Rick Wood v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality ( 2014 )


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  •                             NUMBER 13-13-00189-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    RICK WOOD,                                                                 Appellant,
    v.
    TEXAS COMMISSION ON
    ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,                                                      Appellee.
    On appeal from the 261st District Court
    of Travis County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    This is an appeal from a Travis County District Court decision on an administrative
    agency act.   Rick Wood, a landowner, filed a protest with the State Office of the
    Administrative Hearings (SOAH) challenging the application of Lerin Hills Municipal
    Utility District (Lerin Hills) for a proposed water treatment center to be built near his
    property.    Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a proposal for decision
    denying Lerin Hills’s application on one issue:              whether the application met the Texas
    Commission on Environmental Quality’s (the Commission’s) antidegradation rule.
    Upon review, the Commission overruled the ALJ, approved the project, and issued a
    revised order explaining its decision. Wood then appealed the Commission’s final order
    to a state district court, which upheld the Commission’s approval and granted the
    Commission’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on Wood’s Texas Open
    Meetings Act claim.
    By seven issues, which we re-number and re-organize as four, Wood contends
    that:   (1) the decision not to refer a regionalization, or need, issue to the SOAH was
    erroneous; (2) the Commission erred when it held that Lerin Hills met the Commission’s
    Tier 2 antidegradation standard; (3) the Commission erred when it revised the ALJ’s
    proposed order to approve the project; and (4) the trial court erred in granting a
    no-evidence summary judgment.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    I. BACKGROUND1
    On May 3, 2006, Lerin Hills submitted an application for a Texas Pollution
    Discharge Elimination System permit.             See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.061
    (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (providing that the Commission may issue
    permits regarding solid waste facilities).                This application sought permission to
    discharge effluent from a new wastewater treatment facility that would serve a planned
    1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to an
    order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through
    2013 3d C.S.).
    2
    1,475 single-family housing development in Kendall County, Texas.         The application
    proposed discharging the treated wastewater into an unnamed tributary, then to the
    headwaters of an impoundment on Deep Hollow Creek, then to Deep Hollow Creek, then
    to Frederick Creek, then to Upper Cibolo Creek in Segment Number 1908 of the San
    Antonio River Basin.
    The Commission issued a public notice after it received Lerin Hills’s application
    and declared it complete.   Appellant Rick Wood, whose property was located near the
    proposed site, requested a contested case hearing before an ALJ on the application.
    The Commission granted Wood’s request for hearing on the following issues:
    1.     Whether the proposed effluent discharge would be in compliance
    with regulations intended to protect ground water and surface water;
    2.     Whether the effluent limitation in the draft permit would protect water
    quality and the designated uses of the receiving waters;
    3.     Whether the permit would authorize Lerin Hills to discharge the
    appropriate amount of wastewater based on the service area
    projections;
    4.     Whether the proposed facility would comply with the siting
    requirements set forth in 30 Texas Administrative Code section
    309.12;
    5.     Whether the facility would meet the rule requirements intended to
    reduce nuisance odor conditions;
    6.     Whether Lerin Hills’s compliance history was such that the permit
    should not be issued; and
    7.     Whether certain requirements of the draft permit regarding plant
    operator and safety concerns were sufficient to ensure compliant
    plant operations.
    Notably, the Commission did not grant a hearing on Wood’s question of whether
    regionalization, or need, was at issue.     During the public comment period, Wood
    3
    contended that there was not a need for this additional wastewater treatment facility
    because there was another treatment facility in the region that could handle the
    anticipated discharge from the new planned development.         The Commission chose,
    however, not to submit this issue to the ALJ for a hearing.
    On November 18–20, 2008, an ALJ from the SOAH, Judge Shannon J. Kilgore,
    held a live hearing on the aforelisted issues with respect to Lerin Hills’s application.
    Several water quality experts testified:   Charles Marshall testified for the Commission;
    Dr. James Miertschin, an environmental engineer, and Paul Price, an aquatic biologist,
    testified for Lerin Hills; Peter Schaefer, an aquatic scientist, testified for the
    Commission’s Executive Director; and Dr. Roger Lee testified for Wood.          The ALJ
    subsequently issued a proposal for decision (PFD) which concluded that Lerin Hills met
    its burden of proof on all of the contested issues save one:   whether the permit met the
    Commission’s antidegradation rule.    See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 307.5 (West, Westlaw
    2013 though 3d C.S.).        This rule provides that changes that can affect the
    fishable/swimmable quality cannot be allowed unless the applicant can show to the
    Commission’s satisfaction that the lowering of water quality is necessary for important
    economic or social development.     
    Id. The Commission’s
    Executive Director and Lerin
    Hills filed extensive exceptions to the PFD on the antidegradation issue.
    On May 20, 2008, the Commission held a full hearing on Lerin Hills’s application.
    Chairman Buddy Garcia, Commissioner Dr. Bryan Shaw, and Commissioner Larry
    Soward presided at the hearing.      After deliberation, wherein the Commission heard
    testimony from the ALJ, representatives from Lerin Hills, Wood, and the Commission’s
    Executive Director, and considered the evidence from the SOAH hearing, the
    4
    Commission voted to reverse the ALJ recommendation on the antidegradation issue.
