Andres Chevez v. Jerry L. Brinkerhoff ( 2014 )

Affirm in part; Reverse and Remand in part; Opinion Filed December 22, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00572-CV
ANDRES CHEVEZ, Appellant
V.
JERRY L. BRINKERHOFF AND JOHN B. ANDERSON, Appellees
On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-10-015850-E
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O’Neill, Evans, and Brown
Opinion by Justice O’Neill
Appellant Andres Chevez was injured while working for Martin Lopez as a bricklayer’s
helper on a construction project at appellee John B. Anderson’s home. Appellee Jerry L.
Brinkerhoff was the general contractor who hired Lopez. In two issues, Chevez contends the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Anderson and Brinkerhoff. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment in part and reverse and remand in part. We issue this memorandum
opinion because the dispositive issues are settled in law. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
Anderson hired Brinkerhoff to construct an addition to his home. Anderson and
Brinkerhoff signed a written contract on April 18, 2008. Brinkerhoff in turn hired Martin Lopez
as a subcontractor for the masonry work. Lopez prepared a written estimate for the work, but his
agreement with Brinkerhoff was not otherwise reduced to writing. Brinkerhoff and Lopez had
worked together on previous jobs. Chevez had been working for Lopez for approximately two
years before his injury. On November 25, 2008, Chevez was on the job site at the Anderson
home for the first time. Chevez testified that he was walking on a scaffold holding bricks in his
hands when “the board that I was walking on flipped, and I fell out of the scaffold.” Neither
Anderson nor Brinkerhoff was at the home when the accident occurred.
Chevez brought suit against Anderson, Brinkerhoff, and Lopez, 1 asserting claims for
negligence and negligence per se 2 and alleging joint enterprise among the defendants. He sought
to recover his medical expenses, pain and suffering and mental anguish, lost wages and loss of
earning capacity, physical impairment, and exemplary damages. Both Brinkerhoff and Anderson
filed traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment, asserting among other grounds
that they owed no duty to Chevez. Chevez responded to each motion and also filed special
exceptions and objections to each. The trial court granted Anderson’s and Brinkerhoff’s motions
for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellees’ motions for summary judgment included traditional grounds and no-evidence
grounds. 3 When a party files a summary judgment motion on both traditional and no-evidence
grounds, we first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of Rule 166a(i). Ford
1
Chevez has dismissed his claims against Lopez, and Lopez is not a party to this appeal. Lopez filed for bankruptcy during the pendency
of this case. This case was abated and closed until the bankruptcy court lifted the stay pursuant to an agreement between Lopez and Chevez. The
agreed order from the bankruptcy court provided that although the state court litigation could proceed, Chevez could seek to recover only
insurance proceeds, not any other assets of the debtor. Chevez and Lopez filed a Rule 11 agreement to reopen the trial court proceedings under
the terms of the bankruptcy court’s order. The trial court signed an order reopening the case, and discovery proceeded. Lopez’s counsel
withdrew, and Lopez proceeded pro se. Lopez did not seek summary judgment, and Anderson’s and Brinkerhoff’s motions do not address
Chevez’s claims against Lopez. After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Anderson and Brinkerhoff, Chevez filed a notice of
nonsuit of his claims against Lopez, stating that “Plaintiff has remaining claims and causes of action in this cause against only Defendant
MARTIN LOPEZ, which Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue to trial.” He then filed a “Motion for Entry of Order of Dismissal,” requesting that
in light of the trial court’s summary judgment orders and Chevez’s nonsuit, all of Chevez’s claims be dismissed. The trial court granted this
motion by written order, which recited that “this is a Final Judgment disposing of all parties and issues in this cause.” As a result, the merits of
Chevez’s claims against Lopez have not been adjudicated.
2
Chevez does not raise any issue on appeal regarding his negligence per se claims.
3
Although the trial court only granted Anderson’s traditional motion for summary judgment and granted both of Brinkerhoff’s motions, we
will discuss them together because the grounds were substantially the same and the lack of a no-evidence summary judgment for Anderson does
not change the outcome of our opinion.
