in the Interest of D.H. and K.H., Children ( 2019 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00148-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF D.H. AND K.H., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 323-106366-17
Before Gabriel, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant A.S. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s final order terminating her
parental rights to D.H. and K.H. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b). The trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s conduct satisfied the
termination grounds listed in family code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and
alleged in the petition for termination. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial
court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s
parental rights was in D.H. and K.H.’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
Accordingly, the trial court ordered the termination of Mother’s parental rights to
D.H. and K.H. and named appellee Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services (DFPS) as their permanent managing conservator.1
On June 14, 2019, Mother’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and
corresponding motion to withdraw, stating that he has conducted a professional
evaluation of the record and has concluded that there are no arguable grounds to be
advanced to support an appeal of the trial court’s termination order and that the
appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief presents the required professional evaluation of
the record demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on appeal and
referencing any grounds that might arguably support the appeal. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of D.H. and K.H.’s father.
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No party appeals that portion of the termination order.
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App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding Anders procedures apply in parental-
termination cases), disp. on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). Further, counsel informed Mother of
her right to request the record and to file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State,
436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In addition, this court informed
Mother of these rights and gave her the opportunity to notify this court of her intent
to respond. Mother has not filed a response. DFPS has notified this court that it
agrees with Mother’s counsel that there are no grounds assailing the trial court’s
judgment.
In reviewing a brief that asserts an appeal is frivolous and that fulfills the
requirements of Anders, this court is obligated to undertake an independent
examination of the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. See
In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied) (citing
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Having carefully
reviewed the record and the Anders briefs, we conclude there are no arguable grounds
for reversal; thus, we agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is without merit. See
In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). We affirm the
trial court’s order of termination. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw in light of the supreme court’s decision
in In re P.M. because counsel has not shown “good cause” other than his
determination that an appeal would be frivolous. See 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016)
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(“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the absence of
additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573,
582–83 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pets. denied) (noting that since
P.M. was handed down, “most courts of appeals affirming parental termination orders
after receiving Anders briefs have denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw”). The
supreme court has held that in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations [in
the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the
standards for an Anders brief.” P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel
Justice
Delivered: August 16, 2019
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