    The Commission requested that Lerin Hills’s counsel, Danny Worrell, draft an order
    modifying the ALJ’s proposed order to reflect their new position on antidegradation.    At
    the next Commission meeting on June 26, 2009, attorney Worrell presented the draft
    order and explained the modifications made to the ALJ’s PFD. Wood did not attend this
    public hearing and was not represented by counsel, either.    Ultimately, the Commission
    voted to adopt this order.   Chairman Garcia signed the final order on July 7, 2009.
    Wood appealed the adoption of the final order in a Travis County District Court.
    In his appeal, Wood also added an Open Meetings Claim violation, arguing that the
    Commission violated the Texas Open Meetings Act when it accepted Lerin Hills’s
    proposed modifications when they were not based in the record. The trial court granted
    the Commission’s no-evidence summary judgment motion on Wood’s Open Meetings
    claim and upheld the Commission’s decision and findings.             Wood subsequently
    appealed.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “Judicial review of an administrative order following a contested-case proceeding
    is governed by the substantial evidence rule.”   Citizens Against Landfill Location v. Tex.
    Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 
    169 S.W.3d 258
    , 263 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).
    The Texas Government Code provides the following guidance regarding application of
    the substantial evidence rule:
    If the law authorizes review of a decision in a contested case under the
    substantial evidence rule or if the law does not define the scope of judicial
    review, a court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the state
    agency on the weight of the evidence on questions committed to agency
    discretion but:
    5
    (1)    may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and
    (2)    shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if
    substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
    because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions,
    or decisions are:
    (A)   in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
    (B)   in excess of the agency's statutory authority;
    (C)   made through unlawful procedure;
    (D)   affected by other error of law;
    (E)   not reasonably supported by substantial evidence
    considering the reliable and probative evidence in the
    record as a whole; or
    (F)   arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
    discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
    discretion.
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.174 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
    Under the substantial evidence rule, appellate courts review the evidence as a
    whole to determine if reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the
    agency.   
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    (citing H.G. Sledge, Inc. v. Prospective Inv. &
    Trading Co., 
    36 S.W.3d 597
    , 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)).         A court may
    not substitute its judgment for that of the agency and may only consider the record on
    which the agency based its decision.        
    Id. (referring to
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
    2001.174).    We must not determine whether the agency reached the correct
    conclusion, but whether there is some basis in the record for the agency’s action.     Id.;
    see City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    883 S.W.2d 190
    , 204 (Tex. 1994). “We
    presume that the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions are
    supported by substantial evidence, and the burden to prove otherwise is on the
    6
    appellant.”    
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    (citing Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v.
    Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 
    665 S.W.2d 446
    , 452 (Tex.1984)).       The agency’s decision, in
    this case the Commission’s decision, should only be reversed if the party challenging the
    decision demonstrates that the lack of substantial evidence prejudiced the party’s
    substantial rights.   
    Id. III. ISSUES
    ON APPEAL
    A.     The Decision Not to Refer the Regionalization Issue to the SOAH
    Wood argues that the Commission erred when it decided not to refer the
    regionalization issue to the SOAH.          In other words, Wood contends that the
    Commission should have allowed the SOAH to determine whether there was a need for
    the additional wastewater treatment facility, given that there existed another facility in the
    region.
    Section 26.003 of the Texas Water Code encourages and promotes “the
    development and use of regional and areawide waste collection, treatment, and disposal
    systems.”     TEX. W ATER CODE ANN. § 26.003 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
    Section 5.556(d) of the Texas Water Code deals with the choice to refer issues to the
    SOAH.     See 
    id. § 5.556(d)
    (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The statute, in
    relevant part, provides as follows:
    The commission may not refer an issue to the State Office of
    Administrative Hearings for a hearing unless the commission determines
    that the issue:
    (1)     Involves a disputed question of fact;
    (2)     Was raised during the public comment period; and
    (3)     Is relevant and material to the decision on the application.
    7
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    In addition, section 5.556(e) provides:
    If the commission grants a request for a contested case hearing it shall:
    (1)    Limit the number and scope of the issues to be referred to the State
    Office of Administrative Hearings for a hearing; and
    (2)    Consistent with the nature and number of the issues to be
    considered at the hearing, specify the maximum expected duration
    of the hearing.
    
    Id. at §
    5.556(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
    A plain reading of the statute reveals that the decision to refer an issue to the
    SOAH is discretionary and at the Commission’s will. The Commission “determines”
    whether the issue “involves a disputed question of fact,” “was raised during the public
    comment period,” and “is relevant and material.”          
    Id. at §
    5.556(d).     Here, it is
    undisputed that Wood raised the issue of regionalization, or need, during the public
    comment period.      Thus, the only questions at issue were whether regionalization
    involved a disputed question of fact and if it was relevant and material to the
    Commission’s decision to grant the application.     
