Brence J. Walker v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
02-14-00493-cr
FILED SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS FORT WORTH, TEXAS
7/2/2015 12:59:52 PM
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS DEBRA SPISAK
CLERK
July 7, 2015
Cause No. 02-14-00493-CR
DEBRA SPISAK, CLERK
IN FILED IN -
2nd COURT OF---APPEALS ---
THE COURT OF APPEALS FORT WORTH, --- - - TEXAS
FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS - - ---- SC ------
7/2/2015- 12:59:52
- ID - PM
-
---- VO ------
AT FORT WORTH DEBRA - - SPISAK
----
----Clerk
__________________________________________________________________
BRENCE J. WALKER
RECEIVED IN
Appellant 2nd COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
7/2/2015 12:59:52 PM
v.
DEBRA SPISAK
Clerk
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from Cause No. 1335687D in the 396th District Court of
Tarrant County, Texas, Honorable Elizabeth Berry, Judge Presiding
__________________________________________________________________
Appellant’s Brief on Appeal
__________________________________________________________________
Stickels & Associates, P.C.
John W. Stickels
State Bar No. 19225300
Bethel T. Zehaie
SBOT No. 24073791
P. O. Box 121431
Arlington, Texas 76012
Phone: (817) 479 - 9282
Fax: (817) 622 – 8071
john@stickelslaw.com
Attorneys for Appellant
Brence J. Walker
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 38(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
following is a complete list of the names and addresses of all parties to the trial
court’s final judgment and counsel in the trial court, as well as appellate counsel, so
the members of the court may at once determine whether they are disqualified to
serve or should recuse themselves from participating in the decision of the case and
so the Clerk of the Court may properly notify the parties to the trial court’s final
judgment or their counsel, if any, of the judgment and all orders of the Court of
Appeals.
Trial Judge: The Honorable Elizabeth Berry
396th District Court – Visiting Judge
Tarrant County, Texas
401 Belknap
Fort Worth, Texas 761966
Appellant: Mr. Brence J. Walker
TDC No. 01920746
J. Middleton Transfer Facility
13055 FM 3522
Abilene, TX 79601
i
Appellant’s Trial
and Appellate Counsel: Mr. John W. Stickels
SBOT No. 19225300
and
Bethel T. Zehaie
SBOT No. 24073791
P. O. Box 121431
770 N. Fielder Rd.
Fort Worth, Texas 76104-7666
Appellee: The State of Texas
Appellee’s Trial Counsel: Mr. Jacob O. Mitchell
SBOT NO. 24060298
and
Mr. William A. Vassar
SBOT NO. 24039224
Assistant District Attorneys
401 W. Belknap Street
Fort Worth, Texas 76196
Appellee’s Counsel
on Appeal: Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney
Appeals Division
401 Belknap
Fort Worth, Texas 76196
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE PARTIES........................................................................................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... vi
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE ............................................................1
POINTS OF ERROR .................................................................................................3
POINT OF ERROR 1 ................................................................................................3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 9, 10, AND 19 OF THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTION. .....................................................................................................3
POINT OF ERROR 2 ................................................................................................3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38.23 OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE............................................................................................................3
POINT OF ERROR 3 ................................................................................................3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18.22 OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE............................................................................................................3
iii
POINT OF ERROR 4 ................................................................................................3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE PERSON IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION..................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ......................................................................4
Appellant was wrongfully convicted of the felony offense of possession of a firearm
by a felon because the Court erred in overruling his Motion to Suppress the Search
of the Motor Vehicle. This error allowed the jury to consider evidence, the firearm,
which was obtained in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9, 10, and 19 of the Texas Constitution. The jury
would not have convicted Appellant of this offense absent the Court’s error. .........4
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ...............................................................................4
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES........................................................................6
JURISDICTION.........................................................................................................6
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES POINTS OF ERROR ....................................7
POINT OF ERROR 1 - RESTATED ........................................................................7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 9, 10, AND 19 OF THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTION. .....................................................................................................7
POINT OF ERROR 2 - RESTATED ........................................................................7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38.23 OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE............................................................................................................7
iv
POINT OF ERROR 3 - RESTATED ........................................................................7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM HIS PERSON IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18.22 OF THE TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE............................................................................................................7
POINT OF ERROR 4 - RESTATED ........................................................................7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE PERSON IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION..................................................7
A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS – STANDARD OF REVIEW: ..................................7
B. MOTION TO SUPPRESS – THE APPLICABLE LAW: ...................................8
C. ERROR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE – HARM ANALYSIS: ......................12
