Leticia McWilliams v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                          COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-14-00142-CR
    LETICIA MCWILLIAMS                                                 APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                      STATE
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    FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1174887D
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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    I. INTRODUCTION
    Appellant Leticia McWilliams appeals from the revocation of her
    community supervision. In her sole point, McWilliams argues that the trial court
    abused its discretion by revoking her community supervision and by sentencing
    her to four years’ imprisonment. We will affirm.
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On January 19, 2010, McWilliams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
    agreement, to the third-degree felony of intoxication assault. See Tex. Penal
    Code Ann. § 49.07 (West 2011). The trial court sentenced McWilliams to ten
    years’ confinement; imposed a $1,000 fine; suspended the sentence; and placed
    McWilliams on community supervision for a period of ten years. On July 22,
    2011, the State filed a petition to revoke McWilliams’s community supervision.
    Three months later, the State filed a motion to dismiss its petition to revoke, and
    the trial court dismissed the petition, continued McWilliams’s community
    supervision, and imposed additional conditions of community supervision.
    The State filed a second petition to revoke McWilliams’s community
    supervision on February 4, 2014, alleging that McWilliams had violated multiple
    conditions of her community supervision.      Specifically, the State alleged that
    McWilliams was ordered by the trial court to submit to supervision by the
    Supervision with Immediate Enforcement (SWIFT) Court and that she had
    violated that condition when she was discharged from the SWIFT Court for
    noncompliance, as follows:
    a. The Defendant failed to install the In-Home monitoring device as
    court ordered and directed by Tarrant County CSCD in the month of
    January 2014.
    b. The Defendant failed to submit a urine specimen or a non-diluted
    urine specimen on or about January 30, 2014 as directed by Tarrant
    County CSCD.
    2
    The State also alleged that McWilliams had violated additional conditions of her
    community supervision when she failed to pay the supervision fee of $60 or any
    other amount on the fifteenth day for the various months during the period from
    April 2010 to January 2014, as listed in the petition (Paragraph 2); failed to install
    the in-home monitoring device in January 2014 (Paragraph 3);2 failed to pay for
    urine testing for eight months during the period from 2012 to 2014 (Paragraph 4);
    failed to pay for electronic monitoring fees and owed a total balance of $2,425
    (Paragraph 5); and failed to obtain or verify employment for July 2012 through
    January 2014 (Paragraph 6).
    At the revocation hearing, McWilliams pleaded “not true” to the allegations
    in the State’s second petition to revoke.           After hearing testimony from
    McWilliams’s community supervision officer, McWilliams’s SWIFT community
    supervision officer, and McWilliams, the trial court found the allegations in
    Paragraphs 1a, 1b, 2, 3, and 4 of the State’s second petition to revoke to be true
    and sentenced McWilliams to four years’ confinement.3
    III. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
    In her sole point, McWilliams argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion by revoking her community supervision and by sentencing her to four
    2
    The State notes in its brief that the allegation in Paragraph 1a is repeated
    in Paragraph 3.
    3
    The judgment does not contain findings related to the allegations in
    Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the State’s second petition to revoke.
    3
    years’ imprisonment. McWilliams argues that all of the violations alleged in the
    State’s second petition to revoke, other than a single act of failing to submit a
    urine specimen, were based on her failure to do acts that were founded on
    financial obligations and that there was no proof that she had the ability to meet
    those financial obligations.
    We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of
    discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006); Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a
    revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.
    Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is
    the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
    testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
    court’s ruling. 
    Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493
    ; Garrett v. State, 
    619 S.W.2d 172
    ,
    174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of
    proof, the trial court abuses its discretion by revoking the community supervision.
    
    Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493
    –94.
    The record reveals that the trial court added supplemental conditions of
    community supervision on September 24, 2012, requiring McWilliams to submit
    to supervision by the SWIFT Court and to submit a valid, nondiluted, and
    nonadulterated urine, hair, blood, breath, or saliva sample for testing according to
    the time and manner directed by the supervision officer.         Two weeks later,
    4
    McWilliams signed a document entitled “SWIFT Court Warning,” which stated
    that she was required to call the drug-test hotline every weekday and, if selected,
    to report for testing before 3:00 p.m. that same day. In bold at the bottom of the
    warning, it stated, “I have read or have had the S.W.I.F.T. program explained to
    me. I understand also that my probation can be revoked for any violation of
    probation.”
    During   the   revocation    hearing,   McWilliams’s   SWIFT     community
    supervision officer testified that McWilliams was discharged from SWIFT for
    noncompliance, which included failing to submit a urine specimen on January 30,
    2014.4 McWilliams testified that she presented on January 30, 2014, to give a
    urine specimen but that she left at 1:35 or 1:40 p.m. before giving a sample
    because her mother had to be at work.         On cross-examination, McWilliams
    admitted that she did not give a urine specimen on January 30, 2014, and that
    she understood that was a condition of her probation and a condition of the
    SWIFT order. On appeal, McWilliams does not deny that she failed to submit a
    urine sample on January 30, 2014.       Instead, she argues that “her failure to
    submit a urine sample was beyond [her] control and [that] she was in fact present
    and able to submit a sample[;] she just could not stay all afternoon due to her
    mother[’]s work.”
    4
    The record includes a letter from McWilliams’s community supervision
    officer to the trial court stating that McWilliams was discharged from the SWIFT
    Court for “noncompliance” on January 31, 2014—the day following her failure to
    provide a urine specimen.
    5
    Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
    we hold that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
    McWilliams violated the condition of her community supervision that required her
    to submit to supervision by the SWIFT Court when she failed to submit a urine
    specimen on January 30, 2014.          See 
    Cobb, 851 S.W.2d at 873
    ; see also
    Sanchez v. State, No. 01-13-00631-CR, 
    2014 WL 3107659
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] July 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
    appellant’s community supervision on the ground that he had failed to submit
    urine samples on four occasions). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion by revoking McWilliams’s community supervision and
    sentencing her to four years’ confinement. See 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763
    ; see
    also Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)
    (holding that proof of any one violation is sufficient to support revocation order).
    We overrule McWilliams’s sole point.
    6
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled McWilliams’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    /s/ Sue Walker
    SUE WALKER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: December 18, 2014
    7