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Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). The non-movant, here Chevez, must
produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the
summary judgment under that provision. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d
at 600. A genuine issue of material fact exists if more than a scintilla of evidence establishing
the existence of the challenged element is produced. Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 928, 929
(Tex. 2000). If the non-movant fails to produce more than a scintilla of evidence under that
burden, then there is no need to analyze whether the movants’ proof satisfied the rule 166a(c)
burden. Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d at 600.
If the non-movant meets its burden under rule 166a(i), we consider the motion under rule
166a(c). In a traditional motion, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972). A defendant
moving for summary judgment must disprove, as a matter of law, one of the essential elements
of the plaintiff’s causes of action, or may prove all of the elements of an affirmative defense.
Lear Sigler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991); Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co.,
797 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex. 1990). We review the trial court’s summary judgment decision de
novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
We review the trial court’s rulings on special exceptions and on objections to summary
judgment evidence for abuse of discretion. Gatten v. McCarley, 391 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (special exceptions); Garner v. Fidelity Bank, N.A., 244 S.W.3d
855, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (objections to summary judgment evidence). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to guiding
rules or principles. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427, 435
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ).
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DISCUSSION
1. Summary judgment on negligence claims
In his second issue, Chevez argues that the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment for appellees. He raises six sub-issues. He contends he produced more than a scintilla
of evidence that each appellee owed a duty to him; that each appellee had actual or constructive
knowledge of a dangerous condition; 4 and that Brinkerhoff was an occupier of the premises. 5 He
also argues there is a genuine issue of material fact whether appellees had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition. He contends there is a fact issue regarding whether
appellees contractually retained or actually exercised control over the methods, manner, and
means of the work he was doing when he fell. And he asserts that the trial court erred when it
failed to find a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each appellee is liable under his
premises liability claim.
a. Duty of owner or general contractor to employee of independent
contractor
Generally, a premises owner or general contractor has no duty to ensure that an
independent contractor safely performs his work. Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez, 967
S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). It is only when the general contractor or owner
retains some control over the independent contractor’s work that a limited duty arises. Koch Ref.
Co. v. Chapa, 11 S.W.3d 153, 154 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam). The duty of care is commensurate
with the control retained. Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 357. Control may be established by
4
A defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition is an element of a premises liability claim. See Corbin v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983). But in the context of a claim arising from a premises defect created by the work activity
of an independent contractor, the plaintiff must also prove the defendant had the right to control the work in addition to proving the elements of a
premises liability claim. Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523, 529 (Tex. 1997). Because we conclude, as discussed below,
that neither Anderson nor Brinkerhoff had the right to control the masonry work, we do not reach the question of actual or constructive
knowledge of a dangerous condition. See id.
5
In his motion for summary judgment, Brinkerhoff contended that he could not be held liable under a premises liability theory because there
was no evidence he was either an owner or occupier of the premises. Because a general contractor with control of the premises has the same
duties as an owner or occupier, see Olivo, 952 S.W.2d at 527, whether Brinkerhoff was an occupier of the premises is not dispositive of any claim
asserted by Chevez, and we need not address the question further.
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contractual right or by an exercise of actual control. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602,
606 (Tex. 2002). Whether a contract gives a right of control is generally a question of law. Id.
(citing Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. 2001)); see also Johnston
v. Oiltanking Houston, L.P., 367 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no
pet.). If a written contract assigns the right to control, then the plaintiff need not prove an actual
exercise of control to establish a duty. See Bright, 89 S.W.3d at 606. But if the contract does not
explicitly assign control over the manner of work to the general contractor or owner, or in the
absence of a contractual agreement, then the plaintiff must present evidence that the owner or
general contractor actually exercised control over the manner in which the independent
contractor performed his work. Id.; Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d
223, 226 (Tex. 1990).
There are two types of negligence claims that arise in this context: (1) a claim arising
from an activity on the premises, in which the plaintiff is harmed by or as a contemporaneous
result of the activity itself (“negligent activity”), and (2) a claim arising from a premises defect.
Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex. 1997). And, as we discuss in
more detail below, there are two subcategories of premises defects for which an independent
contractor’s employee may seek to hold the general contractor liable. Id. First, there may be
defects that exist on the premises when the business invitee entered or that are created through
some means unrelated to the activity of the injured employee or his employer (“existing
defects”). Id. Second, there may be defects the independent contractor or the injured employee
created by its work activity (“defects from work activity”). Id. For both negligent activity and
premises defect claims, the general contractor or owner must retain a right to control the injury-
causing activity or condition for liability to attach. Id. at 528 (citing Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689
S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985)).
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Appellees’ summary judgment motions addressed both negligent activity and premises
defect theories. As described by Anderson, Chevez contends the negligent activity was
conducting masonry work without fall protection equipment, and the premises defect was a loose
board in the scaffold.
b. Claims against owner
Anderson did not retain any control over Lopez’s work. Anderson’s contract with
Brinkerhoff, a standard form of the American Institute of Architects (AIA), granted the owner
certain rights of approval and supervision. These general rights, however, are insufficient to
establish any duty to a subcontractor’s employees. See Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 356 (general
rights to order work stopped or resumed, inspect progress, receive reports, make suggestions or
recommendations, or prescribe alterations do not establish control of contractor’s methods of
work) (quoting RESTATEMENT (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965)). If, as here, the owner does not
have the right to control the means, methods, or details of the independent contractor’s work, or
if the injury did not arise from the control retained in the contract, no duty arises. See Bright, 89
S.W.3d at 606 (quoting Elliott-Williams Co. v. Diaz, 9 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex. 1999)).
Nor did Anderson exercise any actual control over the bricklaying and masonry work.
The undisputed summary judgment evidence established that Anderson had not met, and had
never interacted with, either Lopez or Chevez before Chevez’s injury. Anderson testified that he
was not home on the day of Chevez’s accident. Anderson had no involvement with the
scheduling of Lopez’s work during the project or purchasing the materials needed for Lopez’s
masonry work. Chevez himself testified that he expected Lopez, not Anderson, to control or
direct his work on the project. There is no evidence in the summary judgment record that
Anderson retained either contractual or actual control over Lopez’s work. The trial court’s
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summary judgment for Anderson on Chevez’s negligent activity claim was proper. See Chapa,
11 S.W.3d at 158 (no fact issue precluding summary judgment for owner where no control).
The trial court’s summary judgment was also proper on Chevez’s claim that the loose
board on the scaffold was a premises defect. He argues that Anderson had a duty to inspect the
premises and warn of dangerous conditions which he knew or should have known to exist, citing
Lawrence. See Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d at 225. In Lawrence, the court identified the two
subcategories of premises defects (existing defects and defects from work activity) and explained
that the duty to inspect and warn arises only in the existing defects subcategory. Id. The defect
alleged by Chevez, however, is a defect from work activity, and therefore falls into the second
subcategory. See id. For this subcategory, “the premises owner normally owes no duty to the
independent contractor’s employees because an owner generally has no duty to ensure that an
independent contractor performs its work on the premises.” Id. Unless the owner retains the
right of supervisory control over the work that caused the injury, no duty arises. See id. As we
have discussed, Anderson did not have a contractual right to control the masonry work and did
not actually exercise control. See id. Anderson established his right to judgment as a matter of
law on Chevez’s premises defect claim. See Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d at 600.
c. Claims against general contractor
The same standards apply to Chevez’s claims against Brinkerhoff. See Chapa, 11
S.W.3d at 155 n.1 (general contractor owes same duty as premises owner to independent
contractor’s employee; cases considering duty of owner and general contractor are used
interchangeably). Brinkerhoff did not retain control over Lopez’s work. The general rights of
supervision granted Brinkerhoff in his contract with Anderson, as we have noted, are insufficient
to establish a duty to Lopez’s employees. See Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 356; Johnston, 367
S.W.3d at 417.
