William Gerard Palmer v. State ( 2015 )

MODIFY and AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed November 9, 2015.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00671-CR
WILLIAM GERARD PALMER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F12-00445-K
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Lang-Miers, and Myers
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Appellant, William Gerard Palmer, appeals his conviction for capital murder. He
challenges the trial court’s exclusion of his expert’s testimony regarding diminished capacity and
failure to include a lesser included instruction on manslaughter in the jury charge. In a cross-
issue, the State argues that the judgment does not correctly reflect appellant’s sentence. For the
reasons that follow, we resolve appellant’s issues against him, sustain the State’s cross-issue,
modify the judgment, and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Early in the morning on January 26, 2012, appellant drove from his home in Sachse to the
home of Ray and Mary Davis, his in-laws, in Dallas where his estranged wife was staying the
night. Appellant parked his van down the street from the Davises’ house, walked to the house,
got in his wife’s car, and waited. When his wife came out to her car to get clothes for work,
appellant attacked her with a knife. She ran screaming into the house with appellant chasing her
and stabbing her the entire way. She died from her injuries. Her half-sister, Kelley, was also
staying at the Davises’ house with her six-year-old daughter. Appellant’s father-in-law tried to
stop appellant, and appellant stabbed him 19 times, killing him. Kelley realized it was futile to
try to stop appellant, and she ran upstairs to get her child. She passed her stepmother
(appellant’s mother-in-law), who was headed downstairs to see what was going on. Kelley and
her daughter hid in a closet; Kelley called 911. Appellant stabbed his mother-in-law 31 times.
Kelley heard appellant walking up the stairs and opening doors, looking for her, as she was
talking to the 911 operator. Appellant did not find her and eventually left the house and drove
home. The police arrived while Kelley was on the phone with the 911 operator.
Appellant arrived home, showered, and got ready for work. His fingers had been cut
rather severely during the murders, and he dripped blood in his van and house. He pretended
that he cut himself to explain the injuries and blood to his three children (the youngest was 17
years old at that time). He also poured carpet-cleaning products that he used in his work all over
the van to cover up the blood. After he had cleaned up, he drove to Taco Bueno for a Diet Coke
and a sausage burrito. The police were on the lookout for him and arrested him in the drive-
through lane.
The State indicted appellant for capital murder of his father-in-law by stabbing him with
a knife and by killing another (his mother-in-law) in the same criminal transaction. The State did
not seek the death penalty.
Appellant pleaded not guilty. Although he did not dispute that he killed his in-laws, he
did not claim he was insane at the time of the offense and, instead, contended that he suffered
from diminished mental capacity that prevented him from having the mens rea required for
capital murder.
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At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, appellant offered testimony from three
expert witnesses about his alleged diminished capacity: Dr. Kristi Compton, a clinical and
forensic psychologist; Dr. Antoinette McGarrahan, a psychologist specializing in forensic
psychology and neuropsychology; and Dr. Jonathan Lipman, a neuropharmacologist. Through
the experts’ testimony, appellant sought to prove that he had a history of anxiety, depression, and
other mental conditions that doctors were attempting to control through various medications, but
were having difficulty with controlling the undesirable side effects of the medications. When his
wife left him about two weeks before the murders, his depression worsened, and his medications
were changed, adversely affecting his brain and mental state. He contended that the experts’
testimony would show that he did not have the specific intent to kill his in-laws at the time of the
murders. The trial court said it would permit Dr. McGarrahan’s and Dr. Lipman’s testimony, but
not Dr. Compton’s.
At the hearing, Dr. Compton had testified that appellant told her he went to his church,
talked to the pastor and the pastor’s wife, and they told him “there was demonic oppression and
this was the cause of his wife leaving him . . . .” 1 Appellant told Dr. Compton “as the days went
on, he began talking to family and talking to the church members and he came to believe that this
was a demonic or spiritual oppression and he had to rid his wife of the demonic forces.”
Appellant did not tell Dr. Compton that he went to his in-laws’ house for the purpose of ridding
his wife of demonic forces; he told her he went to the in-laws’ house, “stayed in his van and was
praying and calling out the names of the demons. . . . And that is his last recollection.”
According to Dr. Compton, appellant’s next recollection was that he was back at his house
talking briefly to his daughter. Dr. Compton testified that there was a “probability” that
1
The evidence was undisputed that appellant’s wife was addicted to the game Mafia Wars. Appellant told one of his daughters “that Mafia
Wars was surrounded by demons” and that his wife “was surrounded by demons . . . because she played Mafia Wars too much.”
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appellant’s reason for going to his in-laws’ house and murdering three people was “his belief that
there was demonic possession[.]”
Dr. Compton testified that she believed there was a probability that appellant “was in a
diminished mental state at the time of the killing[s],” but she could not say that “for sure.” She
said if allowed to testify she would offer the opinion that appellant has a mental disease or
defect, there were “factors that would indicate he was in a diminished mental state” at the time of
the murders and “there are also factors that would indicate that he was not” in a diminished
mental state at the time of the murders. She said, “Ethically, I cannot say one way or the other if
he formed the intent to kill [his in-laws] and his wife.”
