarding Ramsey $2,303,000.
The clerk was required to send Ironman and Rieger notice of the Final Judgment pursuant
to Rules 306a(3) and 239a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The clerk's records are
believed to show that notice in the form of a letter was dated July 10, 2015, and mailed to both
Defendants. While each Defendant ultimately received a copy of the clerk's July 10, 2015letter,
they did not receive it until July 28, 2015, at the earliest. (Ex. 1,1 7-10; Ex. 2, ~ 6-9)_3
As soon as Defendants learned that a default judgment had been entered, Matthew Garrett
contacted Ironman's insurance agent and learned, for the first time, that the lawsuit papers
Garrett previously and timely forwarded to the agent had not been sent to the insurance carrier.
(Ex. 1, ~ 8). The undersigned counsel was inunediately retained to represent both Defendants,
make an appearance and begin work on preparation of appropriate motions to set aside the
default judgment
Based upon the foregoing, on August _ , 2015, Defendants Ironman and Rieger filed a
Motion to Extend Post-Judgment Deadlines with the Court in order to extend the time for them
to assert their rights to a new trial, and set aside the default judgment. Now, by the present
motion, Defendants ask the Court to grant them a new trial and set aside the default judgment of
July 1, 2015. The facts giving rise to the entry of the default judgment are indicative of ruistake
3
It is unclear from the record when the district clerk' s office placed the July 10, 2015
letters in the mail. The file copy maintained in the clerk's file shows it was file-stamped
at 4:49p.m., July 10, 2015. (Ex. 4). Given the time the clerk's letter was filed, it may
not have been placed into the mail until the following Monday, July 13, 2015. In any
event, Defendants did not receive the letter until July 28, 2015, at the earliest.
3
only, not conscious indifference. Moreover, Defendants' failure to file timely answers was not
due to their mistake, as the suit papers were promptly forwarded to the insurance agent.
Defendants have meritorious defenses to the claims raised in Plaintiff's Petition and Plaintiff will
not be prejudiced by an order vacating the default judgment. Justice requires that the default
judgment be set aside so that Plaintiff's claims can be determined based on their merit, rather
than through a truncated default proceeding.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
A. Defendants respectfully request this Court to vacate the final judgment and grant. a
new trial because the default was the result of a mistake, not conscious indifference,
Defendants can set up meJitmious defenses, and granting a new tJial will not
prejudice Plaintiff.
1. Controlling standards.
A court should set aside a default judgment and grant a new trial if a defendant can meet
the requirements of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939).
Craddock requires the defendant to do the following:
a. demonstrate that the failure to file an answer was not intentional or the
result of conscious indifference, but was merely a mistake or accident. In
re RR, 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006); Estate of Pollockv. McMurrey,
858 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. 1993);
b. "set up" a meritorious defense.4 Director v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 270
(Tex. 1994); and,
c. demonstrate that granting a new trial will not result in delay or prejudice
to plaintiff Id., 889 S.W.2d at 274 n.3.
In evaluating these factors, the court should exercise liberality in favor of the defaulted
party. See Sexton v. Sexton, 737 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex. App.-san Antonio 1987, no writ).
4
"Setting up" a meritorious defense means merely that the Defendant must allege facts
constituting a defense to Plaintiff's cause of action and must support the allegations with
affidavits or other evidence that set up, not prove, a prima facie defense. Estate of
Pollack, 858 S.W.2d at 392.
4
Accordingly, when all three elements of the Craddock test are met, the trial court abuses its
discretion if it fails to grant a new trial. Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 85
(Tex. 1992).
2. Defendants' failure to file an answer was a mistake, not conscious indifference.
The first element of the Craddock test requires Defendants to demonstrate that an answer
was not filed due to a mistake or accident. In re RR, 209 S.W.3d at 114. This is because ooder
Texas law, only an intentional failure to file an answer or conscious indifference will allow a
default judgment to remain in place. Id. The facts set forth in this motion and the attached
affidavits demonstrate that Defendants, or Ironman' s insurance agent, did not act intentionally or
with conscious indifference. The Court should find in favor of Defendants because their failure
to answer was the result of a mistake or accident and adequate justification exists for the failure
to answer. See Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., Inc., 913 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. 1995);
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewerey Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006).