    Id. In this
    case, the Commission determined that the need for an additional facility
    was not in question. We look to Lerin Hills’s original application, wherein it identified the
    Tapatio Springs Service Company wastewater treatment center as an existing facility
    located within three miles of the proposed development.               Testimony from the
    Commission’s Executive Director revealed that the Tapatio Springs facility was only
    authorized to treat 150,000 gallons of domestic wastewater daily; Lerin Hills requested
    the ability to treat 500,000 gallons of effluent per day.    The issue of geography also
    created a problem.    According to the Executive Director,
    8
    The proposed facility is located on the opposite side of a major topographic
    ridge from the Tapatio Springs Service Company facility. If the Lerin Hills
    permit is issued, wastewater would be collected in gravity sanitary sewers
    and then pumped at relatively low pressures to the proposed facility;
    however[,] for Lerin Hills to connect to the Tapatio Springs Service
    Company facility, wastewater would first have to be centrally collected in
    the lower part of the Lerin Hills area and then pumped over the ridge,
    requiring a vertical lift over 200 feet. Lerin Hills indicates this is
    undesirable because it will increase costs for the future Lerin Hills
    homeowners and it will increase the risk of raw sewage spills due to higher
    pressure in the sewage force main.
    We conclude that the Commission did not err when it declined to grant a hearing
    on the question of regionalization, or need. Section 5.556(d) of the Texas Water Code
    gives the Commission discretion to determine which issues should be considered for
    hearing, and in light of the foregoing concerns regarding the limited capacity and
    geographic challenges of using another wastewater facility in the vicinity, we hold that
    the Commission wielded its discretion appropriately.                   Id.; see State v. Pub. Utility
    Comm’n of Tex., 
    883 S.W.2d 190
    , 196 (providing that “the contemporaneous
    construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is
    entitled to great weight”) (referring to Dodd v. Meno, 
    870 S.W.2d 4
    , 7 (Tex. 1994) &
    Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 
    845 S.W.2d 820
    , 823 (Tex. 1993)). We overrule this
    issue.2
    B.        The Commission’s Tier 2 Antidegradation Standard
    Wood also contended that the Commission erred when it held that Lerin Hills met
    the Commission’s Tier 2 antidegradation standard. The Texas Administrative Code
    sets forth this standard:
    2 We further note that the Commission did, though, honor Wood’s request by granting him a
    hearing on seven other issues raised during the public comment period. By limiting the number of issues it
    heard, the Commission complied with its duty to “limit the number and scope of the issues to be referred” to
    the SOAH. TEX. W ATER CODE ANN. § 5.556(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
    9
    Tier 2. No activities subject to regulatory action that would cause
    degradation of waters that exceed fishable/swimmable quality are allowed
    unless it can be shown to the commission's satisfaction that the lowering of
    water quality is necessary for important economic or social development.
    Degradation is defined as a lowering of water quality by more than a de
    minimis extent, but not to the extent that an existing use is impaired. Water
    quality sufficient to protect existing uses must be maintained.
    Fishable/swimmable waters are defined as waters that have quality
    sufficient to support propagation of indigenous fish, shellfish, terrestrial life,
    and recreation in and on the water.
    30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 307.5.
    “In Texas, the TCEQ has the primary authority to establish surface water quality
    standards, which it implements, in part, in its permitting actions.” Tex. Comm'n on Envtl.
    Quality v. City of Waco, 
    413 S.W.3d 409
    , 411 (Tex. 2013). A review of the record shows
    that the Commission measures water quality issues by two standards:           the quantitative
    and the narrative standards.   
    Id. at 411,
    n.3 (indicating that the Commission has defined
    “narrative” water quality standards as “qualitative, somewhat subjective assessments”
    compared to “quantitative or numeric measures”).        In its brief, the Commission further
    explained:
    Narrative standards apply to parameters such as nutrients that are harder
    to quantify. Unlike many water-quality criteria, which are based on a
    certain toxicity threshold determined by testing, the variability of
    ecosystems makes developing a cause/effect relationship between nutrient
    concentrations and ecological factors more difficult to readily determine
    through testing. Hence, a narrative standard rather than a numeric
    standard is applied.
    In comparison, the Commission referred to its “Implementation Procedures,”
    which uses numerical data for elements that are easy to quantify, such as dissolved
    oxygen, total dissolved solids, sulfate, chloride, pH, temperature, toxic pollutants, and
    bacteria, among others.    See TEX. COMM’N ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Procedures to
    Implement the Texas Surface Water Quality Standards (June 2010), available at
    10
    http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/permitting/waterquality/standards/docs/june_20
    10_ip.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
    According to its brief, the Commission measures antidegradation under the
    narrative standard.   As applied to this case, that means that the Commission would
    require qualitative, subjective evidence to determine whether Lerin Hills’s proposed
    facility would “lower[] . . . water quality by more than a de minimis extent, but not to the
    extent that an existing use is impaired.” 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 307.5.
    At the May 20, 2009 Commission meeting, the ALJ confirmed that she used the
    more strict, quantitative standard to determine whether antidegradation would occur if
    the Lerin Hills facility were approved.   She testified as follows:
    Both Lerin Hills and the ED have excepted to my analysis and findings
    concerning the antidegradation rule.           They’re both critical of my
    characterization of the rule and in particular tier 2 as very stringent and
    challenging. They suggest that I have over-read the rule. In addition[,]
    they assert that I have applied a standard of proof that’s someho[w] stricter
    than the preponderance of the evidence standard. . . . I do believe that
    this is a strict and not a lenient rule. . . .
