Carmen Montiel v. Alex Eduardo Lechin ( 2019 )

Opinion issued March 14, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-18-00781-CV
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CARMEN MONTIEL, Appellant
V.
ALEX EDUARDO LECHIN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 334th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2017-68138
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Carmen Montiel, attempts to appeal the trial court’s interlocutory
order denying her Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”) motion to dismiss.
Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, asserting
that appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely. We dismiss the appeal.
Applicable Law
Under the TCPA, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss claims based on
the defendant’s exercise of the right of free speech. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 27.003. The trial court must rule on a TCPA motion to dismiss within 30 days of
the hearing on the motion. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(a). If the court
does not rule within that time, the motion is denied by operation of law. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a). Once the motion is denied by operation of law,
“the moving party may appeal.” Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§51.014(a)(12) (authorizing appeal from interlocutory order denying motion to
dismiss filed under section 27.003). Section 27.008(b) of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code requires an appellate court to expedite an appeal from the trial
court’s failure to rule under section 27.005. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
27.008(b). Because such an appeal is an accelerated appeal of an interlocutory order,
a notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days of the date the motion is denied by
operation of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1 (appeals from interlocutory orders are
accelerated appeals); 26.1(b) (in accelerated appeal, notice of appeal must be filed
within 20 days of judgment or order).
Discussion
In the underlying case, appellant filed a TCPA motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 27.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The trial court held
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a hearing on the TCPA motion on April 6, 2018. Appellant’s motion was overruled
by operation of law 30 days later, on May 6, 2018, when the trial court did not rule
on the motion. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005. Appellant’s notice of
appeal was due 20 days later. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). However, because the 20-
day deadline fell on a Saturday, the deadline was automatically moved to Monday,
May 28, 2018. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a).
On August 15, 2018, appellant requested a ruling from the trial court on her
TCPA motion to dismiss. On August 21, 2018, the trial court issued an order that,
among other things, dismissed appellant’s request for ruling as moot because the
motion had been denied by operation of law. This portion of the order provides:
2. Defendant Carmen Montiel’s Request for a Ruling is moot.
While the timeline of abatement, filing of motions and hearing
dates is confusing in the statute and in this case; by any measure,
the time allowed for the Court to enter an Order as to Defendant
Montiel has lapsed and therefore Defendant Carmen Montiel’s
Motion to Dismiss is denied by operation of law.
Appellant filed her notice of appeal on August 28, 2018—90 days after her
TCPA motion was denied by operation of law.
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting
that the notice of appeal was untimely filed more than 20 days after the appellant’s
TCPA motion was denied by operation of law. Appellant filed a response asserting
two arguments. We examine both below.
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First, appellant generally asserts that there is “confusion” as to the effect the
automatic abatement provisions of the Defamation Mitigation Act (the “DMA”)
have on a TCPA motion to dismiss and the deadlines governing such motions. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.062. But appellant fails to argue any
interpretation or application of the statutes, much less demonstrate how such an
interpretation or application would make her notice of appeal timely when applied
to the facts of this case. Presumably, appellant is attempting to assert that her notice
of appeal was timely because there may be some application of the DMA’s
abatement provisions that prevented her TCPA motion to dismiss from being denied
by operation of law on May 6, 2018. Appellant asserts that confusion regarding the
effect of the DMA’s abatement provisions on timelines governing TCPA motions is
evident in the trial court’s order, quoting the order as stating:
2. Defendant Carmen Montiel’s Request for a Ruling is moot.
While the timeline of abatement, filing of motions and hearing
dates is confusing in the statute and in this case; . . .
But appellant fails to address—and her partial quote of the order omits—the trial
court’s conclusion that “by any measure, the time allowed for the Court to enter an
Order as to Defendant Montiel has lapsed and therefore Defendant Carmen
Montiel’s Motion to Dismiss is denied by operation of law.” Accordingly,
appellant’s general assertions that the DMA may affect timelines regarding TCPA
motions fail to demonstrate that her notice of appeal was timely.
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Second, appellant argues that we should consider her TCPA motion to have
been denied by the trial court’s August 23, 2018 order rather than by operation of
law on May 6, 2018. Appellant asserts that we should apply the later date because
“[r]egardless of whether [her] motion to dismiss was overruled by operation of law,
any order on her TCPA motion was unquestionably interlocutory” and the trial court
“should continue to possess plenary power to alter, modify, or grant, an order it
previously issued – even one which is made by operation of law.” Based on this
reasoning, appellant argues that “the trial court erred when it found [her] motion to
dismiss had been overruled by operation of law on August 23, 2018” and “effectively
denied her motion as of that date making [her] notice of appeal (filed on August 28,
2018) timely.” We disagree.
