Jose M. Rodriguez v. State ( 2006 )


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  •                                   NO. 07-05-0355-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL D
    SEPTEMBER 5, 2006
    ______________________________
    JOSE M. RODRIQUEZ, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2005-409220; HONORABLE JIM BOB DARNELL, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Following a plea of not guilty, appellant Jose M. Rodriquez was convicted by a jury
    of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to sixty years confinement.
    By a single issue, appellant contends the evidence was factually insufficient to support a
    finding of guilt. We affirm.
    Appellant was charged with abducting the victim and forcing her to drive to various
    locations in Lubbock while threatening her with a pocketknife. At trial, the victim testified
    she met appellant at the He’s Not Here Saloon on Avenue Q where they played three
    games of pool. After the third game, the victim decided to leave. As she walked toward
    the door, appellant asked her for a ride; however, she refused stating she had to go to
    work. She then left the bar and walked to her vehicle in the parking lot. Immediately after
    entering her vehicle, the victim testified she saw appellant sitting in the passenger seat
    holding a pocketknife. Appellant ordered her to drive and stated that he also had a gun.
    The victim testified she did not jump out of the vehicle and run back into the bar because
    she “was in shock.”
    First, appellant ordered the victim to drive to a “crack house” on 14th Street. During
    the drive, appellant repeatedly threatened to “slice [her] throat” if she “tried to do anything
    stupid.” Upon arriving at the residence, the victim observed several men in front of the
    house. One of the men approached the vehicle and handed appellant a substance
    wrapped in tinfoil. Appellant then proceeded to smoke the substance in a glass pipe. He
    also attempted to make the victim smoke some of the substance but was unsuccessful.
    While appellant was preoccupied, the victim testified she grabbed an ASP baton she
    carried for protection from beneath the seat and put it under her legs so that it was easily
    accessible. She also stated she did not jump out of the vehicle at this point because she
    did not feel safe amongst the men and feared being “dragged into the house.”
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    Next, appellant instructed her to drive slowly through two hotel parking lots. The
    victim testified she did not feel safe getting out at either hotel and was hoping appellant
    would eventually leave her alone. Appellant then ordered her to drive to a secluded
    industrial area on Slaton Highway. At some point, the victim decided to ignore the
    command and made a U-turn back toward town. Appellant became angry and stated he
    was going to rape her and cut her throat. The victim pulled into the Unisource warehouse
    parking lot and told appellant she needed to take one of her anxiety pills before she could
    drive any further. As appellant looked for her pills in the ashtray, she stepped on the gas
    and jumped out of the vehicle. As appellant took off in her vehicle, she ran to the loading
    dock of the warehouse and told two Unisource employees to call the police.
    Lubbock police officers found the victim’s abandoned truck the next day, and the
    victim subsequently identified appellant out of a photo lineup. At trial, the State called
    seven witnesses, including the victim. One witness testified on behalf of appellant. By his
    sole issue on appeal, appellant contends the evidence was factually insufficient to sustain
    the jury’s finding that he assaulted the victim with a deadly weapon. We disagree.
    In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence without the prism
    of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and set aside the verdict only if it is so
    contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
    Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    , 9 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000).             We must determine after
    considering all the evidence in a neutral light, whether the jury was rationally justified in
    finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.          Zuniga v. State, 
    144 S.W.3d 477
    , 484
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    (Tex.Cr.App. 2004). In our review, we do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh any
    evidence, or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, as this was the function of the trier
    of fact. See Adelman v. State, 
    828 S.W.2d 418
    , 421 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992).
    Here, the evidence is consistent with the victim’s testimony that she was assaulted
    with a deadly weapon. Barry Baird testified he arrived at the He’s Not Here Saloon and
    observed the victim and appellant in the parking lot by her vehicle. The victim testified
    appellant brandished a pocketknife throughout the event and repeatedly threatened to
    harm her.    The two Unisource employees testified they saw a vehicle pull into the
    warehouse parking lot and observed the victim run up to the loading dock “screaming and
    yelling.” They described her as “shaken, hysterical, and crying” and heard her say that a
    man was trying to stab her and kill her. They also recalled seeing a black baton in the
    parking lot. The baton was later retrieved by a police officer.
    Lubbock police officer James Sullivan, who responded to the scene and took the
    victim’s statement, described the victim as “absolutely hysterical” and stated that she
    appeared to be a victim. The next day, he was able to lift two fingerprints from the victim’s
    vehicle which were later confirmed to be those of appellant. Detective Roy Vieregge
    confirmed the victim was able to identify appellant out of a photo lineup and that appellant’s
    fingerprints were found in the victim’s vehicle. Furthermore, he testified he was initially
    skeptical of the victim’s version of events, but after further investigation, became “very
    comfortable” that the events actually happened.
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    On the other hand, the lone witness for the defense, David Gomez, who was
    awaiting trial on charges of aggravated assault and murder, testified he was at the house
    on 14th Street and remembered the victim and appellant together “looking to get some
    drugs.” He stated he observed the victim and appellant smoke crack cocaine and rode in
    the backseat of the victim’s truck while they searched for methamphetamine. He further
    stated he did not hear appellant threaten the victim and did not see a knife.
    After reviewing the entire record, we find the evidence indicating appellant assaulted
    the victim with a deadly weapon to be sufficient. The jury, as trier of fact, may choose to
    believe all, some, or none of any witness's testimony. Sharp v. State, 
    707 S.W.2d 611
    , 614
    (Tex.Cr.App. 1986). A jury's decision is not manifestly unjust merely because it resolved
    conflicting views of evidence in favor of the State. Cain v. State, 
    958 S.W.2d 404
    , 410
    (Tex.Cr.App. 1997). Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence is
    not so weak that the jury's verdict was clearly wrong and unjust, nor is the verdict so
    against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. We
    hold the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s
    issue is overruled.
    Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
    Don H. Reavis
    Justice
    Do not publish.
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