Robinson, Olin Anthony ( 2015 )

PD-0974-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 11/5/2015 10:30:31 PM
November 9, 2015 Accepted 11/9/2015 7:30:00 AM
No. PD-0974-15 ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF
TEXAS
______________________________________________________________________________
OLIN ANTHONY ROBINSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________
Petition in Cause No. 05-05-7221 from the
24th Judicial District Court of Jackson County, Texas
and the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District
of Texas in Cause No. 13-13-00571-CR
______________________________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS
______________________________________________________________________________
WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 659-7330
(713) 599-1659 (FAX)
SBOT# 21633500
attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
OLIN ANTHONY ROBINSON
______________________________________________________________________________
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court’s final order, as well as the
names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.
PARTIES COUNSEL
Petitioner:
Olin Anthony Robinson Willie & Associates, P.C.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
Houston, Texas 77027
Trial and Appellate Counsel for Petitioner
Trial Court:
The Honorable Kemper Stephen Williams, III
Presiding via assignment
24th Judicial District Court
Jackson County, Texas
Respondent:
The State of Texas Law Offices of Jim Vollers
Jim Vollers, Esquire
2201 Westover Road
Austin, Texas 78703
Appellate Counsel for Respondent
Jackson County District Attorney’s Office
Robert E. Bell, Esquire
Jackson County District Attorney
115 W. Main Street, Room 205
Edna, Texas 77957
Trial Counsel for Respondent
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court due to
the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in its statutory construction of TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 versus the specific provisions contained
in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 . . . . . . 3
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order due to the
fact that the Court of Appeals violated TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 by not
addressing the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 controlled the disposition of this
appellate litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. The Court of Appeals did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to
entertain a direct appeal from a trial court granting continuing jurisdiction
community supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES:
Basaldua v. State,
558 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10
Boykin v. State,
818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ex parte Dotson,
76 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4
Grimes v. State,
807 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Houlihan v. State,
579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10
Keehn v. State,
233 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 8
Leos v. State Emp. Workers’ Comp. Div.,
734 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission,
767 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 8
Musgrove v. State,
82 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.--San Antonio
2002, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 6
McNatt v. State,
188 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5
Pippin v. State,
271 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.--Amarillo
2009, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Roberts v. State,
No. 04-10-00558-CR, 2010 WL 4523788
(Tex. App.--San Antonio Nov. 10, 2010, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
Page(s)
Sanders v. State,
832 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.--Austin
1992, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
State v. Hardy,
963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
State v. Robinson,
No. 13-12-00121-CR, 2013 WL 1188101
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Mar. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
State v. Robinson,
No. 13-13-00571-CR, 2014 WL 4401523
(Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Aug. 26, 2014, pet. granted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CONSTITUTIONS:
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
TEX. CONST., art. I, § 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
TEX. CONST., art. I, § 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
RULES AND STATUTES:
TEX. R. APP. P. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.44.29(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.44.29(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an appeal brought by the State of
Texas with regard to the trial court’s
granting of “shock probation” to the
Defendant, Olin Anthony Robinson.
Trial Court: The Honorable Kemper S. Williams, III,
Presiding via assignment,
24th Judicial District Court,
Jackson County, Texas.
Parties in the Court of Appeals: The State of Texas – Appellant;
Olin Anthony Robinson – Appellee.
Court of Appeals: Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Supreme
Judicial District of Texas; Opinion by
Justice Garza joined by Justices Rodriguez
and Benavides; State v. Robinson, No. 13-
13-00571-CR (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi
Aug.26, 2014, pet. granted).
Court of Appeals’ Disposition: Order of the trial court reversed and case
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court due to
the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in its statutory construction of TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 versus the specific provisions contained
in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2.
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order due to the
fact that the Court of Appeals violated TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 by not
addressing the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 controlled the disposition of this
appellate litigation.
The Court of Appeals did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to
entertain a direct appeal from a trial court granting continuing jurisdiction
community supervision.
vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the Petitioner timely filed his
motion for continuing jurisdiction community jurisdiction and it is also
uncontroverted and undisputed that the trial court timely held a hearing and
granted the motion. The State complained that it was not given the opportunity for
a full evidentiary hearing and appealed the ruling of the trial court. On the first
appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to afford the State
a full evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, No. 13-12-00121-CR, 2013
WL 1188101, at *2 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Mar. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d). The trial
court complied with the Court of Appeals’ mandate and, after affording the State a
full evidentiary hearing, again granted the motion for shock probation. The State
brought this present appeal claiming that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction
to enter the order granting shock probation after remand and the Court of Appeals
issued its opinion and judgment agreeing with the premise of the State. See State v.
