State v. Christopher Glen Adams , 454 S.W.3d 48 ( 2014 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-13-00048-CR
The STATE of Texas,
Appellant
v.
Christopher Glen ADAMS,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR120324
Honorable Spencer W. Brown, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2014
REVERSED AND REMANDED
This case stems from a trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress following the arrest of
Appellee Christopher Glen Adams for driving while intoxicated. Because we conclude the trial
court erred in determining that Adams was under arrest when the officer requested Adams
accompany him back to the accident scene, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Adams’s
motion to suppress and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This court previously issued an opinion in this DWI motion to suppress. See State v.
Adams, No. 04-13-00048-CR, 2014 WL 2874270 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 24, 2014, no
pet.). Because the trial court erred in refusing to file the more specific findings of fact requested
by the State, we remanded the cause to the trial court to make additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Id. at *8. We instructed the trial court to “make ‘findings of fact with greater
specificity’” as to the following:
(1) the impact of the injuries sustained by Mr. Rice and the blood on his face and
whether any such injuries supported [Department of Public Safety Trooper
James Salaz’s] probable cause to arrest Adams for driving while intoxicated;
(2) the extent of Trooper Salaz’s conversation with Adams, prior to Adams being
transported back to the scene of the accident, wherein Adams admitted he was
the driver of the vehicle and that he had been drinking, and whether such
conversation supported a custodial arrest or an investigatory detention; and
(3) whether [the period when] Trooper Salaz transported Adams from the accident
scene to the fire station was part of an investigatory detention, what transpired
at the fire station, what factors were utilized in Trooper Salaz’s decision to
arrest Adams for driving while intoxicated, and whether such information
amounted to probable cause to arrest Adams for driving while intoxicated.
Id. at *7–8. On July 21, 2014, the trial court’s additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
were filed with this court and the matter was reinstated on this court’s docket.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Having provided a rather detailed rendition of the facts in our previous opinion, we need
not do so here. See id. at *1–2. The parties agree that an accident occurred in the early morning
hours of January 22, 2012. A nearby resident called police and advised the officers that the two
men in the vehicle were down the road at the Steinle residence. Upon Trooper Salaz’s arrival at
the residence, Adams immediately acknowledged he was the driver of the vehicle and ultimately
entered Trooper Salaz’s vehicle to accompany him to the accident scene. The parties disagree,
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however, whether Adams’s actions were voluntary and part of the investigative detention or they
were the result of his arrest.
We, therefore, begin our analysis with whether Trooper Salaz’s request for Adams to return
with him to the accident scene amounted to an arrest.
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION OR ARREST
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under an abuse of
discretion standard and disturbs such ruling only if it falls “outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); State v. Dixon,
206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Castro v. State, 373 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2012, no pet.). “We further apply a bifurcated standard of review, according almost
total deference to the trial court to determine historical facts and those facts which depend upon
witness credibility.” Castro, 373 S.W.3d at 163–64 (citing Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). When the trial court enters findings of fact, the appellate court considers
all of the evidence in the record and “must determine whether the evidence supports those facts by
viewing the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” Id. at 164 (citing Keehn v. State, 279
S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)); accord Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
B. Degree of Restraint
“There are three distinct categories of interactions between police officers and citizens: (1)
encounters, (2) investigative detentions, and (3) arrests.” Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (citing State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Although
both detention and arrest involve some form of restraint on one’s freedom of movement; the
difference is in degree. State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 290–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
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Castro, 373 S.W.3d at 164. The test for whether a person has been arrested is whether the facts
demonstrate the individual’s liberty of movement was actually restricted or restrained. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22 (West 2005); Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 411–12 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (“An arrest occurs when a person’s liberty of movement is restricted or
restrained.”). Simply put, an arrest involves a greater degree of restraint on an individual’s
freedom of movement than that in an investigative detention. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 290
(identifying relevant factors including “the amount of force displayed, the duration of a detention,
the efficiency of the investigative process and whether . . . the person is transported to another
location, . . . [and] whether [the officer] told the detained person that he was under arrest). When
determining whether the officer’s actions amounted to an arrest, we consider the totality of the
circumstances. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49; Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492–93 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); accord State v. Whittington, 401 S.W.3d 263, 272 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).