The trial court ruled that it would not permit Dr. Compton to testify because, despite the
doctor’s qualifications, her testimony would not help the jury. The court reasoned that
Dr. Compton’s testimony “would probably confuse them more than anything and muddy up
things because she doesn’t have – she didn’t say he’s insane, she didn’t say he has diminished
capacity, . . . .”
The next day, appellant asked to make an offer of proof with regard to Dr. Compton’s
testimony, and Dr. Compton testified that appellant “probably could not form the requisite
mental state” to commit these murders. Defense counsel asked Dr. Compton to explain how she
arrived at that opinion, and she explained the bases for her opinion, including appellant’s history
of mental issues (major depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, possible bipolar condition, and
others) and his current stressors (financial and marital). But she also said appellant had no
history of domestic violence, which would normally be associated with such a violent crime.
Additionally, she said “it’s highly unusual that somebody would leave one living witness . . .
who can clearly identify him . . . . Secondly, he just went home and then went to Taco Bueno. It
would be much more rational if he had, you know, full capacity to murder everybody and then
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take off to Mexico or some place.” She also said appellant did not appear to have a negative
relationship with his in-laws, and “[t]o kill them as well did not seem completely rational to me.
A rational response, if he just wanted to kill his wife is wait for her to get off work, . . . or find
some time or some place when there are not other people around.” She testified, “Those are the
things that caused me to pause. There is a likelihood or probability that he was in a diminished
mental state.” The trial court again excluded Dr. Compton’s testimony.
The State presented its evidence to the jury, including evidence that appellant did not act
unusual in the days leading up to the murders, other than deciding to attend church after having
not attended for over ten years. In his defense, appellant presented, among other evidence,
expert testimony about his “long history of major depressive disorder,” anxiety, poor self-
esteem, impulsivity, attention deficit disorder, and “borderline and dependent personality traits”
such as “rapidly changing moods, unstable relationships with others, a lack of a sense of who he
is . . . where they fit [sic] into the world, what their [sic] role is in society.” He also presented
evidence of the medications he was taking and the effects of those medications on his brain,
including exacerbating his depression and “combining to produce a state of suicidal
homicidality.”
Appellant asked for jury instructions on manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide,
but the trial court refused those requests. The jury found appellant guilty of capital murder, and
the court assessed appellant’s punishment at incarceration for life without the possibility of
parole.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
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In issues one and two, appellant argues that the trial court violated (1) his due process
right to present evidence and (2) his right to trial by jury by excluding Dr. Compton’s testimony
about “his diminished capacity to form the requisite mens rea to commit the offense of capital
murder.”
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Texas law presumes that a criminal defendant intended the natural consequences of his
acts. Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Evidence that is relevant to
negate that intent, including evidence of a defendant’s history of mental illness, mental diseases,
or defects, can be admissible. See id.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(a) (West 2005)
(stating that in prosecutions for murder, “the state or the defendant shall be permitted to offer
testimony . . . going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense”).
However, evidence that a mental condition, other than insanity, prevented a defendant from
having the capacity to form the requisite mens rea is not admissible. Jackson v. State, 160
S.W.3d 568, 574–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony about a defendant’s mental
condition for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 574. A trial court has discretion to exclude
evidence of mental illness if the evidence does not “truly negate the required mens rea.” Ruffin,
270 S.W.3d at 595–96; Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574.
Analysis
Appellant argues that an expert’s testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is qualified,
(2) the subject matter is appropriate for expert testimony, and (3) the testimony will assist the
jury. See Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). He argues that the
trial court’s basis for excluding Dr. Compton’s testimony was because her testimony would not
assist the jury, but he argues that her “testimony was no more complicated or confusing than the
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testimony of the other experts allowed to testify.” He argues that Dr. Compton did not have to
be 100% certain about his diminished capacity for the evidence to be admissible to rebut the
State’s evidence of mens rea.
The mens rea for capital murder is intentionally or knowingly causing the death of more
than one person during the same criminal transaction. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1)
(West 2011), 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2014). Even if appellant was suffering from
diminished mental capacity at the time of the murders, Dr. Compton’s testimony did not suggest
that the alleged diminished mental capacity prevented appellant from forming the intent to kill
his in-laws, or any person. See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 381–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(excluded evidence did not show appellant intended to shoot someone other than police officers
he shot or did not intend to shoot any person); Woods v. State, 306 S.W.3d 905, 909–10 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (excluded evidence not probative of intent because did not
explain how psychotic state affected defendant’s ability to perceive person was public servant);
cf. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 596–97 (evidence of defendant’s mental condition admissible to show
defendant thought he was shooting at Muslims when actually shooting at police officers). And
Dr. Compton specifically testified that she could not offer an opinion about whether appellant
formed the intent to commit the murders. Instead, her testimony appeared to be an explanation
for why appellant stabbed his wife and in-laws rather than evidence negating intent. See Mays,
318 S.W.3d at 381–82.
Having reviewed Dr. Compton’s proffered testimony, we conclude that it did not truly
negate the mens rea for the offense and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
allow her to testify. We resolve issues one and two against appellant.