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................14
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).......................................8
Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ...................................9
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000);..................................7
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987)..8, 9
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976)
................................................................................................................................8, 9
Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).......................................8
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990)..............9
Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)............................................8
Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd)..9,
11
Greer v. State, 436 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.–Waco 2014, no pet.)..............................10
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). .......................................7
Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)....9
Rodriquez v. State, 641 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1982, no writ) ...............9
Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).........................................8
vi
Statutes
Tex. Code Crim Proc. Art. 38.23(2001) ......................................................... 3, 7, 12
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 18.01(2007). ..................................................................8
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 18.04(2007). ..................................................................8
Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 18.22(2001). ...................................................... 3, 7, 12
Rules
Rule 38(a)................................................................................................................... i
Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). ........................................................................................6
Tex. R. App. P. 9(4)(i)(1)..........................................................................................14
Constitutional Provisions
Tex. Const. Art. I, §§ 9 ................................................................................... 4, 8, 12
Tex. Const. Art. I, §19 .................................................................................... 4, 8, 12
Tex. Xonst. Art. I, §10 .................................................................................... 4, 8, 12
U.S. Const. Amend. IV ................................................................................... 4, 8, 12
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ................................................................................ 4, 8, 12
vii
NO. 02-14-00493-CR
BRENCE J. WALKER , § IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant §
§
VS. § SECOND DISTRICT
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § FORT WORTH, TEXAS
APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON APPEAL
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Now comes Appellant, Brence J. Walker, with his Brief on Appeal from the
judgment of the 396th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, in Cause No.
1335687D and shows as follows:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: Criminal charges alleging the felony offense
of possession of a firearm by a felon. The
indictment also contained a habitual offender
notification. (CR. 5).
Deadly weapon allegation: Yes – a firearm. (CR. 5).
Course of the Proceedings: Tried before a jury and convicted for the
offense of possession of a firearm by a felon.
(CR. 33-38, 50; 3 RR 130).
1
Disposition of the case: The judge sentenced Appellant to
confinement for thirty-two (32) years in the
Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for the
offense of possession of a firearm by a felon.
(C.R. 64; 5 RR 61). Appellant has remained
in custody pending appeal.
Habitual offender finding: True. (CR. 64; 6 RR 6).
2
POINTS OF ERROR
POINT OF ERROR 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
FROM HIS PERSON IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS
9, 10, AND 19 OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION.
POINT OF ERROR 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
FROM HIS PERSON IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38.23 OF THE
TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
POINT OF ERROR 3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
FROM HIS PERSON IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18.22 OF THE
TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
POINT OF ERROR 4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE
PERSON IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS GUARANTEED
UNDER THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Appellant was wrongfully convicted of the felony offense of possession
of a firearm by a felon because the Court erred in overruling his Motion
to Suppress the Search of the Motor Vehicle. This error allowed the
jury to consider evidence, the firearm, which was obtained in violation
of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Sections 9, 10, and 19 of the Texas Constitution. The jury
would not have convicted Appellant of this offense absent the Court’s
error.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Court erred in overruling Appellant’s Motion to Suppress the Search of
the Motor Vehicle; thus, the jury wrongfully convicted Appellant of the felony
offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. This error allowed the jury to consider
evidence, the firearm, which was obtained in violation of the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the U. S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 8, 9, and 19 of the
Texas Constitution. U. S. Const. Amend V and XIV; Tex. Const. Art. 1, §§9, 10.
And 19. The jury would not have convicted Appellant of this offense without the
Court’s error.
On July 25, 2013, Fort Worth Police Officer Evans arrested Appellant at a
Chevron station in Fort Worth, Texas. (4 RR 16). Appellant drove a Chevrolet
impala into the station and Officer Evans recognized Appellant because there were
warrants issued for his arrest for traffic violations. (4 RR 16-17). After Appellant
exited the vehicle and entered the Chevron, Officer Evans followed Appellant into
4
the Chevron station and arrested him based on the outstanding warrants. (4 RR 17,
19-21). Officer Evans moved Appellant out of the station and placed him in the back
seat of the patrol car. (4 RR 21). Officer Evans waited for additional officers to
arrive at the Chevron station. (4 RR 21). After the other officers arrived at the scene,
Officer Evans transported Appellant to the jail. (4 RR 21-22).
Subsequent to Appellant being transported, Officer Evans looked in the
Chevrolet Impala and saw a pit bull and a black bag in the Impala. (4 RR 21-22).
Officer Evans then made a decision to impound the Chevrolet impala. (4 RR 22, 28).