C. Facts Before the Trial Court
During his testimony, Trooper Salaz further explained he told Adams that “[s]ince this
involved an injury, especially an injury, and damage in excess of a thousand dollars,” he needed
to complete a “crash report.” According to Trooper Salaz’s testimony, “I asked [Adams] if we
could go back to the scene, and so I [could] complete my crash report.” Trooper Salaz continued
that Adams readily agreed, and that an “unhandcuffed” Adams “jumped in my patrol car” and they
drove to the scene of the accident. When asked, Trooper Salaz testified that Adams was not under
arrest, and the only reason Adams was in his patrol car was so they could return to the truck to
generate the crash report.
Trooper Salaz testified that on the drive back to the accident “the air within the car filled
up with that odor of somebody who has been drinking” and Adams again admitted to consuming
alcohol. As part of his investigation, Trooper Salaz “wanted to make sure [Adams] should have
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been driving in the first place” and requested Adams complete some field sobriety tests. Adams
agreed. However, because Trooper Salaz did not feel the accident scene—an undulated, dirt
roadway—was a safe place to conduct the tests, he drove Adams to the volunteer fire department
which had a large parking lot, “a safer environment.”
Based on a strong smell of alcohol coming from Adams, Adams’s admitting to consuming
alcohol, and Adams’s performance on the field sobriety tests (the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk
and turn, and one-leg stand tests), Trooper Salaz concluded that Adams “was not safe to drive”
and placed Adams under arrest for driving while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 49.01(2) (West 2011) (defining intoxicated as “not having the normal use of mental or physical
faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, . . . or any other substance into the body.”).
On cross-examination, Trooper Salaz conceded that he did not see Adams either driving or
wreck the vehicle. He also acknowledged that although he told Adams he was legally obligated
to stay at the scene of the accident because someone was injured and there was over $1,000.00 in
damage, Adams was actually only required to report the accident, not necessarily stay at the scene.
D. Analysis
In its second issue, the State contends the trial court erred in concluding that Adams was
arrested at the Steinle residence. The evidence and the trial court’s findings of fact show that
Adams’s liberty of movement was not restricted. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22;
Amores, 816 S.W.2d at 411–12. Specifically, Trooper Salaz testified that he asked Adams if he
would mind accompanying him back to the scene. Adams was not handcuffed and there were no
weapons drawn. Adams was not blocked in by police cars or ordered to accompany Trooper Salaz.
To the contrary, Trooper Salaz stated he “asked” Adams to accompany him back to the scene of
the accident and an “unhandcuffed” Adams “jumped in my patrol car” and the trial court found
Trooper Salaz “requested” Adams to accompany him.
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The circumstances in this case simply do not meet the level of Amores and its progeny.
816 S.W.2d at 411–12; see also Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(concluding “arrest” occurs “when a person’s liberty of movement is successfully restricted or
restrained, whether this is achieved by an officer’s physical force or the suspect’s submission to
the officer’s authority”). Compare Burkes v. State, 830 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
(concluding an arrest occurred when, without any prior questioning, officer shined a flashlight in
the appellant’s eyes, ordered him to lie on the ground, and handcuffed him); and Hoag v. State,
728 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (concluding an arrest occurred when suspect
removed from the car at gunpoint, taken to the rear of the car, and given Miranda warnings);
Carter v. State, 150 S.W.3d 230, 237–38 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (holding
investigatory detention when officer testified that he “asked” unhandcuffed, un-Mirandized
defendant to get into the car and denied that he “told” him to get into the car); with Lamb v. State,
No. 14-01-01034-CR, 2003 WL 21782346, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 31, 2003,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding an arrest had not occurred when
the appellant walked away from the approaching officers; officer’s partner told appellant to “come
here;” the appellant continued to walk away; after officer’s partner made contact with appellant’s
arm, appellant stopped and turned toward the officers); and Garcia v. State, 967 S.W.2d 902, 905
(Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (concluding investigative detention and comparing to case
when four police vehicles were on the scene and ten to fifteen officers, with weapons drawn, were
present). Here, the facts only support that the interactions between Trooper Salaz and Adams,
resulting in Adams accompanying Trooper Salaz in his patrol car back to the accident scene,
amounted to an investigative detention and not an arrest. See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49. Because
Adams was not arrested prior to leaving the Steinle residence, we sustain the State’s second
appellate issue.
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CONCLUSION
We conclude that Adams’s presence in Trooper Salaz’s vehicle was not an arrest. Because
Adams does not raise an issue with the officer’s probable cause to arrest for DWI based on the
smell of alcohol emanating from Adams, Adams’s admission of consuming alcohol, and his failed
field sobriety tests, our analysis ends here. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of
Appellee Adams’s motion to suppress and remand this matter to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
PUBLISH
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