The court should grant a new trial because Defendants' failure to answer was not
intentional, but was accidental. Both Defendants were served with process. The lawsuit papers
were forwarded to Ironman's insurance agent by email. (Ex. 1, 1 6; Ex. 2, 1 4; Ex. 3, 1 6).
Defendants remember this because they had similarly forwarded the lawsuit papers from the
Seyda accident to the insurance agent as welL Both Defendants anticipated and expected that
they would be defended, as had occurred in the Seyda matter. Ironman's insurance agent,
however, did not realize he had received a copy of service papers relating to a new claim, the
Ramsey matter. The insurance agent explains in his affidavit the nature of the mere oversight
that resulted in the Ramsey petition not being forwarded to the insurance canier:
6. On or about February 2, 2015, pursuant to an ongoing business
relationship with Matthew Garrett, I received an e-mail with
5
several attaclunents. The content of the email involved mainly
business matters other than the Ramsey lawsuit. I opened the first
two attachments to the email, which pertained to those other
business matters. However, by oversight, I did not open the third
attaclunent. Included in the third attachment was a copy of the
petition and other lawsuit papers relating to the Ramsey lawsuit. I
did not realize that the third attaclunent to the e-mail included a
copy of the petition and other lawsuit papers showing that that this
lawsuit had been served upon Ironman and Mr. Rieiger. Had I
known that the attaclunents contained a service copy of the
Ramsey lawsuit, I would have inunediately forwarded the same to
the insurance carrier, consistent with my standard practice, and as I
did in the Seyda matter. Also, my usual practice is to routinely
read all my emails and attaclunents; however, on this occasion, I
did not see the third attachment.
7. As a result of this oversight, I did not follow standard practice by
inunediately forwarding the lawsuit to the insurance carrier. The
insurance carrier, in turn, did not hire a lawyer to file an answer
and defend the Defendants, resulting in a Default Judgment that
appears to have been rendered on July 1, 2015. This
omissionfailure was the result of an simple oversight and was not
the result of conscious indifference. Had the oversight not
occurred, I would have forwarded the lawsuit to the insurance
carrier and I would have expected the insurance carrier to hire
counsel to timely file an answer and otherwise appropriately
respond to the lawsuit as it had for the Seyda accident.
(Ex. 3).
Defendants' conduct certainly does not reflect intentional action or conscious
indifference to the requirements of a party to litigation. Further, the actions of the insurance
agent, while a mistake, also do not reflect intentional action or conscious indifference. He
simply did not realize the Ramsey petition was attached to an email addressing other business
matters. Defendants desire to dispute the merit of this claim. This is a case of human error and a
simple mistake, which could happen to anyone. This is not a case of conscious indifference or
intent not to answer the lawsuit. Once Defendants learned of the Final Judgment, they
inunediately contacted the agent, and now counsel has been retained.
6
3. Case law supports setting aside the default judgment.
The present case is an instance of a mistake the law forgives. See, e.g., Milestone Oper.,
Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 SW.3d 307, 309-10 (Tex. 2012) (defendant's agent testified that
he did not remember being served and had not provided suit papers to defendant's attorney);
Bank One v. Moody, 830 SW.2d 81, 84-85 (Tex. 1992) (bank president testified bank did not file
answer because he erroneously believed the bank had complied with proced\U'es); Strackbein v.
Pre-witt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. 1984) (defendant's office staff misplaced citation).
For further example, in Titan Indem. Co. v. Old South Ins. Group, 221 SW.3d 703 (Tex.
App. - San Antonio 2007, no pet), the San Antonio Co\U't of Appeals held the district co\U't
abused its discretion by denying a motion for new trial following the entry of a default judgment.
In that case, a defendant's general counsel received multiple petitions against other parties,
which he forwarded to outside counsel. He later received another petition, which believed,
mistakenly, was duplicative of the prior lawsuits. He took no action and a default was entered
against the defendant
On appeal, the co\U't noted that when Schwartz received the initial lawsuit papers, he did
not ignore them; rather, he forwarded them to the appropriate outside counsel to be addressed.
