Garrick Jamal Smith v. State ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • DISMISSED; Opinion Filed April 1, 2019.
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-19-00007-CR
    GARRICK JAMAL SMITH, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
    Grayson County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 068331
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Nowell
    Opinion by Justice Myers
    Garrick Jamal Smith appeals his convictions for assault of a public servant, tampering with
    or fabricating physical evidence, and taking a weapon from a peace officer. Appellant pleaded
    guilty to all three offenses in exchange for the State’s agreement to “cap” punishment in the first
    two counts and to abandon the enhancement paragraph in the third count. The trial court found
    appellant guilty and assessed punishment at twelve years in prison for each of the first two counts
    and two years in state jail for the third count. Appellant then filed his notice of appeal.
    After reviewing appellant’s notice of appeal and the details of the convictions, we had
    questions regarding our jurisdiction. By letter dated January 23, 2019, we asked appellant and the
    State to file letter briefs regarding the jurisdictional issue. Neither party responded.
    The clerk’s record shows that when appellant was indicted, each count had been enhanced
    by a prior felony conviction. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to count 1, assault of a public
    servant, and count 2, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence (both third-degree felonies
    enhanced by prior felony convictions to second-degree felony punishment), in exchange for the
    State’s agreement to recommend a “cap” of 15 years. He also agreed to plead guilty to count 3,
    taking a weapon from a peace officer (a state-jail felony originally enhanced by a prior felony
    conviction to a third-degree punishment) in exchange for the State’s agreement to abandon the
    enhancement paragraph. The trial court admonished appellant in writing that if he pleaded guilty
    under a plea bargain agreement with the State and the trial court followed the plea bargain,
    appellant would not be allowed to appeal his convictions “except for those matter, if any, raised
    by written motions filed and ruled on by the Court prior to trial.” Appellant, appellant’s trial
    counsel, the district attorney, and the trial court signed the agreement. The clerk’s record also
    shows that no substantive written motions were filed or ruled on by the trial court prior to the
    hearing on appellant’s pleas. The trial court then followed the plea bargain agreement, found
    appellant guilty, and assessed punishment. The trial court certified that appellant had waived his
    right to appeal.
    A defendant in a plea bargain case‒that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty or
    nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the
    prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant‒may appeal only (1) matters that were raised by written
    motion filed and ruled on before trial or (2) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). There are two basic kinds of plea-bargaining: charge-bargaining and
    sentence-bargaining. Shankle v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 808
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Charge-
    bargaining involves whether a defendant will plead guilty to the offense that has been alleged or
    to a lesser or related offense, and whether the prosecutor will dismiss, or refrain from bringing,
    –2–
    other charges. 
    Id. Sentence-bargaining may
    be for binding or non-binding recommendations to
    the court on sentences, including a recommended “cap” on sentencing and a recommendation for
    deferred-adjudication probation. 
    Id. Here, appellant
    entered into a sentence plea-bargain with the State when he agreed to plead
    guilty in exchange for (1) the State’s recommendation of a fifteen-year-cap in the third-degree
    offenses that were enhanced to second-degree felony punishment and (2) the State’s agreement to
    abandon the enhancement paragraph that would have raised the range of punishment from state
    jail to third-degree felony in the taking a weapon from a peace officer offense. As previously
    noted, no substantive written motions were filed or ruled on by the trial court prior to the hearing
    on appellant’s plea, and the trial court did not give permission to appeal. Thus, appellant waived
    his right to appeal.
    We dismiss this appeal.
    /Lana Myers/
    LANA MYERS
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    190007F.U05
    –3–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    GARRICK JAMAL SMITH, Appellant                       On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District
    Court, Grayson County, Texas
    No. 05-19-00007-CR          V.                       Trial Court Cause No. 068331.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Myers,
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                         Justices Osborne and Nowell participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal for want of
    jurisdiction.
    Judgment entered this 1st day of April, 2019.
    –4–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-19-00007-CR

Filed Date: 4/1/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/2/2019