Luis Miguel Hernandez v. State ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00498-CR
LUIS MIGUEL HERNANDEZ APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE
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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1331780D
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CONCURRING OPINION
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Because Appellant Luis Miguel Hernandez’s third issue is framed as an
issue of prosecutorial misconduct—an issue that need not be strictly preserved in
light of the resulting due process violation of Appellant’s right to a fair trial—I
concur with the Majority’s disposition of this appeal. Appellant’s third issue
asserts that “[t]he trial court judge reversibly erred and abused its discretion in
overruling the Appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s inflammatory use of the
racial slur ‘Niggas’ which was outside the record of the case and had been urged
intentionally and was manifestly designed to deny the Appellant a fair jury trial
during the State’s closing jury argument at the end of the guilt-innocence phase
of the Appellant’s trial.”
At trial, Appellant claimed he did not commit murder but acted in self-
defense. The jury was charged on self-defense. The State requested, and the
trial court submitted, a jury charge on provocation.1
The evidence established that the deceased, who was an African
American male, physically initiated the confrontation with Appellant by running at
1
The trial court’s instruction on provocation provided, in pertinent part:
You are further instructed as part of the law of this case, and
as a qualification of the law on self-defense, that the use of force by
a defendant against another is not justified if the Defendant
provoked the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless
the Defendant abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates to
the other person his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot
safely abandon the encounter and the other person, nevertheless,
continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the Defendant.
So, in this case, if you find and believe from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, immediately before
the difficulty, if any, then and there did some act, or used some
language or did both, with the intent on the Defendant’s part to
produce the occasion and to bring on the difficulty with [the
deceased], and that such words or conduct on the Defendant’s part,
if there was such, were reasonably calculated to, and did, provoke a
difficulty, and that on such occasion [the deceased] attacked the
Defendant with deadly force, or reasonably appeared to the
Defendant to so attack the Defendant, and that the Defendant then
cut [the deceased] with a knife in pursuance of his original design, if
you find there was such, then you will find the Defendant guilty.
2
Appellant. The State asserted that the deceased ran at Appellant because
Appellant “used racial slurs and cuss words.”2 The sole witness to the altercation
was the deceased’s wife. She recounted that the deceased ran at Appellant
because, when she asked Appellant to stop yelling at the deceased in the
presence of her daughter, Appellant said, “F--- that b----, no one cares about
her.”
During the State’s initial closing argument, the prosecutor explained to the
jury:
It is not in dispute that the Defendant killed [the deceased]. I
mean, that’s pretty much been admitted here in the courtroom.
What you next have to consider is whether or not he gets to
claim self-defense. And remember in jury selection when [another
prosecutor] was talking to you-all about the term -- the legal term
“provoking the difficulty.” I can’t go pick a fight with someone and
then decide to claim self-defense after I do something bad.
No witness testified that Appellant uttered the word “niggas” to provoke the
fight with the deceased; no witness testified that Appellant called the deceased
“and his family” “niggas.” The decedent’s wife testified that the deceased ran at
Appellant after Appellant said, regarding the deceased’s young daughter, “F---
that b----, no one cares about her.” Nonetheless, during final closing argument,
the prosecutor told the jury, “What were the words of provocation? I’ll tell you
2
Fort Worth Police Detective Ernie Pate testified that Appellant had
“admitted to [him] that when [Appellant] first spoke to [the deceased] that
[Appellant] used racial slurs to [the deceased] and cuss words because of a prior
altercation and prior confrontations they had had.”
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what the words of provocation were. [Appellant] called [the deceased] and his
family ‘niggas.’ That’s what it was.”
Prosecutors are constitutionally prohibited from making racially or
ethnically inflammatory remarks during closing argument. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1770 n.30 (1987); Bains v.
Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1037 (2000). Such
comments “violat[e] a criminal defendant’s due process and equal protection
rights.” Bains, 204 F.3d at 974. Because racial fairness is an indispensable
ingredient of due process and racial equality a hallmark of justice, appeals to
racial passion can distort the search for truth and drastically affect a juror’s
impartiality. United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The United States Supreme Court has held that “prosecutorial misconduct
may so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3109
(1987) (internal quotation omitted). To constitute a due process violation, the
prosecutorial misconduct must be of such significance that it would result in the
denial of a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 765, 107 S. Ct. at 3109; see
Burwell v. Teets, 245 F.2d 154, 163 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1957).