Id. at 709. When he received actual service of process of the remaining two lawsuits, he
believed that they were duplicates of the same suit, which had been forwarded to outside
counsel. The San Antonio Co\U't of Appeals emphasized that the Craddock analysis must be
performed within a liberal framework, one which recognizes that "[i]t is a basic tenet of
jurisprudence that the law abhors a default because equity is rarely served by a default." Id. at
708 (citing Benefit Planners, ILP v. RenCare, Ltd., 81 S.W.3d 855, 857-58 (Tex. App.-san
Antonio 2002, pet. denied)). Moreover, "[t]he historical trend in default judgment cases is
7
toward the liberal grant of new trials." Id. (citing Tex. Sting Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc., 82 S.W.3d
644, 650 (Tex. App.-san Antonio 2002, pet. denied)).
Because the "[c ]ontrolling fact ... is the absence of a pwposeful or bad faith failure to
answer," the court in Titan determined that Schwartz' s failure to appreciate that the subsequent
notices of the lawsuits were not mere duplicates of that which he acted upon earlier was a mere
mistake, not conduct demonstrating bad faith. Specifically, the Court held: "Schwartz's
testimony reveals negligence at best, but it does not establish that he knew there were three
different lawsuits and that he simply did not care and intentionally failed to answer two of the
lawsuits." Id. at 710. Similarly, the insurance agent did not knowingly ignore the Ramsey
petition; he simply did not realize he had received it.
Further, in National Rigging, Inc. v. City ofSan Antonio, 657 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Court of Appeals reversed the district court' s denial of a
motion to set aside a default judgment. There, a party failed to notify legal counsel that the
defendant had been served, and, as a result, a default judgment was taken against that entity. The
court of appeals again determined that a mistaken belief that service of citation was a duplicate
of documents previously received and acted upon was not indicative of intent "to suffer
judgment to go by default." Id. at 173 (citing Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 125). Thus, the Court
held: "We fmd that the defendant's failure to answer before judgment was not intentional on the
part of the president of that company, or the result of his conscious indifference, but was due to a
mistake. "
Further, a mistaken belief that a claim has been resolved or dismissed negates intentional
disregard or conscious indifference. Ashworth v. Brzoska, 274 S.W.3d 324, 333 Tex. App.-
8
Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). See also State v. Sledge, 982 S.W.2d 911, 915-16 (Tex.
App.- Houston (14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
In deciding whether to set aside a default judgment, the controlling factor is the " absence
of a purposeful or bad faith failure to answer ... [and] even a slight excuse will suffice.... "
Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.- Houston (14th Dist.] 1988, no writ). The
facts at issue here compare favorably to those addressed in Sledge, Titan Indemnity and National
Rigging, and other cases finding that a default should be set aside due to mistake. Here, there is
unmistakable evidence that the defaulting party intended to dispute the claim, and desired to
respond to the suit. The Defendants should not be punished when they forwarded the petition
and citation to the agent.
4. Defendants have meritorious, and likely conclusive, defenses, including the clear
absence ofproximate cause.
To prevail on the present motion, Defendants are required only to "set up" a meritorious
defense. This simply means they must allege facts that constitute a defense to Plaintiff's causes
of action and support the allegations with affidavits or other evidence, proving a prima facie
defense. Estate ofPollack, 858 S.W.2d at 392; Director, 889 S.W.2d at 270. Defendants are not
required to prove their defenses. Titan Indem., 221 S.W.3d at 711. A meritorious defense is one
that, if proved, would cause a different result on retrial, although not necessarily the opposite
result. Liepelt v. Oliviera, 818 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.---corpus Christi 1991, no writ). The
Court is not permitted to consider controverting affidavits on the issue of a meritorious defense.
Estate ofPollack, 858 S.W.2d at 392.
Proximate cause is a necessary element of a claim for negligence. To appreciate the
absence of proximate cause in this case, the Court need look no further than Ramsey's petition.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Ironman and Rieger were negligent because, she says, the Seyda
9
accident involving Rieger occurred on SH 288, the same highway on which Ramsey was
traveling. But Rieger did not strike Ramsey' s vehicle. Rieger was involved in a completely
separate accident occurring long before Ramsey' s accident. The Condry Defendants, not Rieger,
struck Ramsey' s vehicle.