    ....
    Mr. Price, the biologist, opined that nutrients in the discharge would not
    have an adverse effect on the plant life in the impoundments at Deep
    Hollow Creek. . . . Mr. Price [, though,] was not in command of the only
    quantitative data that exists that attempts to predict the effects on the
    receiving stream of the nutrients in this discharge. [He] was not a very
    persuasive witness. That leaves the opinion of Dr. Miertschin [who]
    offered a general opinion that the increased plant and algal growth will not
    be significant. His opinion was quite conclusory.
    The ALJ explained that she felt that the experts for Lerin Hills, Mr. Price and Dr.
    Miertschin, were unable to quantify their conclusions that the effluent would lower water
    quality by more than a de minimis extent.      Accordingly, the ALJ maintained that these
    expert opinions were incompetent because they were unexplained by numerical data.
    11
    Lerin Hills, at the same May 9th hearing, protested the ALJ’s requirement of the
    quantitative standard to measure antidegradation.      Counsel for Lerin Hills stated that
    the use of numeric proof was neither required “by the rules, the Texas Surface Water
    Quality Standards or the implementation procedures.” At the hearing, Chairman for the
    Commission, Buddy Garcia, confirmed that “we [the Commission] do use a narrative
    criteria here, and have.” Chairman Garcia expressed that, although the Commission
    would eventually prefer to move toward establishing numerical criteria to determine
    antidegradation, it was not the current standard used to measure this tier 2 requirement.
    Accordingly, the Commission overruled the ALJ’s recommendation because it held that
    the ALJ used the incorrect standard to measure the proposed treatment facility’s impact
    on water quality.
    Wood urges us to consider State v. Mid-South Pavers in support of his contention
    that the ALJ’s recommendation should stand.      See 
    246 S.W.3d 711
    (Tex. App.—Austin
    2007, pet. denied).       We find Mid-South Pavers inapposite on this matter.            In
    Mid-South, a case involving a highway construction contract, the Austin Court of Appeals
    partially reversed a decision by the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT)
    because TxDOT overruled an ALJ’s finding on witness credibility.          
    Id. at 726.
    The
    Third Court of Appeals ruled that “by resolving conflicts and credibility issues in disputed
    evidence, the executive director [of TxDOT] has essentially stepped into the shoes of the
    factfinder and reweighed the evidence to reach a specific result.     This is not what the
    legislature envisioned. . . .”   
    Id. The Commission
    did not do that here.       Instead, the Commission held that the
    ALJ used the incorrect standard to measure the possible antidegradation of water
    12
    quality.   The ALJ testified that she used the stricter, quantitative standard to measure
    antidegradation when Commission chair Garcia confirmed that the Commission has, to
    date, only used the narrative standard in such decisions.   And the testimony from Lerin
    Hills’s experts Dr. Miertschin and Mr. Price revealed that while water chemistry would
    change with the construction of a new water treatment facility, the changes would have a
    de minimis impact on water quality.     See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 307.5.        This
    evidence thus met the narrative standard.
    Using the substantial evidence standard, we review the evidence as a whole to
    determine if reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the agency in
    the disputed action. 
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    . We may not determine whether the
    Commission reached the correct conclusion, but whether there is some basis in the
    record for its action.    Id.; see City of El 
    Paso, 883 S.W.2d at 204
    .         Here, the
    Commission’s decision was based on the ALJ’s use of an incorrect standard, not on its
    re-evaluation of a witness’s credibility.   See Mid-South 
    Pavers, 246 S.W.3d at 726
    .
    Because we hold that there is substantive evidence to uphold the Commission’s decision
    to overturn the ALJ’s decision on antidegradation, see 
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    , we
    overrule this issue.
    C.     The Commission’s Revision of the ALJ’s Proposed Order
    Wood presented three reasons why the Commission’s revision of the ALJ’s
    proposed order was erroneous:       the Commission allegedly (1) used new “sampling
    requirements” for the determination of baseline water quality; (2) used information
    outside the record; and (3) failed to provide a sufficient “explanation of changes” to the
    ALJ’s order. We analyze each complaint in turn.
    13
    1.     New Sampling Requirements
    Wood argued that the Commission erred when it used “new sampling
    requirements” for the determination of baseline water quality after the close of the
    contested hearing.        Although Wood’s briefing on this issue is somewhat unclear, we
    surmise that one of the bases Wood has for this complaint is that the Commission
    determined that a narrative, not quantitative, standard was used to measure the
    antidegradation requirement for the permit’s approval.                  As more clearly explained in
    section III(B) of this opinion, we conclude that this change was not a “new sampling
    requirement” but rather the Commission’s decision to use the customary water quality
    standard.      Because we concluded that there existed substantial evidence to uphold the
    Commission’s decision to change from a quantitative to narrative standard, see 
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    , we upheld this Commission decision.
