William Buckner Hubble v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00541-CR
WILLIAM BUCKNER HUBBLE APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 07-256
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant William Buckner Hubble was charged with unlawfully possessing
a firearm at a location other than where he lived after having been convicted of a
felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04(a) (West 2011). The State filed
notice of its intention to use two prior felony convictions to enhance punishment
to habitual offender status. The notice included a 1994 felony possession-of-a-
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
controlled-substance conviction and a 1987 felony burglary-of-a-motor-vehicle
conviction.
A jury found Hubble guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Prior to
commencement of the punishment phase of trial, Hubble’s defense attorney
objected to the use of Hubble’s 1987 burglary-of-a-motor-vehicle conviction as a
prior felony conviction for enhancement purposes because the legislature had
reclassified that offense from a felony to a misdemeanor after Hubble’s 1987
conviction. The trial court overruled the objection.
During the punishment phase of trial, the State introduced evidence to
support the two prior felony convictions. The State also introduced evidence of
Hubble’s prior misdemeanor convictions for assault in 1997, possession of
marijuana in 2003 and in 2005, driving while intoxicated in 1993 and 2005, and
possession of a prohibited weapon in 2006 and of a 1987 judgment revoking
probation for burglary of a habitation.
During closing arguments, Hubble’s attorney argued,
Now, the charge, of course, has a huge wide range just like I
told you it would during voir dire. You can assess anywhere from
two to 99 years or life, depending upon your findings after you
review this charge on punishment.
. . . The State has alleged that he committed the crime, or
was convicted of a crime of burglary of a motor vehicle in 1987.
That would have made him around 19 years old. I don’t know very
many people that would want to be judged on their behavior as a 19
year old.
Now, did there happen to be a gun? Obviously not. . . . . But
another thing to remember about burglary of a motor vehicle, and no
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one is saying it’s a good crime. There’s not such a thing. But you
also need to realize that since then and now—
The State then objected that “he’s going outside the record.” The trial court
sustained the objection.
The jury found both enhancement allegations to be true, which increased
the punishment range to a minimum of 25 years’ imprisonment and a maximum
of 99 years’ or life imprisonment, and assessed Hubble’s punishment at sixty
years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §12.42(d) (West Supp. 2014).
The trial court sentenced Hubble accordingly. Although Hubble did not timely
perfect an appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted his request for
leave to file an out of time appeal. See Ex Parte Hubble, No. WR-79509-01,
2013 WL 5568448 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2013) (not designated for
publication).
In two issues, Hubble contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
sustaining the State’s objection to his closing argument as set forth above.
Hubble argues that the trial court’s ruling impermissibly limited his closing
argument and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Hubble
acknowledges that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State
may use for enhancement purposes a prior felony that has since been
reclassified as a misdemeanor. See State v. Wooldridge, 237 S.W.3d 714, 716–
17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). And he concedes that the State’s use of his prior
conviction for burglary of a motor vehicle for enhancement was proper in this
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case because that offense was classified as a felony at the time of his 1987
conviction. Rather, Hubble asserts that he should have been allowed to tell the
jury that the offense of burglary of a motor vehicle has since been reclassified as
a misdemeanor and that, consequently, had he committed that offense a few
years later, the State could not have used it to enhance his punishment in this
case.
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds
for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Landers v. State, 402 S.W.3d
252, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the
request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining
party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(2); Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “To
avoid forfeiture of a complaint on appeal, all a party has to do is let the trial judge
know what he wants and why he thinks he is entitled to it and do so clearly
enough for the judge to understand the request at a time when the trial court is in
a proper position to do something about it.” Bedolla v. State, 442 S.W.3d 313,
316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Here, Hubble did not inform the trial court of the specific argument he
intended to make after the State interrupted his argument to object and after the
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trial court sustained the State’s objection. Defense counsel argued, “[A]nother
thing to remember about burglary of a motor vehicle, and no one is saying it’s a
good crime. There’s not such a thing. But you also need to realize that since
then and now—” The only other argument in the record that sheds light on what
defense counsel was attempting to argue was his objection at the beginning of
the punishment phase of trial to the State’s use of Hubble’s 1987 burglary of a
vehicle conviction for enhancement. Specifically, defense counsel stated,
Judge, I am going to object to the portion and to any enhancement
that’s come up with regard to burglary of a motor vehicle inasmuch
as that offense since then has been reduced to a Class A -- I mean,
not this particular one. I’m saying the legislature since the ‘80s has
realized -- has thought better of it and gone back in and made that a
Class A misdemeanor. I don’t think it’s fair to come at him two
decades later using it as a felony enhancement. And we are asking
that that be removed from the charge.
As the State recognizes on appeal, Hubble was not required to formally
except to the trial court’s ruling on the State’s objection to preserve error for
appeal but the only matter apparent to the trial court from the context of the
record was that defense counsel wanted to inform the jury that it should not use
the prior burglary conviction for enhancement because it has been reclassified as
a misdemeanor. To the extent that defense counsel was attempting to make any
other argument, he has not preserved his complaint for appeal. See Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1(a)(1). And to the extent that defense counsel was attempting to
argue that the jury should not use Hubble’s 1987 felony conviction to enhance his
punishment because it has since been reclassified as a misdemeanor, this is not
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a proper statement of the law, as conceded by Hubble on appeal. See
Wooldridge, 237 S.W.3d at 716–17. This argument is also contrary to the law
contained in the jury charge. See State v. Renteria, 977 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998) (holding that jury argument stating law contrary to the jury
charge is improper). The jury charge stated the applicable law regarding the
jury’s consideration of the prior felony offenses alleged by the State for
enhancement; the jury was tasked with determining whether the allegation of the
prior conviction was true beyond a reasonable doubt. An argument that the jury
find the allegation not true because the prior offense is no longer classified as a
felony would be an improper suggestion that the jury refuse to follow the law.
See Eckert v. State, 672 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, pet. ref’d).
Because Hubble was not entitled to make the only argument preserved for
appeal and because he did not preserve for appeal any other complaint
regarding his attempted jury argument, we overrule Hubble’s two issues and
affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1).
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
DAUPHINOT, J. concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: December 23, 2014
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