Moreso, the affidavits attached to this motion present facts that set up a causation
defense. As Rieger states, the Condry-Ramsey accident occtuTed "quite a distance" from the
location of the Seyda accident. (Ex. 2, ~ 3). He also confums that he was not involved in the
Condry-Ramsey accident. In fact, he did not even learn that the Condry-Ramsey accident had
occtuTed until much later in 2014. (Ex. 2, ~ 3). Condry's subsequent accident with Ramsey,
long after the Seyda accident occtuTed, is far too removed from the time and location of the
Seyda accident to satisfy the proximate cause element. Condry' s independent act of striking
Ramsey' s vehicle also constitutes a superseding and intervening cause of Ramsey's alleged
mJunes.
The court should grant a new trial because Defendant have set up a meritorious defense.
Ramsey' s petition and the Defendants' respective affidavits support the argument that any
injuries Ramsey suffered as a result of being struck by Condry were not proximately caused by
Rieger or Ironman.
5. A new trial will not prejudice Plaintiff
Finally, the court should grant a new trial because a new trial will not delay or injure
Ramsey. Defendants flied an answer simultaneously with this motion. Defendants have also
flied a Motion to Extend Post-Judgment Deadlines. All of this activity has occurred since July
28, 2015, the date on which Defendants first acquired actual knowledge of the judgment through
their receipt of the clerk's notice letter. No material evidence or witnesses are less available now
10
than they were when Defendant's answer was due. See Director, 889 S.W.2d at 270 (stating the
pwpose of this element is to protect the plaintiff against the sort of delay that would cause it to
be disadvantaged in the trial of its case such as the loss of witnesses or other valuable evidence).
In addition, even though not required, Defendants are offering to reimburse Plaintiff's
counsel for reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the default judgment. See Angelo v.
Champions Restaurant Equip. Co., 713 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. 1986) (finding failure to offer
reimbursement will not preclude a new trial). Defendants are ready to proceed in defending the
suit.
The Court has not entered a docket control order, and no discovery has occUlTed, to
counsel's knowledge. The parties will have many months to complete discovery. Ramsey will
not be prejudiced by the Court granting the new trial.
For all of these reasons, Defendants have demonstrated that their failure to timely answer
the lawsuit was a mistake, that they have meritorious defenses, and that Plaintiff will not be
prejudiced by granting a new trial. Defendants, therefore, respectfully request the Court to set
aside and vacate the Final Judgment and to grant a new trial.
B. The Comt sh ould gr an t a new trial in the interest of justice and fairness.
The Court has discretion to grant a new trial for "good cause" and in the interest of
justice. TEx. R Crv. P . 320. If any case cries out for setting aside a default judgment on equity
grounds, it is this case. The Plaintiff has obtained a $2 million default judgment in a car wreck
case when her own petition alleges that Rieger was not even involved in the Condry accident
about which she complains. Equity cannot allow this judgment to stand uncorrected.
11
C. Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor or a new hial based upon legally
and factually insufficient evidence in suppmt of the judgment (liability and
damages).
The default judgment must be set aside and a new trial granted because Plaintiff has
offered legally and factually insufficient evidence in support of its causes of action and the
damages ultimately awarded.
1. Controlling standard
The court must find insufficient evidence was presented in support of Plaintiff's causes of
action when the record reveals: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; or (2) the
court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
prove a vital fact; or (3) the evidence offered to prove the vital fact is no more than a mere
scintilla of evidence, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1994). No more than a scintilla
of evidence exists on a vital fact where reasonable minds cannot differ from the conclusion that
the evidence offered to support the existence of a vital fact lacks probative force. Also, in a "no
evidence" review, inference stacking is impennissible. Schlumberger v. Nortex Oil & Gas
Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Tex. 1968). The legal equivalent of no evidence occurs when
"mere circumstantial evidence" gives rise to inferences equally consistent with two different
propositions. Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997).
In reviewing a factual sufficiency claim, the court weighs all the evidence, including any
evidence contrary to the trial court's judgment. E.g. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.