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Chevez also relies on certain general conditions set forth in another AIA form to argue
that under the contract with Anderson, Brinkerhoff had a contractual right to control the means,
methods, and details of Lopez’s work. 6 Chevez cites to articles 3 and 10 of the form, which
address the contractor’s supervision of construction procedures and safety precautions. The
court in Deleon v. DSD Development, Inc., No. 01-03-00806-CV, 2006 WL 2506743, at *5–6
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.), considered and rejected
the argument that these provisions imposed a contractual duty of care on a general contractor to a
subcontractor’s employee. Considering the contract as a whole, the contract’s express language
made clear that it governed only the relationship between the owner and the general contractor
“and served to allocate the rights and responsibilities between them exclusively.” Id. at *6. The
court found it significant that the general terms and conditions also included a provision that the
contract “shall not be construed to create a contractual relationship of any kind” between any
persons or entities other than the owner and general contractor. See id. The court concluded that
the purpose of the provisions was to insulate the owner from tort liability and “to create a duty of
fiscal responsibility” flowing from the contractor to the owner for claims arising from the
project. Id.; see also Andrews v. DT Constr., Inc., 205 S.W.3d 4, 12–13 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2006, no pet.) (rejecting argument that injured employee of subcontractor was beneficiary of
contract between owner and general contractor). We reached a similar conclusion in Gonzalez v.
VATR Construction, LLC, explaining that an injured employee of a sub-subcontractor “cannot
rely on upstream contracts” between a general contractor and a subcontractor to establish the
existence of duty. 418 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
6
Chevez argues that these general conditions were incorporated by reference into the contract between Anderson and Brinkerhoff. For
purposes of this appeal, we presume that they were. We note, however, that the record includes only incomplete excerpts stamped “sample.”
Anderson and Brinkerhoff both offered summary judgment evidence of the contract they signed, and there is no evidence which, if either, of
these different incomplete samples was included in the document Anderson and Brinkerhoff identified as their contract.
–8–
Chevez relies on DeLeon v. Thos. S. Byrne, Ltd., No. 02-10-00438-CV, 2012 WL 42942,
at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.), 7 to argue that he raised a fact
issue on contractual control. In Byrne, the contract between Byrne (the general contractor) and
Sparkling Clean (the subcontractor) assigned control of the number of workers on the job to
Byrne, as well as the right to substitute labor, materials, and equipment if Byrne determined
Sparking Clean’s to be insufficient. Id. Both of these areas of contractually-retained control
related to the activity that caused the injury to DeLeon, a worker on the job. Id. Although four
workers were required to operate the equipment in question, only three were on the job when
DeLeon was injured. Id. Therefore, DeLeon raised a fact issue regarding contractual control by
Byrne, and summary judgment for Byrne was error. Id.
Byrne is distinguishable. Most important, the contract in question in Byrne was between
the general contractor and the subcontractor. Id. Here, the contract on which Chevez relies is
between the owner and the general contractor, and specifically provides that it shall not be
construed as creating a contractual relationship of any kind between any persons other than the
owner and general contractor. As between Brinkerhoff and Anderson, the contract assigns
responsibility to Brinkerhoff. The undisputed summary judgment evidence, however, is that
there was an oral subcontract between Brinkerhoff and Lopez under which Lopez had
responsibility for the means, methods, and details of the masonry work, as well as for the safety
of his workers. This subcontract was the parallel to the contract construed in Byrne, not the
contract between Anderson and Brinkerhoff. In Gonzalez, we concluded the injured worker
could not rely on contracts to which he was not a party or a third-party beneficiary. See
Gonzalez, 418 S.W.3d at 786.
7
We refer to this case as “Byrne” to avoid confusion with the Houston Deleon case cited above.
–9–
In addition, the contract in Byrne expressly granted to the contractor control of specific
activity relating to DeLeon’s injury. Id. Here, the contract provides more generally that
Brinkerhoff shall supervise and direct the work, and assigns sole responsibility and control to
him over means and methods of construction. There is nothing relating to masonry or the
equipment required for it. Byrne does not resolve the issue of contractual control in this case.
Chevez also argues that under article 9 of the contract, Brinkerhoff could not assign
responsibility for the masonry work without obtaining Anderson’s written consent, and therefore
retained responsibility for Lopez’s work and Chevez’s injury. This provision, however,
explicitly states that the owner and general contractor “bind themselves . . . to the other party
hereto” and shall not assign the contract “as a whole” without written consent of the other.