    Another complaint Wood has with regard to sampling requirements was the
    Commission’s decision to disregard Dr. James Miertschin’s sampling data.                            Dr.
    Miertschin testified that he took one set of samples when he conducted his investigation
    of Lerin Hills’s proposed discharge route. The ALJ used this sampling data to establish
    several findings of fact in her PFD, specifically, findings of fact numbers 38, 40, 43, and
    46.3 The Commission, however, chose to disregard these samples. In its final order,
    the Commission explained its decision as follows:
    3   Here are the relevant findings of fact from the ALJ’s Proposal for Decision:
    Finding of Fact No. 38: The phosphorus concentrations in the Hahnfeld pond and SCS
    impoundment after the commencement of the proposed discharge could be as much as
    150% to 1,200% of measured background.
    Finding of Fact No. 40: The record in this case includes no attempt to estimate
    quantitatively the amounts of phosphorus that will be biologically available in the stream
    14
    The Commission determined that the ALJ’s inclusion of “background”
    information in certain Findings of Fact was not appropriate, because that
    “background” was based on a single set of samples. Background
    developed in accordance with EPA guidance and TCEQ practices requires
    more extensive sampling to be correctly determined. Therefore, what the
    ALJ proposed as Finding of Fact Nos. 38, 40, 43, and 46 have been
    deleted and the remaining Findings of Fact have been renumbered
    accordingly.
    The Commission’s Executive Director, in his exceptions to the ALJ’s PFD, pointed out
    that this was a correct move because “if a permitee collects samples to obtain
    site-specific data, at least 30 samples must be taken, but the TCEQ would prefer 30–50
    samples to ensure that there are at least 30 valid data points and to get a more
    statistically reliable number.”      Dr. Miertschin further testified that his single set of
    samples were not taken during critical conditions of warm temperatures and base flow
    conditions. This testimony provides yet another reason why this single sampling of data
    was not representative of normal conditions of the receiving stream.                   And, again,
    because we have held that a narrative standard should have been used in this case,
    quantitative sampling was not necessary.
    Under the substantial evidence test, “we presume that the agency’s findings,
    inferences, conclusions, and decisions are supported by substantial evidence, and the
    burden to prove otherwise is on the appellant.”          
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    ; Charter
    Med.-Dallas, 
    Inc., 665 S.W.2d at 452
    .          Here, we find there was substantial evidence in
    over time as the discharge continues.
    Finding of Fact No. 43: The record in this case includes no attempt to estimate
    quantitatively the amounts of algal and plant growth that may result from the increased
    nutrient loading from the proposed discharge.
    Finding of Fact No. 46: Lerin Hills has not shown that any lowering of water quality
    resulting from the proposed discharge would be necessary for an important economic or
    social development.
    15
    the record for the Commission’s decision to discount sampling data that was
    unnecessary under the narrative standard and/or unreliable due to the small sample
    size.
    2.      Amended Findings of Fact
    Wood further contends that the Commission’s amendments to the ALJ’s Findings
    of Fact No. 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 43 were based on information outside the record
    made before the administrative law judge in violation of section 2003.047(m) of the
    Texas Government Code. 4               TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2003.047(m) (West, Westlaw
    through 2013 3d C.S.). Section 2003.047(m) provides as follows:
    Except as provided in Section 361.0832, Health and Safety Code, the
    4   We set forth the relevant findings of fact from the ALJ’s Proposal for Decision:
    Finding of Fact No. 32: Modeling of the effects of the proposed discharge indicates that
    the lowest DO level in Deep Hollow Creek would be between 5.03 mg/L and 5.27 mg/L,
    compared to a presumed background of 6.25 mg/L.
    Finding of Fact No. 36: Predicted concentrations of phosphorus in the SCS impoundment
    would be 0.42 mg/L, 0.28 mg/L, 0.12 mg/L, and 0.05 mg/L (upstream to downstream),
    compared to the measured background of 0.035 mg/L or the presumed background of 0.05
    mg/L.
    Finding of Fact No. 37: Predicted concentrations of phosphorus in the Hahnfeld pond and
    SCS impoundment after the commencement of the proposed discharge could be as much
    as 150% to 1,200% of measured background.
    Finding of Fact No. 38: The phosphorus concentrations in the Hahnfeld pond and SCS
    impoundment after the commencement of the proposed discharge could be as much as
    150% to 1,200% of measured background.
    Finding of Fact 39: Lerin Hills’ phosphorus modeling uses a uniform decay rate to attempt
    to reflect removal of phosphorus from the water column, but the modeling does not attempt
    to reflect cumulative phosphorus loading over time.
    Finding of Fact No. 40: The record in this case includes no attempt to estimate
    quantitatively the amounts of phosphorus that will be biologically available in the stream
    over time as the discharge continues.
    Finding of Fact No. 43: The record in this case includes no attempt to estimate
    quantitatively the amounts of algal and plant growth that may result from the increased
    nutrient loading from the proposed discharge.