1996); Burnett v. Motyka, 610 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1980).
12
2. Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence of liability.
There is no evidence, or factually insufficient evidence, that the injuries alleged were
proximately caused by any breach of duty by Defendants. For this reason alone, evidence
sufficient to support liability for actual damages is lacking.
3. Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to support the damages awarded.
Moreover, there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the damages
awarded in the judgment. The judgment entered in this case assesses damages against Defendant
in the amount of S2.3 million . Plaintiff has not submitted legally and factually sufficient to
support the alleged damages asserted. Awards for medical care and future surgery, pain and
suffering, or mental anguish must be supported by competent evidence justifying the figure
sought and cannot be arbitrary. See Parklvay v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.3d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995).
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request this Court to grant a new trial.
D. Request for remittitur
In the event this Court does not set aside the default judgment, Defendants request this
Court to suggest a remittitur to Plaintiff in accordance with substantial justice, and, if refused by
Plaintiff; order a new triaL
E. Request for findin gs of fact and conclusions of law
As noted above, the damage award referenced in the default judgment is not supported by
any :fitctual findings or conclusions. Defendant respectfully requests this Court to enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law in support of the damages asserted in this case.
13
CONCLUSI ON AND PRAYER
THEREFORE, for the above reasons, and in the interest of justice and fairness,
Defendants, IRONMAN EXPRESS, LLC and ERIC RAYE RIEGER, ask the Court to vacate the
July 1, 2015 Final Judgment, set aside the June 12, 2015 interlocutory default judgment, grant a
new trial, and for all other relief to which they are justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
BURT, BARR & O ' DEA, L.L.P
By: Jeffiy P. O 'Dea
Jeffiy P O 'Dea
State Bar No. 15192400
3900 Essex Lane, Suite 330
Houston, Texas 77027
Telephone: (713) 650-8700
Facsimile: (713) 655-8383
CHAMBERLAIN, HRDLICKA, WHITE
WILLIAMS & AUGHTRY
By: lsi Kevin D. Jewell
Kevin D. Jewell
State Bar No. 00787769
1200 Smith Street, Suite 1400
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 658-1818
(713) 658-2553 (fax)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
14
CERTIF1CATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been
forwarded to the following counsel of record in accordance with the electronic seiVice rules on
this 26th day of August, 2015 as follows:
lsi Kevin D. Jewell
Kevin D. Jewell
ScottSanes
Rice & Sanes, LLP
Pearland Town Center Offices East
11200 Broadway, Suite 2705
Pearland, Texas 77584
(713) 799-8400 (teL)
(888) 328-7060 (fax)
scottsanes@aol.com
15
CAUSE NO. 82302-CV
ASIILEYNICOLERAMSEY, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Plaintiff §
§
v. §
§
DUSTIN RAY CONDRY, JORO CONDRY, § BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
ERIC RAYE RIEGER and IRON MAN §
EXPRESS, LLC. §
§
Defendant § 412Til JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AFFIDAV1T OF~ I I HEW GARRETI
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Matthew Garrett,
who, b~ing by me duly sworn, stated under oath the following:
I. My name is Matthew Garrett. I am over the age of 18 years. I have personal
knowledge of the facts stated in this affidavit and I am in all respects qualified to
make the same. I am of SOWld mind, and have never been convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor involving moral twpitude. The statements contained herein are
true and correct.
2. I am the registered agent of Defendant, Ironman Express, LLC ("Ironman") which
was a domestic transportation company with its principal place of business at 50 I
W. Mulberry in Angleton, Texas. Ironman Express ceased doing business on or
about July 30, 2014. After this time I went to work for another company in New
BraWlfels, Texas and mail addressed to myself and/or lronman was forwarded
from 501 W. Mulberry, Angleton, TX to my address at 4975 IH 35 South, New
Braunfels, Texas 78132.
3. On or about April 10, 2014 a vehicle performing work for Ironman was involved
in a coll ision in Brazoria Cow1ty on SH 288 South with an automobile driven by
Irsat Seyda ("the Seyda accident") which accident resulted in a suit being fi led in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas Houston
Division. I submitted that lawsuit to lrooman's insurance agent and the insurance
carrier ultimately defended lrorunan and Eric Reiger and later settled the case.
