in the Matter of the Marriage of Arturo Joel Marin and Elizabeth Friday and in the Interest of Malissa Marin, a Child ( 2005 )

NO. 07-04-0456-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL D
MARCH 24, 2005
______________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE
OF ARTURO JOEL MARIN AND ELIZABETH FRIDAY
AND IN THE INTEREST OF MALISSA MARIN, A CHILD
_________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1, LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2004-526,011; HONORABLE RUSTY B. LADD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Elizabeth Friday,1 acting pro se, perfected appeal from a default decree
of divorce terminating her marriage to appellee Arturo Joel Marin. That decree, rendered
August 12, 2004, named appellee as sole managing conservator and named appellant
possessory conservator of the couple’s only child. Appellant timely perfected appeal by
filing a notice of appeal September 3, 2004. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1.
1
Appellant’s docketing statement reflects her current name as Elizabeth Friday Atnip.
The trial court’s docket sheet contains a notation that the court also treated
appellant’s notice of appeal as a motion for new trial and set the motion for a hearing.
Appellant filed an amended motion for new trial November 16, 2004, and the motion was
heard November 22, 2004. On receiving a third supplemental clerk’s record on January
27, 2005, containing an order signed by the trial court judge January 25, 2005, providing
appellant’s motion for new trial “is hereby GRANTED,” we considered the effect of that
order on the pending appeal.
After reviewing the clerk’s record we concluded the order granting a new trial signed
January 25, 2005, was ineffective because it was signed after the time for such orders
allowed by Rule of Civil Procedure 329b. In re Marriage of Marin, No. 07-04-0456-CV
(Tex.App.–Amarillo February 7, 2005). Our February 7 order directed appellant to file her
brief no later than March 7, 2005, and cautioned her the failure to do so, or seek an
extension of time in which to file her brief, would make her appeal subject to dismissal for
want of prosecution. Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1). Appellant has not filed a brief or motion
for extension as directed in our February 7 order.
Litigants representing themselves must comply with the same procedural rules as
are applicable to represented parties. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181,
184-85 (Tex. 1978); Clemens v. Allen, 47 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
Because of her failure to file a brief or make any other response to this court’s order,
appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b),(c).
Per Curiam
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