Pedro Santillano (Santellano) v. Pat I. Martin ( 2007 )

NO. 07-06-0311-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
MAY 30, 2007
______________________________
PEDRO SANTILLANO,
Appellant
v.
PAT I. MARTIN,
Appellee
_________________________________
FROM THE 285TH DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY;
NO. 2004-CI-18165; HON. MARTHA TANNER, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Memorandum Opinion
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Pedro Santillano appeals from a judgment granting Pat I. Martin specific
performance of a contract. The latter purported to obligate Santillano to sell a tract of land
for $63,500. Martin sought a judgment compelling Santillano to convey the realty per the
alleged agreement. Via three issues, Santillano contends that the purported agreement
could not be the subject of specific performance. We agree and reverse the judgment.
Background
The supposed written agreement Martin sought to enforce simply contained
Santillano’s name followed by the address “147 Fantasia, San Antonio, Texas 78216.”
Following the aforementioned addressed appeared this verbiage: “Agree to sell 6.67 acres
[with ‘+ - 1' below the 6.67] 11599 Foster Rd. for $63,500 w/ $500.00 earnest money.” A
signature, purportedly that of Santillano, and the notations “10-08-04" and “CK# 4390
$500.00 -10-08-04” ended the memorandum. Again, nothing else appeared in it.
Authority
Specific performance may be ordered only if the essential terms of the contract are
expressed with reasonable certainty. Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. 1973).
This means a certainty greater than that normally required when attempting to enforce the
contract via an action at law for damages. Guzman v. Acuna, 653 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex.
App.–San Antonio 1983, writ dism’d). Moreover, those terms must be sufficiently precise
to enable a court to determine the respective obligations of the parties without resorting to
parol evidence. Id.; accord, Langley v. Norris, 141 Tex. 405, 173 S.W.2d 454, 459 (1943)
(so holding); Abraham Inv. Co. v. Payne Ranch, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 518, 527 (Tex.
App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (so holding). So too must the description of the realty
subject to conveyance be reasonably certain, and one that alludes only to an address
without reference to any city, county or state in which the land is located “is palpably
insufficient to support . . . specific performance . . . .” Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53,188
S.W.2d 150, 154 (1945).
2
Here, we have a memorandum that fails to name or describe the buyer.
Furthermore, the property’s description consists of only a partial street address without
reference to any particular city, county, state or nation.1 Without reference to a buyer in
the agreement, a court cannot determine the obligations of all the parties unless parol is
considered. Indeed, without a promise to buy, it cannot be said that Martin agreed to buy
anything. Moreover, without the document containing a correct street address
accompanied by allusion to the city, county or state wherein the address is located, a court
cannot determine where the land is without admitting parol. Wilson v. Fisher, supra. Given
these deficiencies, the memorandum at issue here is not, as a matter of law, reasonably
certain or susceptible to specific performance.
Accordingly, we sustain Santillano’s issues, reverse the trial court’s judgment and
render judgment denying Martin specific performance.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
1
W e also note that if the address appearing in the judgm ent is the correct one, it differs from the one
in the m em orandum . The latter speaks of “11599 Foster Rd.” while the form er describes a “11599 S. Foster
Rd.” (Em phasis added).
3