Robinson, No. 13-13-00571-CR, 2014 WL 4401523 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi
Aug.26, 2014, pet. granted).
On July 28, 2015, the Petitioner filed his Petition for Discretionary Review
with the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. On November 4, 2015, this Court
granted the Petition for Discretionary Review.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When a Court of Appeals reverses and remands a case for proceedings
consistent with its opinion, the parties are placed in the same position at the time
they were before the appeal. See McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); Musgrove v. State, 82 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, pet.
ref’d); Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b). Statutory
construction requires that the above-referenced statute and rule be given their
“plain meaning” and a specific statute and rule will control over a general statute
and rule. See Ex parte Dotson, 76 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
A Court of Appeals is obligated to address an issue that has been properly
assigned and briefed and is not at liberty to ignore the issue when adjudicating an
appeal. See Keehn v. State, 233 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lone Star
Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 767 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1989); TEX. R. APP. P.
47.1.
There is no constitutional authority or statutory authority permitting a direct
appeal from an order granting or denying continuing jurisdiction community
supervision (“shock probation”). See Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
2
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court due
to the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in its statutory construction
of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 versus the specific provisions
contained in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP.
P. 43.2.
The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, §
6 is in direct conflict with the specific provisions contained in TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) and stands the doctrine of
statutory construction “on its head.”
It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the Petitioner timely filed his
motion for shock probation and it is also uncontroverted and undisputed that the
trial court timely held a hearing and granted the motion. The State complained that
it was not given the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing and appealed the
ruling of the trial court. On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court to afford the State a full evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State
v. Robinson, No. 13-12-00121-CR, 2013 WL 1188101, at *2 (Tex. App.--Corpus
Christi Mar. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d). The trial court complied with the Court of
Appeals’ mandate and, after affording the State a full evidentiary hearing, granted
the motion for shock probation. The State brought this present appeal claiming that
the trial court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the order granting shock
3
probation after remand. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion agreeing with the
premise of the State. It is the Petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals’
opinion violates the doctrine of statutory construction and in the process violates
the doctrine of stare decisis and violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Rights of the Appellee guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, §§ 3 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.
The Court in Ex parte Dotson, 76 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002),
held:
One of our general rules of statutory construction is that a more
specific statute or rule will prevail over a more general one. (Citation
omitted.)
(Emphasis added.)
The Petitioner contends that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and
TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) are a specific statute and rule which directly control the
issue in the case at bar and they are both outcome determinative.
The Court in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991),
succinctly and unambiguously held:
When we interpret statutes . . ., we seek to effectuate the “collective”
intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.
(Citation omitted.) We do so because our state constitution
4
assigns the law making function to the Legislature while assigning the
law interpreting function to the Judiciary. (Citation omitted.)
When attempting to discern this collective legislative intent or
purpose, we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the
statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning
of that text at the time of its enactment. . . . We focus on the literal
text also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the
legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute
was enacted into law. . . . Yet a third reason for focusing on the literal
text is that the legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect the
Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.
Thus, if the meaning of the statutory text, when read using the
established canons of statutory construction relating to such text,
should have been plain to the legislators who voted on it, we
ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals was required to give TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) their “plain meaning.” Moreover, the
Court of Appeals is required, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to interpret the
statute and rule as announced by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The
Court in McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), held:
When a court of appeals reverses and remands a case to the trial court
without instructions to render a specific judgment, the effect is to
restore the parties to the same situation as that in which they were
before the appeal.
5
(Emphasis added.) See also Grimes v. State, 807 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Musgrove v. State, 82 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002,
pet. ref’d).
The Court of Appeals did not and cannot cite to a case from the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas which would allow and uphold the contentions of the
State after the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court. The
cases cited by the Court of Appeals to buttress its opinion are totally inapplicable
as a matter of law.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has, on more than one occasion,
interpreted and construed the “plain meaning” of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d). The interpretation, or lack thereof, by the
Court of Appeals of the aforementioned statute and rule is anathema to the
interpretation by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas and such interpretation
violates the doctrine of stare decisis in the process.
