Jose Alfredo Gallegos v. State ( 2015 )

NUMBER 13-14-00135-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JOSE ALFREDO GALLEGOS, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 92nd District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant, Jose Alfredo Gallegos, challenges his conviction for the offense of
assault against a family member, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
25.11 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 46 2015 R.S.). By three issues, which we treat
as two, Gallegos asserts that: (1) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (2)
he was harmed by cumulative error. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Two separate incidents within a 12-month period led to Gallegos being charged
with third degree felony assault of Maria Garcia, whom he dated for five years. The first
incident occurred on July 2, 2012, during a cookout at Garcia’s residence. Several
members of Garcia’s family and friends attended the cookout. On three separate
occasions that evening, Gallegos engaged in arguments with Garcia. Gallegos left the
cookout, along with Garcia’s guests, which left Garcia alone with her two children. Later
that evening, Gallegos entered Garcia’s residence through the kitchen door, walked
towards Garcia in the kitchen, and confronted her. Gallegos grabbed Garcia, struck her,
and caused her to fall on her face. As Garcia attempted to defend herself, her children
intervened, which prompted Gallegos to leave the scene. Two days later, Garcia filed
criminal charges against Gallegos. Officer Troy Williams of the Elsa Police Department
took Garcia’s initial report, which started the investigation.
The second incident occurred on August 23, 2012, under similar facts as the July
2nd incident. Garcia hosted a cookout at her residence, and Gallegos showed up twice
uninvited. Again, later that evening, Gallegos returned, broke Garcia’s residence’s
window, entered the house, and hit Garcia with his hand. Gallegos was arrested for this
incident three months later. The State indicted Gallegos the following year for
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to Garcia on July 2nd and
August 23rd, 2012. See Id.
During Gallegos’ trial, the State introduced testimony from fact witnesses, police
officers, investigators, and Garcia. Garcia’s thirteen-year old daughter testified that she
attempted to restrain Gallegos at the time of the July incident. Garcia’s eleven-year-old
2
son testified that he had also attempted to aid Garcia. Additionally, the State submitted
photographs of Garcia’s injuries from both assaults into evidence.
The jury found Gallegos guilty as charged and assessed Gallegos’ punishment at
fifteen years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional
Division with a $5,000.00 fine. This appeal followed.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
By two issues, which we treat as one, Gallegos asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective.
A. Standard of Review
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
meet two prongs: (1) appellant must show that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance; and (2) that as a result of his counsel’s deficient performance, his defense
was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Bone v. State, 77
S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Specifically, an appellant must show that his
counsel's representation fell below the objective standard of professional norms. Id.
Appellant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mitchell v. State, 68
S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc). A “reasonable probability” is one
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. It is not sufficient for an appellant
to show “that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”
Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 693). Rather, an appellant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that,
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id.
3
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). Therefore, the “benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
In evaluating the first prong of Strickland, counsel’s competence is presumed and
the defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney’s representation
was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action
was not sound strategy. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). If the
appellant fails to prove one prong of the test, we need not evaluate the other prong. See
Strickland at 697; Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A
defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates the court's need to
consider the second prong of the analysis. Cueva v. State, 339 S.W.3d 839, 857 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2011, pet. ref'd) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). Moreover,
counsel’s performance is deficient when his representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, unless a defendant can show in the record that counsel’s
conduct was not the product of a strategic decision. Id. 858.
B. Discussion
Gallegos first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed either
through a motion in limine or an objection to the State’s characterization of Garcia as “the
“victim” a total of fifteen times throughout the trial.
Gallegos cites a Connecticut decision for support. See State v. Cortez, 276 Conn.
241, 249 (2005). In Cortez, the court held the phrase “the victim” had prejudiced the
defendant. Id. at 250. The complainant in Cortez was referred to as “the victim” a total
4
of 76 times. In contrast, in this case, Garcia was referred as the victim fifteen times.
However, Cortez was explicitly overruled by a later decision by the Connecticut Supreme
Court. See State v. Ciullo, 314 Conn. 28, 54-55, 100 A.3d 779, 796 (2014) (concluding
that even if the reference to the laborers as “the victims” was improper, the outcome of
the case would have remained unaltered).
Considering that a decision from an out of state court has no precedential value in
a Texas court, Gallegos’s reliance on these cases are unpersuasive. Instead, we look to
Texas case law for guidance. Gallegos argues that use of the phrase “the victim” by the
prosecutor and witnesses should have prompted objections by trial counsel. A similar
issue was dealt with in Weatherly v. State, 283 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2009, pet. ref’d). In Weatherly, the court held that use of the word “victim” was found not
to be inflammatory or prejudicial as to necessarily cause harm to the defendant when
used occasionally in trial by the attorneys or witnesses. Id. Gallegos cites various
portions of the record where the State’s witnesses referred to Garcia as the victim. In
view of the totality of counsel’s representation and the totality of the record, the failure to
object to the use of the word “victim” in the cited instances in the trial was not an error.
Id. at 487. Additionally, in Cueva, counsel’s performance did not fall below the objective
standard of reasonableness by not objecting to the phrase “the victim.” Cueva, 339
S.W.3d at 864. The court in Cueva held that testimony regarding references to the
complainant as “victim” was: (1) credible; (2) did not cause prejudice; (3) and found that
such terms are commonly used at trial in a neutral manner to describe the events in
question. Id. This analysis is appropriate in this case. In our case, reference to Garcia
as “the victim” was credible because it identified her as the victim of the assault in
5
question. The testimony by the witnesses did not cause prejudice because the use of
“the victim” identified Garcia as a victim to an assault and not that Gallegos was the
aggressor.
Next, Gallegos argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
Officer Williams’s testimony on hearsay grounds. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(a). Gallegos
asserts that prior consistent statements or “backdoor” hearsay through inferences to out-
of-court statements should have been preempted through a motion in limine or an
objection. Officer Williams testified that Garcia had requested a protective order and
asked that Garcia be charged for the assault. Gallegos claims that Williams’s testimony
was “hearsay”, but does not argue how Gallegos’s trial counsel’s failure to object was not
strategic in order to rebut the presumption that his counsel’s performance was proper.
See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384. Furthermore, even if Gallegos rebutted the
presumption that his trial counsel’s performance was proper, he nevertheless fails to
show that as a result of his counsel’s alleged deficient performance for failing to object to
this testimony, his defense was prejudiced. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Thus, his
argument fails. We overrule Gallegos’ first issue.
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR
By his second issue, Gallegos asserts that he was harmed by cumulative error
related to his arguments based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Gallegos argues
that the “aforementioned errors” rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Additionally,
Gallegos alleges that even if none of the errors alone rose to the magnitude of
constitutional breach, their cumulative effect does.
6
While it is conceivable that a number of errors may be found harmful in their
cumulative effect, no authority holds that non-errors may in their cumulative effect cause
error. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
Because we have found no error in this appeal, we overrule Gallegos’s second issue. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
2nd day of July, 2015.
7