    16
    commission shall consider the proposal for decision prepared by the
    administrative law judge, the exceptions of the parties, and the briefs and
    argument of the parties. The commission may amend the proposal for
    decision, including any finding of fact, but any such amendment thereto
    and order shall be based solely on the record made before the
    administrative law judge. Any such amendment by the commission shall
    be accompanied by an explanation of the basis of the amendment. The
    commission may also refer the matter back to the administrative law judge
    to reconsider any findings and conclusions set forth in the proposal for
    decision or take additional evidence or to make additional findings of fact or
    conclusions of law.       The commission shall serve a copy of the
    commission's order, including its finding of facts and conclusions of law, on
    each party.
    
    Id. In his
    brief, Wood argues that the Commission did not base its amended order
    “solely on the record made before the administrative law judge.”     
    Id. He further
    asserts
    that the amended order was not “accompanied by an explanation of the basis of the
    amendment.”       
    Id. We address
    each specifically referenced change.
    a. Finding of Fact Number 32 Regarding Dissolved Oxygen Levels
    Wood argues that the Commission’s change to the ALJ’s finding of fact number
    32 regarding dissolved oxygen levels was not supported by evidence or adequately
    explained. The ALJ’s finding originally read, “Modeling of the effects of the proposed
    discharge indicates that the lowest DO level in Deep Hollow Creek would be between
    5.03 mg/L and 5.27 mg/L, compared to a presumed background of 6.25 mg/L.” The
    Commission’s final order reads, “Modeling of the effects of the proposed discharge
    indicates that the lowest DO level in Deep Hollow Creek would be between 5.03 mg/L
    and 5.27 mg/L.”
    We look to the ALJ’s original PFD and find that she held that the “presumed
    background of 6.25 mg/L” came from Dr. Miertschin’s testimony and findings.        Based on
    the Commission’s decision to disregard Dr. Miertschin’s sampling data because it was
    17
    based on a single set of samples, see discussion at section 
    III(C)(1) supra
    , we find there
    is substantial evidence in the record to support this deletion of language.         As the
    Commission pointed out, “background developed in accordance with EPA guidance and
    TCEQ practices requires more extensive sampling to be correctly determined.” Dr.
    Miertschin’s sampling did not meet the Commission’s requirements for scientific
    sampling data.
    In its “Explanation of Changes” in its final order, the Commission stated that it
    “eliminate[d] language inconsistent with the Commission’s decision . . . [to] reflect[] that
    the Applicant has satisfied all currently applicable water quality requirements . . . .” We
    hold that this change is supported by substantial evidence in the record and explained
    adequately.
    b. Findings of Fact Numbers 36 Through 40 Regarding Phosphorus Levels
    Findings of Fact 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40 dealt with the changes in phosphorus
    levels that would arise in the affected water bodies should the Lerin Hills application be
    granted.   In its final order, the Commission explained that the ALJ erred by requiring
    Lerin Hills to “present quantitative data on cumulative loading of phosphorus over time
    and resulting biomass.” The Commission determined that such data was not required
    for Lerin Hills to meet the current narrative standards for nutrients. Again, based on the
    testimony and evidence in the record, we find that these changes were supported and
    explained sufficiently.
    c. Finding of Fact Number 43 Regarding Algal and Plant Growth
    Wood also argued that the Commission’s deletion of the ALJ’s Finding of Fact
    Number 43 was error. This finding provided that, “the record in this case includes no
    18
    attempt to estimate quantitatively the amounts of algal and plant growth that may result
    from the increased nutrient loading from the proposed discharge.” The Commission
    stated that this finding was deleted because the narrative, not quantitative, standard was
    appropriate to measure algal and plant growth.    “The Commission determined that such
    data was not required in order for the Applicant to meet the current narrative standards
    for nutrients and that such data was not required. . . .” We hold that this statement was
    supported by substantial evidence in the record and adequately explains the
    Commission’s modification.    See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.174; see also section
    
    III(B), supra
    .
    d. Conclusion
    In sum, the Commission’s changes to the ALJ’s findings are supported by
    substantial evidence in the record and explained sufficiently to meet the requirements of
    section 2003.047(m) of the government code.            See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
    2003.047(m).     Because reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as
    the agency in this disputed action, see 
    Citizens, 169 S.W.3d at 264
    , we conclude that
    these amendments should be upheld.
    3.     The Alleged Lack of Specificity in the Commission’s “Explanation of
    Changes”
    Finally, Wood claims that the Commission’s final sentence in paragraph 2 of its
    “Explanation of Changes” violated sections 2001.058(e) and 2003.047(m) of the Texas
    Government Code for want of specificity.         TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e),
    2003.047(m) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). The sentence reads as follows:
    In addition, the Commission modified the Finding of Fact Nos. 31–32,
    36–38, 40, and 44, Conclusion of Law Nos. 6–7, and Ordering Provision
    19
    No. 15 to eliminate language inconsistent with the Commission’s decision
    on this matter and to incorporate new language that reflects that the
    applicant has satisfied all currently applicable water quality requirements
    and that the Commission is issuing the ED’s draft permit, as modified by
    Explanation of Changes No. 3, below.