Nothing in this provision suggests that Brinkerhoff could not subcontract with Lopez for the
masonry work without Anderson’s written consent, or that Brinkerhoff retained contractual
control over the means, methods, and details of Lopez’s work so that a duty was created to
Chevez.
As to actual control, the summary judgment evidence showed that Brinkerhoff hired
several subcontractors to undertake specific work on the project. Brinkerhoff testified that
responsibility for safety on the project was allocated to each subcontractor. Each subcontractor
was to be responsible for the safety of his workers on the site. Brinkerhoff hired Lopez for the
masonry work. Prior to beginning the work, Brinkerhoff met with Lopez to review the
architectural plans so that Lopez understood the type of masonry work the project required.
Brinkerhoff purchased the masonry materials necessary for Lopez to complete the work and had
them delivered to the project site. Lopez testified that he and Brinkerhoff each paid for some of
the materials. Lopez then directed his employees, including Chevez, on how to complete the
masonry work. Lopez testified that Brinkerhoff did not direct Chevez or any of Lopez’s other
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workers on the masonry work to be done. Chevez himself testified that he did not receive any
direction from Brinkerhoff. Lopez provided the tools necessary to complete the masonry work.
During the project, Brinkerhoff did not interact with Chevez, and was not present on the site
when Chevez was injured. Lopez, not Brinkerhoff, paid the masonry workers.
The summary judgment evidence also showed that Brinkerhoff may have owned the
scaffolding from which Chevez fell. Brinkerhoff testified that he owns scaffolding that has been
used on other job sites. But Brinkerhoff also testified that when he is not using the scaffolding at
job sites, Lopez keeps or maintains it. Lopez may use the scaffolding on “different jobs, not
necessarily my [Brinkerhoff’s] jobs.” Lopez in turn testified that he needed no direction from
Brinkerhoff on how to set up, erect, or secure the scaffolding or place the walk boards on it.
Chevez’s complaint, that a board on the scaffolding was not properly secured, arose from
Lopez’s control, maintenance, and use of the scaffolding, not Brinkerhoff’s possible ownership
of it.
The summary judgment record demonstrates that Brinkerhoff did not control the means,
manner, and details of the masonry work on the project, either by contract or in fact, and
therefore did not owe a duty to Chevez. See Gonzalez, 418 S.W.3d at 788–89. Summary
judgment was proper on Chevez’s negligent activity claims against Brinkerhoff.
As to Chevez’s premises defect claims against Brinkerhoff, Chevez again argues that
Brinkerhoff had a duty to inspect the premises and warn of dangers which he knew or should
have known to exist. But as we have explained, the duty to inspect and warn arises only as to
existing defects unrelated to the independent contractor’s work activity. Oliva, 952 S.W.2d at
527. No such defect is alleged by Chevez; his complaint is about the scaffold used in the
masonry work. As we have already discussed, the summary judgment record shows that
Brinkerhoff did not control the means, manner, and details of the masonry work on the project.
–11–
See Gonzalez, 418 S.W.3d at 788–89. Summary judgment was proper on Chevez’s premises
defect claims against Brinkerhoff. See Bright, 89 S.W.3d at 606–611. We overrule Chevez’s
second issue.
2. Sufficiency of motions
In his first issue, Chevez contends the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to
sustain his objections and special exceptions to appellees’ summary judgment motions. Chevez
waived most of these objections and special exceptions by failing to obtain a ruling on them from
the trial court. See Gonzalez, 418 S.W.3d at 783 (waiver of objections to form of summary
judgment evidence); Brooks v. Hous. Auth. of City of El Paso, 926 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1996, no writ) (waiver of special exceptions).
Chevez was not required to specially except, however, that appellees’ no-evidence
motions failed to state specifically the elements of the causes of action on which they contend
there was no evidence. See Coleman v. Prospere, No. 05-13-00068-CV, 2014 WL 4672456, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 22, 2014, no pet. h.). This complaint may be raised for the first
time on appeal. See id. (failure of no-evidence motion to challenge any element of claim or
defense renders motion legally insufficient, which complaint may be raised for first time on
appeal). And he was not required to except to appellees’ motions on the ground that they did not
address one or more of his causes of action. See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858
S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex. 1993).