4. Unbeknownst to me at the time, the police investigation from the Scyda accident
closod SH 288 for a period of time during which time somewhere quite a distance
up SH 288 Plaintiff, Ramsey herein, claims that she suffered injuries when her
automobi le was rear endod by a vehicle owned and operated by the Condry
EXHIBIT
I
Defendants herein. 1 had no notice of the Ramsey-Condry accident which fonns
the basis of this lawsuit until much later in 2014.
5. In late January, 2015, as registered agent for Ironrnan, r was served with the
Original Petition in this lawsuit by the process server who had previously
attempted to serve roe with process at the 50! W. Mulberry address in Angleton
which was ironrnan' s address when it W!!S doing business. I provided my new
address in New Braunfels to the process server by telephone and T also agreed in
advance to meet him on HWY 46 in New Braunfels at about 2 :00p.m. to accept
service of process.
6. On or about February 2, 2015 after accepting service of this lawsuit I submitted
the lawsuit paperwork to Ironrnan's insurance agent just as I had done in the
Seyda matter. Consistent with my practice I anticipated and intended that the
insurance carrier would handle the suit in a similarly appropriate matter. Since I
knew that the insurance carrier had defended Ironman and Eric Reiger and
ultimately settled the Seyda claim, I believed that this matter was being defended.
It was always my intention that Ironman and Eric Reiger defend any claims
arising out of the April lO, 2014 incident.
7. On or after July 28, 2015 I received Notice of JudgmeJJt from the Brazoria County
District Clerk indicating that a Final judgment was rendered on July I, 2015. The
notice was mailed to the 501 Mulberry St. address, although by that date the
process server knew that I was no longer there. The notice of Final Judgment that
I received from the District Clerk was forwarded to me by the post office from the
50 I W. Mulberry St. address to my cum.'Ill address in New Braunfels. This was
the first notice or knowledge that I had that a Default judgment had rendered.
8. After receiving the Notice of Final Judgment I called Eric Reiger to determine if
he knew of the Default judgment or had received notice of the Final Judgment and
he had not yet received notice. A short time later Eric Reiger called and indicated
that he had just -opened mail to find a Notice of Juqgment. I then sent the lawsuit
papers by e-mail to Logan Batlle, Ironman's insurance agent Ultimately, I
learned that the Logan Batlle agent had not forwarded the lawsuit papers or
service documents related to the lawsuit to the insurance carrier in this case as it
had done in the Sey\la matter. In turn, the insurance carrier did not hire a lawyer
to represent Ironman or Eric Reiger and it did not file answers to the suit and
ultimately a Final Judgment was rendered.
9. Ironman's and Reiger's failure to answer and respond to the lawsuit was the result
of a mistake and not because of conscious indifference.
10. July 28, 2015 is more than 20 days, but less than 90 days, after the date of the
j udgment, July I , 2015.
Further affiant sayeth naught."
2
STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF COMAL §
Before me the undersigned, Matthew Garrett personally appeared and after being duly
sworn did make the above affidavit.
Sworn to and subscribed before me on the .J. 5 day of August, 2015.
~LU-~
e PAIUr.tllolllZ
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
o-tbw12,3117
N Pubhc m and for
The State ofTexas
3
CAUSE NO. 82302-CV
ASHLEY NICOLE RAMSEY, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Plaintiff §
§
v. §
§
DUSTIN RAY CONDRY, JORG CONDRY, § BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
ERIC RAYE RIEGER and IRONMAN §
EXPRESS,LLC. §
§
Defendant § 4 12TH JUDICIALDISTRlCT
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC RAYE RIEGER
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Eric Raye Rieger,
who, being by me duly sworn, stated under oath the following:
1. My name is Eric Raye Rieger. -I am over the age of 18 years. I have personal
knowledge of the facts stated in this affidavit and I am in all respects qualified to
make the same. I am of sound mind, and have never been convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. The statements contained herein are
true and correct
2. On or about April I 0, 2014, a vehicle I was driving while performing work for
Ironman Express, Inc. was involved in a collision in Brazoria County on SH 288
South with an automobile driven by Irsat Seyda ("the Seyda accident"). The
Seyda accident resulted in a suit being filed in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas Houston Division against myself and lronman.
