Randall W. Moir v. JP Morgan Chase NA ( 2014 )


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  • DISMISS; and Opinion Filed December 4, 2014.
    S   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-14-00899-CV
    RANDALL W. MOIR, Appellant
    V.
    JP MORGAN CHASE NA, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 429-04102-2013
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices FitzGerald, Fillmore, and Stoddart
    Opinion by Justice Fillmore
    Randall Moir appeals the trial court’s order granting the application for expedited
    foreclosure of a home equity lien filed by appellee JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, pursuant to
    Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 736.8. Upon review of the clerk’s record, it appeared that the
    order from which the appeal was taken was not an appealable order. On August 19, 2014, we
    notified appellant by letter that we questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal.          We gave
    appellant ten days to file a jurisdictional brief explaining how this Court has jurisdiction in light
    of the provisions of rule 736.8(c).      In response, appellant stated that a rule 736 order is
    appealable when “basic legal principles of common law regarding jurisdiction and standing have
    been violated.” Thereafter, appellee responded that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of
    jurisdiction on the ground the order is not appealable based on the plain language of rule 736.
    Appellee noted that appellant has cited no authority in support of his proposition that the order is
    appealable.
    Appellate courts may review only final judgments or interlocutory orders specifically
    made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001).
    Rule 736.8(c) specifically provides that an order granting or denying an application under rule
    736 “is not subject to a motion for rehearing, new trial, bill of review, or appeal” and must be
    challenged in a separate, independent, original proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction.
    See TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.8(c); see also Pittman v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 05-14-00853-CV,
    
    2014 WL 4207154
    , at *1 (Tex. App. Dallas Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing
    appeal for want of jurisdiction). Here, the order appellant seeks to appeal granted the expedited
    home equity foreclosure application filed by appellee pursuant to rule 736.8. The appeal is
    precluded by rule 736.8(c). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.8(c). The Legislature has provided appellant
    a means for challenging the trial court’s order, but that exclusive means is an original proceeding
    in a court of competent jurisdiction rather than an appeal to this Court. Because appellant
    challenges an unappealable order, we hold that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
    Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    /Robert M. Fillmore/
    ROBERT M. FILLMORE
    JUSTICE
    140899F.P05
    –2–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    RANDALL W. MOIR, Appellant                         On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District
    Court, Collin County, Texas
    No. 05-14-00899-CV         V.                      Trial Court Cause No. 429-04102-2013.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore,
    JP MORGAN CHASE NA, Appellee                       Justices FitzGerald and Stoddart
    participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED for want
    of jurisdiction.
    It is ORDERED that appellee JP MORGAN CHASE NA recover its costs of this appeal
    from appellant RANDALL W. MOIR.
    Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2014.
    –3–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-14-00899-CV

Filed Date: 12/9/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2014