Terry Morrison v. State ( 2007 )

NO. 07-06-0455-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
JULY 6, 2007
______________________________
TERRY J. MORRISON,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_________________________________
FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOCKLEY COUNTY;
NO. 2006-414,081; HON. CECIL G. PURYEAR, PRESIDING
_______________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Terry J. Morrison contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
sustain his conviction of forgery of a financial instrument. We affirm the judgment.
The standards by which we test the sufficiency of the evidence are well established
and are found in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)
and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We refer the parties to
those cases.
Christopher Gonzalez, the owner of New Meaning Drywall, discovered that some
checks on his business account were missing. Thereafter, he closed his account.
On May 25, 2006, Lance Branscum delivered an order of pizzas to an apartment.
Appellant answered the door but only wide enough to accept the pizzas and give
Branscum a check. The check was written against the closed account of Christopher
Gonzalez and had on its face the name “C. Michael Gonzalez d/b/a New Meaning Drywall.”
The address of the drywall business also appeared on it. Apparently because the
instrument contained the endorsement of a “Michael Gonzalez,” appellant told Branscum
that it was from his roommate. However, the actual account owner testified that he did not
know appellant; thus it could be rationally inferred that he was not appellant’s roommate.
Branscum did not ask for identification but instead returned to his vehicle. So too
did he observe that the address on the check was not that of the location at which he
delivered the pizzas. Consequently, he called the telephone number on the check and
reached C. Michael Gonzalez (the actual account owner) who told Branscum that he did
not order any pizzas.
Appellant was charged with forgery with intent to defraud and harm another by
passing a forged writing knowing such writing to be forged.1 See TEX . PEN . CODE ANN .
§32.21(a)(1)(B) and (b) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Before us, he does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to show that he passed a forged writing, but questions whether
the State proved he knew it to be forged.
Authority illustrates that from evidence of a defendant making an affirmative, false
statement explaining how he obtained the instrument, a jury can rationally conclude,
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The State established through its own expert handwriting witness that appellant was not the m aker
of the check.
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beyond all reasonable doubt, that he had knowledge of the instrument’s forged nature.
See Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see also Colburn v.
State, 501 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding that false representations as
to the maker or origin of the check constitute sufficient evidence to prove knowledge the
check is forged); Golden v. State, 475 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (holding
that the evidence was sufficient to prove knowledge of its forged nature when the
defendant possessed and passed the forged check and falsely represented that he
obtained it from a specific person). Here, the check appeared to be executed by Michael
Gonzalez of New Meaning Drywall. The maker, according to appellant, was his roommate.
Yet, the address appearing on the check was not that of the location whereat appellant was
found. Moreover, C. Michael Gonzalez of New Meaning Drywall testified that he did not
know appellant. From this, and the teachings of Williams, Colburn, and Golden, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant knew the check given Branscum was forged.
As to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, none of the police officers investigating
the crime remembered Branscum telling them that appellant had said his roommate wrote
the check. Nevertheless, the credibility of Branscum was for the jury to resolve, and we
find no basis on which to overturn its resolution of that issue. If believed, the evidence was
both legally and factually sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
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