The Court in State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998),
held:
When the legislature meets, after a particular statute has been
judicially construed, without changing that statute, we presume the
Legislature intended the same construction should continue to be
applied to that statute.
6
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d), by the
Court of Appeals’ remand without instructions, restored the Petitioner’s case to its
legal status before the first hearing and does not freeze the case in point of time
and the time limitations imposed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, § 6 are
totally not applicable to a hearing on remand, as interpreted by the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas. See also Sanders v. State, 832 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex.
App.--Austin 1992, no pet.). If the intent is clear, the court’s responsibility is to
interpret the statute as intended by the legislature, even when the legislature’s
intent is to overrule a court’s own previous opinion. Leos v. State Emp. Workers’
Comp. Div., 734 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. 1987).
The Court of Appeals has incorrectly interpreted the “plain meaning” of
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) when
juxtaposed with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, § 6 and in so doing has
violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Rights of the Petitioner as well as
violating the doctrine of stare decisis. The opinion and judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed and the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
7
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order due to
the fact that the Court of Appeals violated TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 by not
addressing the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 controlled the disposition of this
appellate litigation.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals completely ignored and refused to
address the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b)
and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) control whether the trial court had the requisite
subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the Petitioner’s motion for shock probation
on remand. That issue was briefed on pages 1-3 of the Brief of Appellee in the
Court of Appeals below. The Court of Appeals did not have the authority to not
adjudicate an issue that was properly briefed and before the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission,
767 S.W.2d 709, 710-711 (Tex. 1989), succinctly and unambiguously held:
“The court of appeals is obliged to ‘address every issue raised and
necessary to final disposition of the appeal.’ . . . The courts of appeals
are not at liberty to disregard them. [T]he rules do mandate full
consideration of all issues raised to move the case as far as possible
toward final disposition.”
(Emphasis added.) See also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Keehn v. State, 233 S.W.3d 348,
349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), completely adopted the Supreme Court of Texas’
8
interpretation and rationale concerning TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. The Court of Appeals
violated the doctrine of stare decisis and has violated the Due Process Rights of the
Appellant guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution by not addressing merits
of the issue. The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed
and remanded with instructions to address of the Petitioner’s issue.
III. The Court of Appeals did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to
entertain a direct appeal from a trial court granting continuing
jurisdiction community supervision.
It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the State of Texas, by and
through the Jackson County District Attorney’s Office, brought forth a direct
appeal of the order of the trial court granting continuing jurisdiction community
supervision (“shock probation”) to the Petitioner. This action by the State not only
violates the doctrine of stare decisis, its action violates the Equal Protection and
Due Process Rights of the Petitioner guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 3 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.
It is well-settled Texas law that there is no constitutional or statutory
authority permitting a direct appeal from an order granting or denying “shock
probation” or from an order modifying or refusing to modify the conditions of
“shock probation.” See, e.g., Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213, 215-216 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). See
9
also Pippin v. State, 271 S.W.3d 861, 863-864 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2009, no
pet.); Roberts v. State, No. 04-10-00558-CR, 2010 WL 4523788, at *1-2 (Tex.
App.--San Antonio Nov. 10, 2010, pet. ref’d).
Unless and/or until the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas overrules its
holdings in Houlihan, Basaldua, and their progeny, the Court of Appeals was and
is bound by those decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court of
Appeals did not have the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction nor did it have the
legal authority to adjudicate the State’s appeal. To repeat, there is no case,
constitutional provision and/or statute to confer subject-matter jurisdiction over the
State’s direct appeal. The State’s appeal should have been dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed
and the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Olin Anthony Robinson, requests that
the Court reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter judgment
affirming the order of the trial court in Cause No. 05-05-7221 or, in the alternative,
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of
Appeals to address the merits of the unadjudicated issue presented by the Petitioner
in this appeal.
10
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
By:/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 659-7330
(713) 599-1659 (FAX)
SBOT# 21633500
attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
OLIN ANTHONY ROBINSON
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served via e-service to Robert E. Bell, Jackson County District Attorney, 115 W.
Main Street, Room 205, Edna, Texas 77957 and the State Prosecuting Attorney,
P.O. Box 12405, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711, on the 5th day of
November, 2015.
/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the Brief of Petitioner on the Merits submitted complies with
TEX. R. APP. P. 9 and the word count of this document is 2,336. The word
processing software used to prepare the document and to calculate the word count
is Windows 7.
/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
11