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 2019-10

Goldfarb PLLC v. Alan P. McDonald ( 2019 )


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  • DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 28, 2019
S   In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-19-00391-CV
GOLDFARB PLLC, Appellant
V.
ALAN P. MCDONALD, Appellee
On Appeal from the 301st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-16-03747
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Whitehill, and Justice Molberg
Opinion by Chief Justice Burns
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce and severance order. As reflected in the
record, appellant intervened in the divorce proceeding seeking to recover attorney’s fees from
appellee for its representation of appellee’s ex-wife during the divorce. The claim was severed
from the divorce before the divorce was finalized and appears to remain pending in the severed
cause.
Because the right to seek appellate review is limited to those whose interests are concluded
or prejudiced by the challenged judgment, we questioned appellant’s standing to bring the appeal
and our jurisdiction. See State v. Naylor,
    466 S.W.3d 783
    , 787 (Tex. 2015); Jack Jones Hearing
Ctrs., Inc. v. State Comm. of Exam’rs in Fitting and Dispensing of Hearing Instruments,
    363 S.W.3d 911
    , 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.); Stroud v. Stroud,
    733 S.W.2d 619
    , 620 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). In briefing filed at our request, appellant argues it “is effectively
appealing from the trial court’s ‘just and right’ division of assets and liabilities, as it seeks an order
awarding certain fees to be payable to the firm.”1 Appellant’s claim for attorney’s fees, however,
was severed from the divorce and not determined by the decree. Accordingly, appellant’s interests
were not concluded or prejudiced by the decree, and appellant has no standing to appeal from the
decree. See Jack
    Jones, 363 S.W.3d at 914
    ;
    Stroud, 733 S.W.2d at 620
    ; see also N.H. Ins. Co. v.
Tobias,
    80 S.W.3d 146
    , 148 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (because appellant’s claims were
severed from original cause, appellant is no longer party to original cause and cannot appeal from
that cause).
Lacking jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
/Robert D. Burns, III/
ROBERT D. BURNS, III
CHIEF JUSTICE
190391F.P05
1
Appellant also argues the decree did not dispose of all claims and is not final. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.
2001). However, the decree followed a bench trial and includes “finality language.” See
    id. at 204, 
    206.
–2–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
GOLDFARB PLLC, Appellant                          On Appeal from the 301st Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-19-00391-CV        V.                      Trial Court Cause No. DF-16-03747.
Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns,
ALAN P. MCDONALD, Appellee                        Justices Whitehill and Molberg
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal.
We ORDER that appellee Alan P. McDonald recover his costs, if any, of this appeal from
appellant Goldfarb PLLC.
Judgment entered October 28, 2019.
–3–