We reject Chevez’s contention that appellees’ motions are deficient regarding his
negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability claims. Appellees’ motions specify that
appellees owe no duty to Chevez. Duty is an essential element of all of Chevez’s claims
grounded in negligence. See, e.g., Stewart v. Columbia Med. Ctr. of McKinney Subsidiary, L.P.,
214 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (essential elements of negligence
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claim are existence of legal duty, breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by
breach); McClure v. Denham, 162 S.W.3d 346, 353–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)
(where plaintiff failed to establish defendant owed duty of care, summary judgment was proper
on negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence claims). 8 Appellee’s motions were
sufficient to support summary judgment on Chevez’s negligence and premises liability claims.
We also reject Chevez’s contention that appellees’ motions are deficient because they fail
to address claims for breach of contract and fraud. Appellees were not required to move for
summary judgment on claims that were not pleaded. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903
S.W.2d 347, 354 (Tex. 1995) (defendant need not show that plaintiff cannot succeed on any
theory conceivable in order to obtain summary judgment, but is only required to “meet the
plaintiff’s case as pleaded”). We therefore review Chevez’s petition to determine if he pleaded
causes of action for fraud and breach of contract. There is no cause of action pleaded for fraud,
nor any allegation that any misrepresentations were made to Chevez on which he relied to his
detriment; therefore, appellees were not required to seek summary judgment on any such cause
of action. See id. Similarly, the petition contains references to a contract or agreement in
paragraph 16, but Chevez does not plead that he was a party to any contract that was breached
for which he seeks damages. He appears to contend that he is a beneficiary of a contract among
the defendants, but the contract he alleges is an agreement to avoid liability for injuries and
damages. 9 These allegations are made in the context of a claim that the defendants were engaged
8
We also reject Chevez’s argument that the motions were deficient for failure to address his claim for exemplary damages. This claim was
premised on appellees’ liability for gross negligence. Without underlying liability, Chevez’s claim for exemplary damages fails. See Fed.
Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. 1993) (recovery of punitive damages requires finding of independent tort with
accompanying actual damages). Because appellees disproved the element of duty on Chevez’s negligence and premises liability claims, it was
not necessary to address or disprove damages or exemplary damages for those claims. See Lear Siegler, Inc., 819 S.W.2d at 471 (defendant on
summary judgment must disprove as matter of law one of essential elements of each of plaintiff’s causes of action).
9
In his appellate briefing, Chevez also argues he is a third party beneficiary to the contract between Anderson and Brinkerhoff. We have
rejected this contention in our discussion of Chevez’s second issue. In any event, this contention is not pleaded.
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in a joint enterprise. We conclude that Chevez did not plead a cause of action for breach of
contract, and appellees were not required to move for summary judgment on that ground. See id.
In paragraph 16 of his petition, however, Chevez alleged that the defendants (including
Lopez) were engaged in a joint enterprise. 10 Neither of the appellees moved for summary
judgment on this ground. Neither a traditional nor a no-evidence summary judgment may be
upheld upon grounds not raised in the summary judgment motion. Jose Fuentes Co., Inc. v.
Alfaro, 418 S.W.3d 280, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. filed) (en banc).