As appellant concedes, cases have held that trial courts lack authority to grant
a motion to dismiss under the TCPA more than 30 days after the hearing on the
motion. See, e.g., Direct Commercial Funding, Inc. v. Beacon Hill Estates, LLC, 407
S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding that
legislature’s mandatory 30-day deadline for trial court to rule on motion after hearing
“would be meaningless if the trial court, acting sua sponte, could reverse the
consequences imposed by statute for the failure to timely act”); Dal. Morning News,
Inc. v. Mapp, No. 05-14-00848-CV, 2015 WL 3932868, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that “trial court is without authority to
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grant a motion to dismiss under the [TCPA] more than thirty days after the hearing”);
see also Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Hous., Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 500
S.W.3d 26, 44–45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (noting that
trial court’s grant of TCPA motion outside of 30-day period following hearing was
subject to challenge) (citing Beacon Hill Estates, 407 S.W.3d at 401). Appellant
merely disagrees with the caselaw on this issue without offering any contrary
authority.
Further, because appellant’s TCPA motion had already been denied by
operation of law, her subsequent request for a ruling granting the motion was
essentially a request for reconsideration of the denial. Appellant’s argument appears
to be that the trial court should have reconsidered the denial by operation of law and
that it erred in declining to do so in its August 23, 2018 order. Even assuming
appellant’s argument that the trial court has the power to reconsider the denial of the
TCPA motion by operation of law, the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from
the date the motion was denied, not the later denial of a motion for reconsideration.
See City of Hous. v. Estate of Jones, 388 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Tex. 2012) (“[a]llowing
interlocutory appeals whenever a trial court refuses to change its mind . . . would
invite successive appeals and undermine the statute’s purpose of promoting judicial
economy.”); Pitts v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., No. 05-17-00115-CV, 2017 WL
474468, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Here, the
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deadline to appeal ran from the date the trial court denied the temporary injunction,
not from the denial of the motion for reconsideration.”). “Permitting appeals under
circumstances such as these would effectively eliminate the requirement that appeals
from interlocutory orders must be filed within twenty days after the challenged order
is signed . . . , [which] would work against the main purpose of the interlocutory
appeal statute, which is to increase efficiency of the judicial process.” Estate of
Jones, 388 S.W.3d at 667. “[T]he language of rule 26.1(b) is clear and contains no
exceptions to the twenty-day deadline.” In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex.
2005).
The time to file a notice of appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion cannot
be based on the subsequent denial of reconsideration because the applicable statutes
only authorize an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a TCPA motion. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.008(a) (“If a court does not rule on a motion to
dismiss under Section 27.003 in the time prescribed by Section 27.005, the motion
is considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party may
appeal.”); 51.014(a)(12) (authorizing appeal from interlocutory order that “denies a
motion to dismiss filed under Section 27.003”). An order denying a motion to
reconsider is not an appealable interlocutory order. See Digges v. Knowledge
Alliance, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 463, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)
(holding that interlocutory order denying motion to reconsider is not independently
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appealable); CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Morrison Homes, 337 S.W.3d 437, 443
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (“[N]o statute exists giving us
interlocutory jurisdiction over an order denying a motion to reconsider.”); State
Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Berdan, 335 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2011, pet. denied) (“The order denying [appellant’s] motion to reconsider and
motion for new trial was not independently appealable so as to start a new timetable
for perfecting the appeal.”); Denton Cnty. v. Huther, 43 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (holding that order denying motion to reconsider
was not distinct appealable interlocutory order with separate timetable for appeal).
Accordingly, appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed
more than 20 days after her TCPA motion was denied by operation of law on May
6, 2018.
Conclusion
Because appellant did not timely file her notice of appeal, this Court lacks
jurisdiction over this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b); Clewis v. Harris Cnty., No.
14-15-00424-CV, 2015 WL 5935825, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] Oct. 13,
2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (dismissing interlocutory appeal for want of
jurisdiction because notice of appeal untimely filed more than 20 days after TCPA
motion to dismiss was denied by operation of law).
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Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion and dismiss this appeal for want of
jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman and Countiss.
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