As support for his decision to impound the Chevrolet impala, Officer Evans stated
that “the location of the vehicle was in a high crime area. The reason I was there to
begin with, being a GM product and Chevy Impala, they are stolen mostly in the
City of Fort Worth.” (4 RR 28, ln. 18-23) Later, Officer Evans testified that he
impounded the Chevrolet Impala “For the protection of the vehicle, the property
itself. And also there was an animal inside the vehicle that had to be removed and
taken into custody.” (4 RR 31. ln.11-16)
Officer Morehouse arrived at the Chevrolet station and conducted an
inventory search of the Impala. (4 RR 42-44). During the search Officer Morehouse
found a firearm inside the black bag in the vehicle. (4 RR 55-57). Subsequent to
the inventory search, the owner of the Chevrolet Impala arrived at the Chevron
5
station prior to the impala being impounded and the Impala was released to her. (4
RR 27-28, 31, 65).
Appellant was arrested and charged with the offense of felon in possession of
a firearm. His trial was held in the 396th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas
before the Honorable Elizabeth Berry. The jury convicted Appellant and the
Honorable Judge Berry sentenced Appellant to thirty-two (32) years confinement in
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and has
remained in custody pending trial.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Appellate Rule 25.2(a)(2), the trial court has filed with the papers
of this cause a Certificate of Defendant’s Right to Appeal which states that this is
not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right to appeal since the revocation
“is not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right to appeal).” (C.R. 70).
Thus, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s appeal. Tex. R. App. P.
25.2(a)(2).
6
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES POINTS OF ERROR
POINT OF ERROR 1 - RESTATED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
FROM HIS PERSON IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS
9, 10, AND 19 OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION.
POINT OF ERROR 2 - RESTATED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
FROM HIS PERSON IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38.23 OF THE
TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
POINT OF ERROR 3 - RESTATED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
FROM HIS PERSON IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18.22 OF THE
TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
POINT OF ERROR 4 - RESTATED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE
PERSON IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS GUARANTEED
UNDER THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS – STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under a bifurcated standard
of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103,
7
106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), but when the trial court’s rulings do not turn on the credibility
and demeanor of the witnesses, Appellate Courts apply a de novo standard of review.
Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
B. MOTION TO SUPPRESS – THE APPLICABLE LAW:
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by
government officials. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Wiede v. State,
214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The Texas Constitution contains similar rights.
Tex. Const. Art. I, §§ 9, 10, and 19. The defendant bears the initial burden of producing
evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct when alleging a violation of
the U.S. or Texas constitution. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred
without a warrant. Id. Once the defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts
to the State, who is then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted
pursuant to a warrant or the search was reasonable. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Arts. 18.01&
18.04 (2007); Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
A police officer’s inventory search of the contents of an automobile is permissible
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of
the Texas Constitution if conducted pursuant to a lawful impoundment. See Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S. Ct. 738, 741, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987); S. Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); Benavides v.
8
State, 600 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 702
(Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
Inventories serve to protect the following: (1) the owner's property while it is in
custody, (2) the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) the
police from potential danger. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097. Inventory
searches should be designed to produce an inventory, not turned into a purposeful and
general means of discovering evidence of a crime. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110
S. Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990). The officer may conduct an inventory search
subsequent to a decision to impound a vehicle, unless there has been a showing that the
officer acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372–
73, 107 S. Ct. at 741–42.
The state bears the burden of proving that an impoundment is lawful and may satisfy
its burden by showing that (1) the driver was arrested, (2) no alternatives other than
impoundment were available to ensure the vehicle's protection, (3) the impounding agency
had an inventory policy, and (4) the policy was followed. Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878,
882 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd).
Two general categories of events will justify impoundment. See Rodriquez v. State,
641 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1982, no writ). First, an officer may impound
a vehicle when the vehicle is a danger to traffic. Id. Second, an officer may impound a
vehicle after the arrest of the vehicle's driver when the vehicle cannot be protected by any
means other than impoundment. Id.; Greer v. State, 436 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.–Waco
9
2014, no pet.). An officer need not independently investigate possible alternatives to
impoundment absent some objectively demonstrable evidence that alternatives did exist.
Greer, 436 S.W.3d at 7.
The Fort Worth Police Department issued Policies and Procedures (Policy 320.01
A). This governs when and under what circumstances a motor vehicle may be impounded.
Policy 320.01 A was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1 and reads as follows:
An officer of the department may impound a motor vehicle and conduct a standard
inventory of its contents under the following circumstances:
1. Removal of motor vehicles from the scene of an accident.
2. Impoundment of motor vehicles parked in a tow away zone.
3. The motor vehicle is stolen or the officer has probable cause to believe that it is
stolen.