Appellees respond that joint enterprise is not a separate cause of action, so that it was not
necessary to address it in their motions for summary judgment. In Shoemaker v. Estate of
Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex. 1974), the court explained that “[t]he theory of joint
enterprise is to make each party thereto the agent of the other and thereby to hold each
responsible for the negligent act of the other.” See also In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d
74, 78 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (joint enterprise is theory involving derivative
liability in which one enterprise participant may be held liable for cause of action proven against
another enterprise participant). The Shoemaker court “quoted and expressly adopted the
Restatement’s definition of a joint enterprise.” St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 525
(Tex. 2003). In Wolff, the court explained that “[a]lthough we have considered the concept of
joint enterprise liability in several cases after Shoemaker, we have not altered Shoemaker’s
adoption of the Restatement definition of joint enterprise.” Id. at 526. The four elements
10
Chevez’s pleading is that defendants “engaged in a joint enterprise, partnership, joint venture and/or agency.” He recites the four
elements of joint enterprise in paragraph 16 of his petition. He does not make any separate pleading as to partnership, joint venture, or agency;
each mention in his petition and appellate briefing lists the four theories together. We note that the elements of proof of these theories differ from
those of joint enterprise. See Blackburn v. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Arlington Subsidiary, L.P., 58 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001,
pet. denied). Although Chevez did not make any allegations to support a claim under these different theories, neither did appellees specially
except or obtain a ruling from the trial court regarding defects in Chevez’s pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 90 (pleading defects waived if not
specifically pointed out in writing and brought to attention of trial court). Unlike the purported fraud and breach of contract claims, for which
there were no allegations “sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved,” see TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(a), these theories were at least mentioned in
Chevez’s petition. Cf. Maswoswe v. Nelson, 327 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (reviewing court should liberally
construe plaintiff’s petition to assert any claim that could be reasonably inferred from specific language of petition, but cannot use liberal
construction as license to read into petition claim it does not contain). Because none of the parties specifically address these additional theories
on appeal, however, we address only the allegations of joint enterprise.
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“essential to a joint enterprise” are (1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of
a group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary
interest in that purpose, among the members, and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of
the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control. Id. (citing Shoemaker, 513 S.W.2d at 16–
17).
Where parties are engaged in a joint enterprise, the negligence of one party may be
imputed to the other. See Shoemaker, 513 S.W.2d at 14 (“The theory of joint enterprise is to
make each party thereto the agent of the other and thereby to hold each responsible for the
negligent act of the other.”). Therefore, if Chevez establishes that one of the defendants was
negligent, and also establishes the elements of a joint enterprise among the defendants, the
negligence of one defendant may be imputed to the others. See id. Anderson’s and
Brinkerhoff’s motions for summary judgment do not address Chevez’s allegations that they were
responsible for injuries on the job site because they were engaged in a joint enterprise with
Lopez, and Lopez was negligent.
Appellees contend that because they obtained summary judgment on Chevez’s
negligence claims against them, there are no grounds for any liability under a joint enterprise
theory, citing G&H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tex. 2011). In Magee, the
court considered whether summary judgment was proper on a vicarious liability claim that was
not addressed in the summary judgment motion. The court determined that any error in granting
summary judgment on a claim not addressed in the motion was harmless because the trial court
also correctly granted summary judgment on the theory of liability on which the vicarious
liability claim was premised. Id. at 297–98. This case differs from Magee in that the summary
judgment does not address negligence on the part of Lopez which might be imputed to appellees.
Even though Chevez has nonsuited his claims against Lopez, he may still attempt to prove in the
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trial court that Lopez was negligent and was engaged in a joint enterprise with appellees for
which appellees are liable. See, e.g., David L. Smith & Assocs., L.L.P. v. Stealth Detection, Inc.,
327 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (theory of joint enterprise “imputes
liability to one who, although he did no wrong, is so closely connected to the wrongdoer that it
justifies the imposition of vicarious liability”). We sustain the portion of Chevez’s second issue
complaining of the trial court’s summary judgment on his allegation that appellees were engaged
in a joint enterprise with Lopez.
CONCLUSION
We sustain Chevez’s first issue in part and overrule it in part. We overrule his second
issue. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse and remand only as to the claim
of joint enterprise which was not addressed in the motions for summary judgment.
/Michael J. O'Neill/
MICHAEL J. O’NEILL
JUSTICE
130572F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ANDRES CHEVEZ, Appellant On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-13-00572-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-10-015850-E.
Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill,
JERRY L. BRINKERHOFF and JOHN B. Justices Evans and Brown participating.
ANDERSON, Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s
judgment granting summary judgment on appellant’s claims that appellees were engaged in a
joint enterprise. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. We REMAND
this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 22nd day of December, 2014.
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