the Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings v. Carol Birch, Charles Homer, Ann Landeros and Carol Wood ( 2010 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-10-00777-CV
The TEXAS STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS,
Appellant
v.
Carol BIRCH, Charles Homer, Ann Landeros, and Carol Wood,
Appellees
From the 419th District Court, Travis County, Texas
Trial Court No. D-1-GN-09-004285
The Honorable Gisela D. Triana-Doyal, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 15, 2010
REVERSED AND RENDERED
This appeal was transferred to this court from the Third Court of Appeals. Appellees
Carol Birch, Charles Homer, Ann Landeros, and Carol Wood (“appellees”) are former
Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”). Appellees sued the Texas State Office of Administrative
Hearings (“the SOAH”), claiming they were either fired or constructively discharged based on
age, gender, or disability. Appellees also claim they were wrongfully terminated in retaliation
for their opposition to “illegal crony favoritism,” and “illegal practices in the operation of state
04-10-00777-CV
agencies tasked with the administration of judicial and quasi-judicial functions.” The SOAH
filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, arguing the trial court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over appellees’ common law claims. The trial court denied the
SOAH’s plea and this interlocutory appeal followed. We reverse the trial court’s order because
sovereign immunity has not been waived, and therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Birch alleges she was constructively discharged due to discrimination based on sex, age,
and disability, as well as in retaliation for her opposition to discriminatory and illegal practices.
Homer alleges he was constructively discharged because he opposed the discriminatory practices
of the SOAH, and Team Leaders pressuring ALJs into making certain decisions. Landeros
alleges she was constructively discharged because she opposed discriminatory practices,
including sexual harassment. As for Wood, she alleges she was terminated because she opposed
discriminatory practices, and because she was paid $350 per month in longevity pay and
received twenty-one hours per month in vacation time. Collectively, appellees claim they were
all terminated for refusing to perform illegal acts, namely, refusing to give in to illegal cronyism.
Appellees cite to Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck in support of their “illegal acts” claims. See
687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). The SOAH filed its plea to the jurisdiction with regard to
appellees’ common law claims.
ANALYSIS
The SOAH contends the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear
appellees’ common law claims under Sabine Pilot. Whether a trial court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law, and is therefore subject to a de novo review. Tex. Dep’t of
Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).
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Unless the Texas Legislature expressly waives sovereign immunity, state agencies are
immune from suit. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). To establish a waiver of
immunity, parties seeking relief must point to a “legislative statute or a resolution granting
express legislative permission.” Salazar v. Lopez, 88 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
In Sabine Pilot, the Texas Supreme Court set forth the very narrow exception to the
Texas at-will employment doctrine, holding that an employee may sue if he was terminated
because he refused to perform an illegal act. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 734-35. Although
Sabine Pilot concerns only non-governmental employers, appellees argue Texas public policy
mandates an extension of Sabine Pilot to governmental employees. Neither the Texas Supreme
Court nor the Third Court of Appeals has directly addressed this issue, but several other courts of
appeals have refused to extend Sabine Pilot to governmental employees. See Midland Indep.
School Dist. v. Watley, 216 S.W.3d 374, 376 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Nueces
County v. Thornton, 2004 WL 396608, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 4, 2004, no pet.);
Salazar, 88 S.W.3d at 353; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767,
777 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Carroll v. Black, 938 S.W.2d
134, 134-35 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, writ denied). These courts have held the governmental
entity retains its sovereign immunity when an employee raises a common law, Sabine Pilot cause
of action. See id. Moreover, appellees have not cited a statute or resolution that establishes a
waiver of immunity in a case like the one before us. Therefore, in accordance with prior
decisions of this court, we refuse to extend the Sabine Pilot exception to governmental
employees. See Salazar, 88 S.W.3d at 353. As we noted in Salazar, the waiver of sovereign
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immunity is best left to the Legislature, not the courts. 88 S.W.3d at 353 (citing Univ. of Tex.
Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994)).
Because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear appellees’ common
law claims, we reverse the trial court’s order.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and dismiss appellees’ common law
claims.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
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