    Section 2001.058(e) provides that a state agency may change a finding of fact or
    conclusion of law made by an ALJ if the agency determines:                            (1) the ALJ did not
    properly apply or interpret applicable law; (2) an administrative decision the ALJ relied
    upon is incorrect or should be changed; or (2) a technical error should be corrected.
    See 
    id. § 2001.058(e).
    When making such a change, the agency “shall state in writing
    5 We set forth the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Commission’s Final
    Order dated July 7, 2009:
    Finding of Fact No. 31: The draft permit would ensure that the narrative standards
    applicable to all segments of the receiving stream would be met.
    Finding of Fact No. 32: Modeling of the effects of the proposed discharge indicates that
    the lowest DO level in Deep Hollow Creek would be between 5.03 mg/L and 5.27 mg/L.
    Finding of Fact No. 36: Predicted concentrations of phosphorus in the SCS impoundment
    would be 0.42 mg/L, 0.28 mg/L, 0.12 mg/L, and 0.05 mg/L (upstream to downstream).
    Finding of Fact No. 37: Predicted concentrations of phosphorus in the Hahnfield Pond
    would be 0.04 mg/L and 0.03 mg/L.
    Finding of Fact No. 38: Lerin Hills’ phosphorus modeling uses a uniform decay rate to
    attempt to reflect removal of phosphorus from the water column.
    Finding of Fact No. 40: An increase in plant and algal growth as a result of the proposed
    Lerin Hills discharge is likely; however, with the effluent limit of 0.5 mg/L (daily average) for
    total phosphorus, the increase will be de minimis.
    Finding of Fact No. 44: Lerin Hills demonstrated that there would not be lowering of the
    water quality of Deep Hollow Creek, Frederick Creek, and Upper Cibolo Creek by more
    than a de minimis extent as a result of the proposed discharge.
    Conclusion of Law No. 6: The draft permit would ensure that the narrative standard
    applicable to the immediate receiving stream (the unnamed tributary), and to Deep Hollow
    Creek, Frederick Creek, and Upper Cibolo Creek would be met. 30 Tex. Admin. Code
    307.4[.]
    Conclusion of Law No. 7: The evidence supports a conclusion that, as to nutrients and
    their effects on surface water quality, the draft permit and proposed discharge would satisfy
    the requirements of the Commission’s antidegradation rule in connection with the waters of
    Deep Hollow Creek, Frederick Creek, and Cibolo Creek. 30 Tex. Admin. Code 307.5.
    20
    the specific reason and legal basis for a change made under this subsection.”               
    Id. And, as
    we noted previously, section 2003.047(m) provides additional authority for this
    contention; it provides that a commission may amend an ALJ’s decision as long as it is
    “based solely on the record” and is “accompanied by an explanation of the basis for the
    amendment.”       
    Id. § 2003.047(m).
    We disagree with Wood’s interpretation of the Commission’s modifications to the
    order.     Before the disputed final sentence, the Commission clearly explained its
    reasoning for the changes:
    The Commission determined that the ALJ misapplied the Commission’s
    policies and rules related to antidegradation, as set forth in 30 TEX. ADMIN.
    CODE ch. 307 and the “Procedures to Implement the Texas Surface Water
    Quality Standards”, by requiring the Applicant to present quantitative data
    on cumulative loading of phosphorus over time and resulting biomass.
    The Commission determined that such data was not required in order for
    the Applicant to meet the current narrative standards for nutrients and that
    such data and modeling were not appropriately required of an applicant
    until the agency has an opportunity to develop an numeric standard in the
    future, after providing sufficient public notice and sound scientific vetting of
    that proposed new standard. The Commission determined that the
    evidence in the record shows that the Applicant has satisfied the applicable
    narrative criteria for nutrients in this matter.
    We conclude that this explanation meets section 2001.058(e) of the government
    code because it explains that the ALJ did not properly apply the correct narrative
    standard to review antidegradation changes. See 
    id. § 2001.058(e)(1)
    (providing that
    an agency may amend a finding if “the ALJ did not properly apply or interpret applicable
    law”). The Commission’s change, therefore, was a technical error that was properly
    corrected. 
    Id. § 2001.058(e)(3).
    We further hold that the explanation meets section
    2003.047(m) because the Commissions amendment is firmly based in the record—there
    21
    was ample testimony and evidence showing that the narrative standard was the proper
    standard to apply.     
    Id. § 2003.047(m).
    4. Conclusion
    In sum, Wood presented three reasons why the Commission erred in revising the
    ALJ’s proposed order. He complained that the Commission (1) used new sampling
    requirements to determine baseline water quality; (2) used information outside the
    record; and (3) failed to specify the basis for its changes in its “explanation of changes.”
    Having determined that there was substantial evidence in the record for the Commission
    to make its changes to the ALJ’s order, see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.174, we
    overrule this issue.
    D.     The No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Wood’s Open Meetings Act Claim
    Wood filed an Open Meetings Act Claim, among other claims, when he appealed
    to a Travis County District Court. In his petition, Wood alleged that the Open Meetings
    Act was violated when the chairman of the TCEQ “adopted a private position espoused
    by another member but never voted upon in an open meeting.”        The Commission filed a
    no-evidence motion for summary judgment on this claim, which the district court granted.
