Tony Romo, Jr. v. State ( 2003 )


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  •                                        NO. 07-02-0254-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL E
    MAY 5, 2003
    ______________________________
    TONY ROMO, JR.,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 93-416,191; HON. BRADLEY UNDERWOOD, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Memorandum Opinion
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ. and BOYD, S.J.1
    Appellant Tony Romo, Jr. appeals the revocation of his probation for the offense of
    securing execution of a document by deception. Via two issues, he contends 1) the trial
    court erred in failing to suppress his confession which allegedly was obtained in violation
    of his “right to counsel . . . at every significant stage of a criminal proceeding after counsel
    1
    John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov’t
    Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
    ha[d] been appointed,” and 2) the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the testimony
    in another criminal proceeding involving him. We affirm the judgment.
    Background
    On November 30, 1993, appellant pled guilty to the offense of securing execution
    of a document by deception for which he received eight years confinement. However, his
    sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for eight years. On October
    14, 1998, the probationary period was extended to November 29, 2003. In May 2000, the
    State filed an application to revoke appellant’s probation which was amended on February
    26, 2001, and again on May 1, 2001. An attorney was appointed on June 21, 2000, to
    represent appellant on the application to revoke his probation.
    Meanwhile, several robberies had occurred in the Lubbock, Texas area for which
    the police believed appellant to be responsible. On the basis of an outstanding warrant
    for appellant arising from the application to revoke his probation, the police arrested
    appellant and took him to the station. They gave him his Miranda warnings and began
    questioning him about the robberies as opposed to matters encompassed in the pending
    motion to revoke probation. During the interrogation, appellant voluntarily waived his right
    to have counsel present and then admitted to committing various burglaries. The State
    subsequently indicted him for one of those offenses in Cause No. 2001-436,194 which was
    then used as a basis to revoke his probation. Appellant moved to suppress his confession
    2
    contending it was in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that motion was
    denied.2
    Issue One - Suppression of Confession
    In his first issue, appellant claims error on the part of the trial court in its failure to
    suppress his confession because he was denied his right to counsel. This is the same
    issue addressed by this court in its prior opinion of Romo v. State, No. 07-02-0061-CR,
    2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 1650 (Tex. App.--Amarillo Feb. 21, 2003, no pet. h.). We overrule
    the issue for the reasons stated in that opinion.3
    Issue Two - Judicial Notice
    In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it took judicial
    notice of testimony presented in Cause No. 2001-436,194, a cause involving another
    prosecution by the State against Romo over which the same judge presided. In short, the
    trial court was allegedly barred from taking such notice because doing so violated the rules
    prohibiting consideration of hearsay. We overrule the issue.
    According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a trial court may take judicial
    notice of evidence admitted at a criminal trial involving the same defendant and over which
    the same judge presided. Moreno v. State, 
    22 S.W.3d 482
    , 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
    (holding a court may take judicial notice of the evidence at a criminal trial and revoke
    probation even if the defendant was acquitted); Barrientez v. State, 
    500 S.W.2d 474
    , 475
    2
    The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
    shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
    3
    That opinion refers to another of this court’s previous opinions styled Romo v. State, No. 07-02-
    0151-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 3 (Tex. App.--Amarillo Jan. 2, 2003, no pet. h.). It too addressed the issue
    before us, and therein we also overruled it.
    3
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding the trial court could take judicial notice of the evidence
    introduced in a prior proceeding which was made the basis to revoke probation when the
    judge was the same). This is true even though the accused objects on the basis of
    hearsay and the purported denial of the right to confront the prior witnesses. Green v.
    State, 
    528 S.W.2d 617
    , 618-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). As previously mentioned, Cause
    No. 2001-436,194 involved the same defendant, and the same judge presided over the
    matter. Accordingly, the rules applicable to the admission of hearsay or the right to
    confront one’s accusers did not prevent the trial court from taking judicial notice of the
    evidence in question.
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
    Brian Quinn
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-02-00254-CR

Filed Date: 5/5/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2015