After I was served with citation and a eopy of the complaint, I provided the suit
papers to Ironrnan, which then submitted the lawsuit paperS to its insurance agent.
The insurance carrier ultimately defended the lawsuit, then settled the case.
3. Unbeknownst to me at the time, the police investigation from the Seyda accident
closed SH 288 for a long period of time during which--and at a location quite a
distance up SH 288 from where the Seyda accident occurred--Plaintiff, Ramsey
herein, claims that she suffered injuries when her automobile was rear ended by a
vehicle owned and operated by the Condry Defendants herein. l did not hit
Ramsey's vehicle and I was not involved in the Ramsey-Condry accident. I h.ad
no notice of the Ramsey-Condry accident which forms the basis of this lawsuit
until much later in 2014.
EXHIBIT
j 2
4. In late January2015, I wns served with process in this lawsuiL After being served
in this lawsuit, I submitted the paperworic to Matthew Garren as I had in the
Seyda matter and I assumed and expected that the insurance company bad hired,
or would hire, a lawyer to defend me as it had in the Scyda case and that
eventually this case also would be settled. It was always my intenti on to be
defended in this lawsuit.
5. On or after July 28, 2015, which was just subsequent to a railing trip that I had
taken, Matthew Garrett telephoned me and indicated that he had received notice
that a Final judgment had been signed in this case. He asked me if I had received
such a notice, but I had not.
6. After learning from Matthew Garrett that he had received Notice of a Final
Judgment in this case I checked with the pawnshop next door to 501 W.
Mulberry, at which location the postman leaves what little mail that is addressed
to me at 501 W. Mulberry, Angleton, Texas. I then discovered that I, too, bad
been sent letter from the Brazoria County District Clerk stating that a Final
Judgment had been entered. The clerk's letter was dated July 10, 2015. A true
and correct copy of the clerk's July 10, 2015 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A
I fust learned that a final judgment bad been entered in this case, at the earliest, on
July 28, 2015, although it may have been a day or two later.
8. I then informed Matthew Garrett that I, too, had now received a Notice of Final
judgment and he indicated he would again notify the insUrance agent.
9. July 28, 2015 is more than 20 days but less than 90 days after the date of the
judgment, July I, 2015.
Further affiant sayeth naught."
Eric Raye Rieger
STATEOFTEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF BRAZORIA §
Before me the undersigned, Eric Rayc Rieger personally appeared and after being duly
sworn did make the above affidavit.
Sworn to and subscribed before.me on the Jtf'"lilday of August, 2015.
Notary Pliblic in and for
The State ofTexas
CAUSE NO. 82302-CV
ASHLEY NICOLE RAMSEY, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Plaintiff §
§
v. §
§
DUSTIN RAY CONDRY, JORO CQNDRY, § BRAZORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
ERIC RAYE RIEO.ER and IRONMAN §
EXPRESS,U£. §
§
Oefmdaot § 4121>1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AFJ1JDAvtT OF LOGAN CBRISfOPHER BATLLE
l.lefore me, the undersigned authority, on this da:y personally appeared lAglln Christopbec
B.atll~:, who, being.by me.duly sw0111, stated under oath the following:
I. ''My name is Logan Christopher Batlle. I am over the age of 18 year3. I have
personal knowled'gc of tho facts stated in this affidavit and I am in all respects
qualified to make tbe same. I am of sound mind and have never been convicted
of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Th.e statements contained
herein are true and correct.
2. I am a !icensed insurmce agent working for McKamie lnsutiiiiCn Division.
4. .A fter the ·!'OA!Plilint and other lawsuit paperwork in the Seyda ~ccide!Jt wei:e
$11bmltted tO. me as the agent, l promptly forwarded them to the insur.mc» ,carrier
wbicl) js my stan~ and tustomaxy practice. The ln.surancc carrier, in tum,
hired. c.iiunsd to defend lronmaD an