Ex Parte: Joseph Stewart, III ( 2002 )

NO. 07-01-0399-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
MARCH 22, 2002
______________________________
EX PARTE JOSEPH STEWART, III
_________________________________
FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2001-001,622; HONORABLE BRADLEY UNDERWOOD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
Relator Joseph Stewart, III brings this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his
application for writ of habeas corpus. Finding no error in the trial court’s ruling, we affirm
the order of the trial court.
On August 21, 2001, relator filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus
in which he challenged his assignment to a psychiatric unit of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Institutional Division and its treatment of him, involuntarily, by the use of
anti-psychotic drugs.1 In his petition, he alleged he was deprived of his due process rights
in violation of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 108 L. Ed. 2d 178
(1990). A copy of the petition was served on the Lubbock County District Attorney, who
did not file a response. On September 16, 2001, without a hearing, the trial court denied
the petition. Hence, this appeal.
On November 13, 2001, relator filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel
on appeal. On November 26, 2001, we disposed of this motion by noting that his claim
was in the nature of a civil action for which no right to appointment of counsel exists. See
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997). Relator filed his pro se brief on
November 29, 2001, and an amended pro se brief on December 7, 2001. On December
21, 2001, we notified relator that we had overruled his “motion for rehearing.” In response,
relator contacted us by letter dated January 21, 2002, questioning whether we had made
a final disposition of his appeal. We had not finally disposed of his appeal and we now
proceed to consider the merits of his appeal.
In his summary of argument in his brief, relator succinctly states his contention that
habeas corpus is the proper mechanism for challenging additional conditions of his
incarceration, even if the remedy sought would not result in his release. In support of that
proposition, relator cites Leahy v. Estelle, 371 F. Supp. 951, aff’d, 503 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir.
1974). In that case, the court cited numerous examples of the use of habeas corpus to
1
Parenthetically, we note that in his pro se brief, relator makes no contention, nor
does he give any indication, that the medication impaired his ability to present his claims
to this court.
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challenge confinement in a particular place or under particular conditions. Id. at 953-54.
It particularly noted Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct.1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439
(1973), in which the Court stated, “when a prisoner is put under additional and
unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody . . . habeas corpus will lie to remove
the restraints making the custody legal.” Id. at 499.
However, it is important to recognize that the holdings in Leahy and Preiser were
bottomed on the federal habeas corpus statute, 26 U.S.C. § 2254(b), and recited that the
statute “does not deny the federal courts the power to fashion appropriate relief other than
the immediate release.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487 (citing Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88
S. Ct. 1549, 20 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1968)). Because Preiser involved a challenge to the removal
of “good time” credit, it concerned the length rather than the conditions of confinement,
making the statement with regard to other conditions of confinement dicta. The case
reaffirmed decisions holding section 19832 actions are the proper remedy for challenges
to the conditions, rather than the length, of confinement. 411 U.S. at 499. Federal courts
have consistently construed federal habeas corpus relief to require exhaustion of state
remedies. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489; Steams v. Parker, 469 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1972).
Texas courts view the scope of habeas corpus differently from the federal courts.
Entitlement to habeas corpus relief under Texas law requires that a decision in the
prisoner’s favor on a dispositive issue results in his immediate release. Headrick v. State,
988 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Ex parte Ruby, 403 S.W.2d 129, 130
2
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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(Tex.Crim.App. 1966). In Ex parte Benavides, 801 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, writ dism’d w.o.j.), the court held that an inmate’s complaints concerning the
terms and conditions of his confinement, including administration of improper medication,
were not the type of “restraint” necessary for habeas corpus relief. Because relator only
seeks reassignment from a psychiatric unit to the general prison population and withdrawal
of his involuntary medication, a decision in his favor would not result in his immediate
release. That being true, he is not entitled in habeas corpus relief in state court.
For the reasons stated, the trial court’s order must be, and is hereby, affirmed.
John T. Boyd
Chief Justice
Publish.
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