William Donald Stanley v. State ( 2014 )


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  •                                      In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    ________________________
    No. 07-14-00162-CR
    ________________________
    WILLIAM DONALD STANLEY, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    On Appeal from the 31st District Court
    Gray County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 8249; Honorable Steven Emmert, Presiding
    December 16, 2014
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
    In October 2012, pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant, William Donald Stanley,
    was granted deferred adjudication community supervision for eight years and assessed
    a $2,000 fine for injury to a child, elderly individual or disabled individual with intent to
    commit bodily injury.1 In January 2014, the State moved to proceed with adjudication
    1
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014). As charged, the offense is a third
    degree felony. Id. at (f).
    alleging Appellant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision by
    possessing and/or consuming marihuana on three separate occasions.                              Following a
    hearing on the State’s motion at which Appellant entered a plea of true, the trial court
    adjudicated him guilty of the original offense and sentenced him to six years
    confinement and the original fine, less any amounts paid. In presenting this appeal,
    counsel has filed an Anders2 brief in support of a motion to withdraw.                            We grant
    counsel’s motion and affirm.
    In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a
    conscientious examination of the record, and in his opinion, the record reflects no
    potentially plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744-45, 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 493
     (1967); In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the
    controlling authorities, the record supports that conclusion.                   See High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel has demonstrated he has complied
    with the requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief
    to Appellant, (2) notifying him of his right to review the record and file a pro se response
    if he desired to do so,3 and (3) informing him of his right to file a pro se petition for
    discretionary review. In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d at 408
    .4 By letter, this Court granted
    2
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L.Ed.2d 493
     (1967).
    3
    This Court is aware of the decision in Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
    4
    Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary
    review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must
    comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within
    five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together
    with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d at
    408 n.22 & 411 n.35. The duty to send the client a copy of the court of appeals’s decision is an
    informational one, not a representational one. It is ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and
    exists after the court of appeals has granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
    Id.
     at 411 n.33.
    2
    Appellant an opportunity to exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should
    he be so inclined. 
    Id.
     at 409 n.23. Appellant did not file a response. By letter, the State
    acknowledged the filing of the Anders brief and notified this Court it would not be filing a
    brief at this time.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant was charged with causing bodily injury to an individual sixty-five years
    of age or older. At the revocation hearing, he testified he is addicted to marihuana. He
    admitted he “failed to stay clean and sober.” He further testified he would benefit from a
    long-term residential treatment program as he had done decades earlier while in the
    Navy. According to his community supervision officer, Appellant originally rejected an
    offer for rehabilitation and has a tendency to relapse.
    By the Anders brief, counsel raises arguable issues on the sufficiency of the
    evidence to adjudicate Appellant, ineffective assistance of counsel and the severity of
    punishment. He concludes, however, that no reversible error is presented.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    An appeal from a trial court's order adjudicating guilt is reviewed in the same
    manner as a revocation hearing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b)
    (West Supp. 2014). When reviewing an order revoking community supervision imposed
    under an order of deferred adjudication, the sole question before this Court is whether
    the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Jackson v.
    State, 
    645 S.W.2d 303
    , 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In a revocation proceeding, the
    3
    State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated a
    condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion.        Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof,
    the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision. Cardona, 
    665 S.W.2d at 494
    . In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation,
    we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Jones v.
    State, 
    589 S.W.2d 419
    , 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).          Additionally, a plea of true
    standing alone is sufficient to support a trial court’s revocation order. Moses v. State,
    
    590 S.W.2d 469
    , 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
    We have independently examined the entire record to determine whether there
    are any non-frivolous issues which might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 80, 
    109 S.Ct. 346
    , 
    102 L.Ed.2d 300
     (1988); In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d at 409
    ; Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We have found no
    such issues. See Gainous v. State, 
    436 S.W.2d 137
    , 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After
    reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that there is no
    plausible basis for reversal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826-27 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2005).
    Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed and counsel's motion to
    withdraw is granted.
    Patrick A. Pirtle
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    4