4. The driver is removed from the vehicle and placed under arrest, there is reasonable
connection between the arrest and the vehicle, and no other alternatives are
available other than impoundment to ensure the protection n of the vehicle.
5. The owner or driver requests or consents to the impoundment by the officer.
6. A motor vehicle which is being stored on any public street, parkway, sidewalk, or
alley in accordance with General Order 320.07,
7. A motor vehicle, which constitutes a danger, hazard, or obstruction to others using
the public to others using the public streets or highways.
8. The officer is authorized to seize and impound the motor vehicle under statute
(e.g., section 103.03 of the Alcoholic Beverage code), a city ordinance, a court
order, or the laws of search or seizure.
None of the conditions listed above were present at the time of the impoundment.
Officer Evans did not follow the procedures of the Fort Worth Police Department when he
decided to impound the Chevrolet Impala automobile. The Impala was not involved in an
accident nor was it illegally parked. (4-24, 25). Appellant was not removed from the
Impala for an arrest. According to Officer Evans—the arresting officer—Appellant was
10
arrested inside the Chevron station, while he was outside of the vehicle; thus, he was not
removed from the Impala for an arrest. Officer Evans admitted, multiple times, that he did
not follow the policies and procedures of the Fort Worth Police Department when he
impounded the Impala. Based on Officer Evans’s own testimony, none of the permitted
circumstances for impoundment were present in this instant case. According to Officer
Evans, the reason for the impoundment was: “For protection of the vehicle, the property
itself. And also there was an animal inside the vehicle which had to be removed and taken
into safety.” This is not a valid reason for impounding the Impala under the policies and
procedures of the Fort Worth Police Department.
Needing to impound the vehicle for the safety of the animal is not a valid condition
for impounding the Impala. Even then, according to Officer Morehouse, the animal was
removed from the vehicle before he even started to inventory the Impala. Therefore, any
reasoning provided by the officers of the Fort Worth Police Department do not support a
proper inventory search. An inventory search is only authorized when a vehicle is
impounded. Officer Morehead admitted that the policies and procedures of the Fort Worth
Police Department did not authorize impounding the Impala.
The impoundment of the Impala was not authorized under the policies and
procedures of the Fort Worth Police Department; thus, the impoundment and subsequent
inventory search of the vehicle was unconstitutional. Under Garza v. State, the state carries
the burden of proving that the impoundment is lawful. Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878, 882
(Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). They may satisfy this burden by proving
11
the following: (1) the driver was arrested, (2) no alternatives other than impoundment were
available to ensure the vehicle's protection, (3) the impounding agency had an inventory
policy, and (4) the policy was followed. The state did not prove that the policies and
procedures of the Fort Worth Police Department were followed when the Impala was
impounded. Id. Based on testimony of officers involved and their admissions, they did not
follow their own inventory policy. The inventory search was invalid because the
impoundment was not authorized and Appellant’s rights were violated under the 4th and
14th Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.
C. ERROR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE – HARM ANALYSIS:
The firearm seized from the vehicle was the only evidence that supported
Appellant’s conviction. The harm to Appellant resulting from the trial court’s wrongful
overruling of his Motion to Suppress Evidence is evident. This Court should reverse
Appellant’s conviction and order a new trial because the fruits of the illegal conduct
harmed Appellant. Based on the above and foregoing, Appellant’s rights as guaranteed
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution, Article
38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 1, Sections 9, 10, and 19 of
the Texas Constitution were violated and such violations require Appellant’s conviction to
be reversed. U.S. Const. Amend. IV, V, XIV; Tex. Const. Art. I, §9; §10, and §19; and
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 38.23 (2001); Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 18.22(2001).
12
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays:
1. That the judgment in this case be reformed and the deadly weapon finding
be stricken from the judgment;
2. To any further relief to which the Appellant may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
Stickels & Associates, P.C.
P. O. Box 121431
Arlington, Texas 76012
Phone: (817) 479-9282
Fax: (817) 622-8071
BY: /S/ John W. Stickels
John W. Stickels
State Bar No. 19225300
john@stickelslaw.com
Bethel T. Zehaie
SBOT No. 24073791
bethel@stickelslaw.com
Attorneys for Brence J. Walker
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Brief has been served
on the office of the Attorney for the State, on the 2nd day of July, 2015.
/S/ John W. Stickels
John W. Stickels
13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(i)(2) because it contains 3,040 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by
Tex. R. App. P. 9(4)(i)(1).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(e) because it has been prepared in proportional spaced typeface using Microsoft
Word software in Times New Roman 14-Point text and Times New Roman 12-point
font in footnotes.
/S/ John W. Stickels
John W. Stickels
14