    1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
    In general, meetings of governmental bodies must be open to the public.      See 
    id. § 551.002
    (West, Westlaw 2013 through 3d C.S.). “The [Open Meeting] Act’s purposes
    are to provide public access to and increase public knowledge of governmental
    decision-making.”      Tex. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy v. Bass, 
    366 S.W.3d 751
    , 759
    (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (citing City of San Antonio v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals,
    
    820 S.W.2d 762
    , 765 (Tex. 1991)).       “The law requires openness, not secrecy, when a
    22
    state agency makes its decision in a contested administrative case.”                   
    Id. One objective
    of the Open Meetings Act is to provide civil remedies for violations of its
    meeting-notice requirements.       City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 
    325 S.W.3d 622
    , 627 (Tex.
    2010) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 551.141–.142 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d
    C.S.)).     “Any action taken by a governmental body in violation of the Open Meetings Act
    is voidable, and ‘an interested person . . . may bring an action by mandamus or
    injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse a violation of threatened violation.’”   
    Id. Here, the
    trial court granted a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of the
    Commission on Wood’s alleged Open Meetings Act claim.           “In reviewing a no-evidence
    summary judgment, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent
    against whom the summary judgment was rendered.”              See Smith v. O’Donnell, 
    288 S.W.3d 417
    , 424 (Tex. 2009) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 824 (Tex.
    2005)).     If the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to
    raise a genuine issue of material fact, a no-evidence summary judgment cannot properly
    be granted.      
    Id. (citing Reynosa
    v. Huff, 
    21 S.W.3d 510
    , 512 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
    2000, no pet.)).
    2. Discussion
    The Commission held two hearings on the Lerin Hills application.              The first
    hearing was held on May 20, 2009. At this hearing, Chairman Buddy Garcia stated the
    following on the record:
    We do use a narrative criteria here, and have. I know that we’re moving
    toward the numerical criteria. I think a logical conclusion has been
    reached here. Any chemistry change would probably lead us be unable
    under our current rules to adopt any permits in the future if that was the
    case, and specifically no discharge permit, I think, will ever be allowed.
    But right now, being able to know what we know in front of us, that at least
    23
    the Chair is interested in reversing the ALJ’s recommendation . . . .
    Commissioner Dr. Bryan W. Shaw echoed Chairman Garcia’s sentiments:
    I agree with reversing the ALJ’s decision. I understand the basis for
    where she’s trying to go, but I think that’s basically where we’re
    endeavoring to develop the standards and the processes to improve that
    methodology to better inform it, and I don’t think we’re there yet. I think
    it’s a noble goal to have but I don’t think it fits within what our current rules
    require. . . .
    At the conclusion of this hearing, Commissioner Shaw moved to continue the
    matter to the Commission’s June 26, 2009 hearing.         He also moved to request Lerin
    Hills to “modify the ALJ’s proposed order to reflect the Commission’s decision on
    antidegradation in accordance with the Commission’s discussions.”
    The second hearing was held on June 26, 2009.            At this hearing, Lerin Hills’s
    attorney went on the record to explain the revisions made to the ALJ’s proposed order.
    He stated that the revisions to the findings of fact could be separated into two general
    categories:   (1) the deletion of language indicating that there was no quantitative
    evidence in the record regarding the antidegradation standards, and (2) deletions of
    findings that compared constituents to background levels. He elaborated:
    The applicant’s rationale for making these revisions is as follows.
    Reference to findings to lack of quantitative evidence of either nutrient
    loading over time or algal and plant growth is not required under TCEQ
    rules and policy for compliance with the antidegradation standard since it’s
    a purely narrative standard and that is the basis of the Commission’s
    decision in this case. Secondly, comparison to background levels of
    constituents is erroneous because in this case they were based on a single
    sample or estimate and TCEQ policy and rules and guidance requires
    numerous samples to accurately determine the background concentration
    of a substance in an aquatic system.
    Neither Mr. Wood nor a representative of his were present at this meeting.          The
    attorney for the Commission’s Executive Director, though, was present and concurred
    24
    with Lerin Hills’s changes.
    The Commission issued the final order granting the application on July 7, 2009.
    This order was drafted by the Commission’s General Counsel. A review of the order
    shows that it reflects the thought-making process the Commissioners exhibited at both
    the May 20th and June 26th meetings.         In particular, the order’s “Explanation of
    Changes” contains a detailed reasoning encompassing the Commissioners’ statements
    and explaining why the Commission chose to approve Lerin Hill’s permit application.
    Even reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wood, see 
    Smith, 288 S.W.3d at 424
    , we cannot say that there was a violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act under
    these facts. We find no evidence in the record regarding Wood’s allegations that the
    Open Meetings Act was violated because Chairman Garcia “adopted a private position
    espoused by another member but never voted upon in an open meeting.”                   The
    discussions, and ensuing decisions, of the Commission were matters of public record.
    We uphold the trial court’s summary judgment on this matter and overrule this issue.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled all of Wood’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    __________________________
    GINA M. BENAVIDES,
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    30th day of December, 2014.
    25