Five Thousand Nine Hundred and Seven Dollars v. State ( 2014 )


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  • AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed December 5, 2014.
    S   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-01367-CV
    FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SEVEN DOLLARS
    ($5,907) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-06641
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Francis, Myers, and Brown
    Opinion by Justice Francis
    Noe Delarosa appeals the trial court’s judgment, which found $5,907 in United States
    currency to be contraband and subject to forfeiture. The money was seized from Delarosa by
    police following his arrest for possession of a controlled substance. Delarosa contends the State
    failed to establish probable cause that a substantial connection exists between the $5,907 and the
    untried possession offense. We affirm.
    The officers who stopped and arrested Delarosa testified at the forfeiture trial. They
    stopped him as he was driving through downtown Dallas because the music being played in his
    vehicle was so loud it was “echoing through downtown” and causing a disturbance. Officers
    identified Delarosa, determined that he had a number of outstanding warrants, and arrested him.
    When asked if there was anything in the vehicle that the police needed to know about, Delarosa
    stated he had some weed in a black backpack. In fact, the backpack found in the vehicle
    contained marijuana in several baggies, a large number of empty baggies (including 76 “dime”
    bags used in the sale of crack cocaine), log sheets for narcotics transactions, a scale, measuring
    spoons, and the $5,907. The scale contained cocaine residue; the spoons and some of the bags
    contained marijuana residue.
    Delarosa was in federal custody on an unrelated offense at the time of trial. He testified
    by telephone, stating that after he was placed under arrest and handcuffed, the officers searched
    him and took nearly $6,000 from his pockets. He testified that he was carrying that large amount
    of cash because he was working “some pretty big jobs” close to where he was pulled over, and
    he had just been paid. Delarosa also said he had corresponded with his customers and his lawyer
    to obtain proof that the cash he was carrying that day was payment for work he had performed.
    He testified that his lawyer had documentation from those customers, and he had been counting
    on his lawyer to handle the trial for him. But Delarosa was not represented at the forfeiture trial.
    In rebuttal, the State re-called the arresting officer, who testified that no money was taken
    from Delarosa’s pockets when he was arrested.
    The State argued the evidence seized from Delarosa’s backpack established that he was
    selling both cocaine and marijuana. According to the State, the proximity of the cash to the
    drugs and drug paraphernalia established that the cash was drug money—earned by selling
    cocaine and marijuana—that should be forfeited.
    Delarosa told the trial court he would present evidence to show the money was
    legitimately earned. However, our record does not include a motion for new trial or any other
    post-judgment filing in the trial court whereby such evidence could have been presented to the
    trial court. Delarosa did attach to his notice of appeal two letters from businesses confirming
    that he had worked for them doing general contract work and that they had paid him a total of
    –2–
    $7,700. However, these letters are not part of our record, and we may not consider them in our
    review. See Perry v. Kroger Stores Store No. 119, 
    741 S.W.2d 533
    , 534 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    1987, no writ) (documents attached to brief cannot be considered); see also Watts v. Hancock,
    No. 05-12-01635-CV, 
    2014 WL 2807955
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18, 2014, no pet.)
    (documents attached to notice of appeal cannot be considered).
    Property that is contraband is subject to seizure and forfeiture. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC.
    ANN. art. 59.02(a) (West Supp. 2014). The statutory definition of contraband includes any
    property used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony under chapter 481 of the
    Texas Health and Safety Code, the Texas Controlled Substances Act. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC.
    ANN. art. 59.01(2)(B)(i). Possession of marijuana greater than four ounces is a state jail felony
    for which the forfeiture statute applies. See id.; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121
    (West 2010). In a forfeiture proceeding, the burden is on the State to establish there was
    probable cause to seize the property; in this context, probable cause is a reasonable belief that a
    substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited and criminal activity defined
    by statute. Fifty-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars in U.S. Currency v. State, 
    730 S.W.2d 659
    , 661 (Tex. 1987).
    In his first appellate issue, Delarosa contends the State failed to establish the necessary
    connection between the $5,907 and the untried charge that he possessed more than four ounces
    of marijuana. We disagree. The State offered evidence that the money was found in the same
    backpack as the marijuana and its associated paraphernalia. The arresting officer testified that
    the presence of the scale, spoons, and dime bags—as well as the log of transactions recording
    payments he had received—indicated Delarosa was selling drugs and the money was payment
    for those sales. Although Delarosa contended the money was payment for legitimate work, he
    offered no evidence other than his own testimony of such a connection. We conclude the State
    –3–
    established a reasonable belief that the $5,907 was substantially connected to Delarosa’s
    possession of the marijuana. We overrule his first issue.
    In his second issue, Delarosa states he has “a statutory right to compel the agency to
    proceed by judicial forfeiture.” The complaint lacks clarity, in the first instance, because the
    State did proceed by judicial process. Delarosa’s legal authority is not helpful either: he cites
    two cases addressing default judgments, although his case was not resolved by default. He also
    cites a case concerning the requirement of notice to satisfy due process. In his summary of
    argument, Delarosa states that his notice of the forfeiture proceeding was served at a residential
    address although the police and district attorney knew he was in federal custody. But Delarosa
    made no complaint concerning notice at trial. To the contrary, he appeared at trial by telephone,
    and he testified that he had been in contact with witnesses and with his attorney concerning
    gathering evidence for trial. Although Delarosa stated he thought his attorney would be present,
    he did not complain that he lacked notice of the nature or timing of the trial. To the extent
    Delarosa’s second issue is a complaint that he received inadequate notice of the forfeiture
    proceeding, we conclude he did not preserve that complaint for our review. See Prade v. Helm,
    
    725 S.W.2d 525
    , 527 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (complaint of inadequate notice under
    rules of civil procedure is waived absent timely and specific objection). We overrule his second
    issue.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Molly Francis/
    MOLLY FRANCIS
    JUSTICE
    131367F.P05
    –4–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED                           On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District
    AND SEVEN DOLLARS ($5,907) IN                        Court, Dallas County, Texas
    UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Appellant                    Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-06641.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Francis.
    No. 05-13-01367-CV         V.                        Justices Myers and Brown participating.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellee THE STATE OF TEXAS recover its costs of this appeal
    from NOE DELAROSA.
    Judgment entered this 5th day of December, 2014.
    –5–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-13-01367-CV

Filed Date: 12/9/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2014