JURY CHARGE
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In issue three, appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct
the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The State contends that appellant did
not object to the charge on this basis and, regardless, the trial court did not err.
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When an appellant raises jury charge error, we first determine whether the jury charge
contained error. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). If there is no error, our inquiry stops. Id.
at 443.
We apply the Aguilar/Rousseau test to determine whether an instruction on a lesser
included offense should have been given to the jury. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 382
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The first step is to determine whether the lesser offense is included
within the greater offense. See id. The State concedes in this case that manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of capital murder; consequently, we proceed to the second step, which is to
determine whether the evidence showed that if appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser
offense. Id. at 382, 385. The evidence must be “more than mere speculation—it requires
affirmative evidence that both raises the lesser[]included offense and rebuts or negates an
element of the greater offense.” Id. at 385.
As distinguished from the capital murder culpable mental state of intentional or knowing
conduct, manslaughter requires reckless conduct that causes another’s death. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.04(a) (West 2011). Conduct is “reckless” when the actor “is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . the result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). To be
entitled to an instruction on manslaughter, “there must be evidence of a lack of intent to kill and
evidence that [appellant] acted recklessly while ignoring a known risk.” Arnold v. State, 234
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S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at
385.
We review a trial court’s decision to submit or deny a lesser included offense instruction
for an abuse of discretion. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Analysis
Appellant argues that he would have been entitled to a charge on manslaughter if the trial
court had not excluded Dr. Compton’s testimony, and that, even without her testimony, the
testimony of his other experts supports a manslaughter charge. We disagree.
Dr. Compton expressly testified that she could not offer an opinion about whether
appellant acted with intent at the time of the murders, and her testimony about appellant’s
alleged diminished mental capacity did not suggest that appellant acted only recklessly at the
time of the murders. Consequently, Dr. Compton’s proffered testimony, if allowed, would not
have supported a charge on manslaughter.
With regard to Dr. McGarrahan and Dr. Lipman, their testimony consists of over 100
pages in the reporter’s record, but appellant does not cite us to any of their specific testimony to
support his argument that he was entitled to a manslaughter charge. Instead, he makes the
general argument that “Dr. McGarrahan testified that a number of mental and personality issues,
especially a history of depression which, with stressors, can cause a person to lose touch with
reality.” Even if that is true, Dr. McGarrahan did not link these “mental and personality issues”
to appellant’s culpable mental state at the time of the murders. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 381–82;
Woods, 306 S.W.3d at 909–10. She did not testify that appellant had lost “touch with reality” at
the time of the murders and, as a result, did not have the intent to kill. And, in fact, as pointed
out by the State in its appellate brief, when Dr. McGarrahan was asked whether appellant “could
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not form the requisite intent to commit this offense,” she said, “I’m not here to provide an
opinion one way or another on that.”
Appellant also makes the general statement that “Dr. Lipman testified that the
anticonvulsants being given to Appellant were very likely exacerbating his depression and that
his mental condition was getting worse, possibly leading to a dissociative or psychotic state.”
Dr. Lipman testified about the various medications appellant was taking, the effects they can
have on a person’s brain, and said “if [appellant] was acting under the belief that he was
responding to the needs of demon possessions, then I consider that psychotic.” Again, however,
Dr. Lipman did not link appellant’s alleged mental condition to a culpable mental state at the
time of the murders. Dr. Lipman did not offer an opinion that appellant’s alleged psychosis
negated a specific intent to kill, nor did he opine that appellant’s alleged psychosis showed he
acted only recklessly in causing his in-laws’ deaths. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 381–82; Woods,
306 S.W.3d at 909–10.
Having reviewed the testimony of both defense experts, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
manslaughter because there is no evidence from which a rational jury could have concluded that
appellant acted only recklessly when he murdered his in-laws. 2 See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385.
We resolve issue three against appellant.
THE STATE’S CROSS-ISSUE
In its cross-issue, the State argues that the judgment reflects appellant was sentenced to
life in prison when it should reflect he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. During the sentencing phase, the trial court stated, “And, sir, the jury, having found you
2
Because we conclude that the jury charge did not contain error and no harm analysis is required, we do not need to address the State’s
contention that appellant did not object to the jury charge.
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guilty of capital murder, I assess your punishment at life in prison without the possibility of
parole.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014) (in capital murder case
when death penalty not sought, mandatory sentence is life without parole). When the sentence
set out in the judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls.
Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The remedy is to reform the
judgment to reflect the sentence orally pronounced. Id. Consequently, we sustain the State’s
cross-issue and modify the judgment to reflect the sentence orally pronounced.
CONCLUSION
We modify the judgment to reflect the sentence of incarceration for life without the
possibility of parole and affirm the judgment as modified.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE
Do not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
140671F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
WILLIAM GERARD PALMER, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-14-00671-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F12-00445-K.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and Myers participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED
to reflect the punishment assessed as “LIFE YEARS WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF
PAROLE INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, TDCJ.”
As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 9th day of November, 2015.
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