An analysis of whether prosecutorial misconduct resulted in a due process
violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial focuses on the effect of the
misconduct––whether it infected the trial with unfairness––not on the
prosecutor’s motive, subjective intent, or culpability.
4
The United States Supreme Court has “clearly indicated that the state
courts have substantial breathing room when considering prosecutorial
misconduct claims because ‘constitutional line drawing in [prosecutorial
misconduct cases] is necessarily imprecise.’” Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501,
516 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1134 (2007) (quoting Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 (1974)). Under Texas
law, we are to resolve allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on a case by case
basis and determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct requires reversal on the
basis of the probable effect on the minds of the jurors. Bautista v. State, 363
S.W.3d 259, 263 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). To warrant reversal,
the prosecutor’s question or comment must be harmful to the defendant and of
such a character so as to suggest the impermissibility of withdrawing the
impression produced. Id.; see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84, 55
S. Ct. 629, 631 (1935) (reversing judgment of conviction and granting new trial
because of due process violation resulting from prosecutorial misconduct).
No witness testified that Appellant “called [the deceased] and his family
‘niggas’” as stated by the prosecutor. The prosecutor’s statement during final
closing argument that Appellant called the deceased and the deceased’s family
“niggas” was outside the record and was a racially inflammatory remark. See
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 n.30, 107 S. Ct. at 1770 n.30; Bains, 204 F.3d at
974. Because the statement was made by the prosecutor during final closing
argument, Appellant had no opportunity to respond to it or to correct it. The
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prosecutor’s statement directly impacted the sole issue in the case––whether
Appellant acted in self-defense or, in fact, by words provoked the difficulty. The
prosecutor told the jury: “What were the words of provocation? I’ll tell you what
the words of provocation were. [Appellant] called [the deceased] and his family
‘niggas.’ That’s what it was.”3 The prosecutor thus not only attributed use of the
word “niggas” to Appellant, but also stated that Appellant had used the word to
refer to the decedent’s family, which no witness testified to. And finally, the
prosecutor expressly told the jury that these words supposedly uttered by
Appellant––calling the deceased and his family “niggas”––constituted “words of
provocation” that defeated Appellant’s claim of self-defense.
In my view, the prosecutor’s statement here directly undermined
Appellant’s sole defense by attributing the use of the racially inflammatory word
“niggas” to Appellant and by telling the jury that Appellant referred to the
deceased’s family as “niggas,” when neither of these facts are in the record or
inferable from the record. To me, the prosecutor’s statement during final closing
3
The State argues that the prosecutor’s statement that Appellant provoked
the fight by calling the deceased and his family “niggas” was a reasonable
inference from Officer Pate’s testimony that Appellant admitted he had used
racial slurs when he first spoke to the deceased. I cannot agree. First, Officer
Pate did not testify that “niggas” was the racial slur Appellant used.
Unfortunately, many ethnophaulisms exist but most people consider this one
exceptionally offensive and inflammatory. Appellant’s concession that he used
racial slurs does not support an inference that he used this particular one.
Second, neither Officer Pate nor any other witness testified that Appellant
directed racial slurs at the deceased’s family, as opposed to at the deceased.
The record supports no inference that Appellant directed racial slurs at the
deceased’s family.
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argument—the very last words the jury heard before retiring to deliberate––was
of such significance that it resulted in the denial of Appellant’s right to a fair trial,
and thus, deprived Appellant of due process. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765, 107 S.
Ct. at 3109; Burwell, 245 F.2d at 163; see also Coleman v. Ohio Adult Parole
Auth., 118 Fed. Appx. 949, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding prosecutor’s
reference in closing argument to defendant’s prior conviction constituted an
introduction of evidence so extremely unfair as to violate fundamental
conceptions of justice and thus a deprivation of defendant’s right to due process);
see also Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“It is
relevant to the harm analysis that the provocation instruction undermined
Elizondo’s sole defense.”). Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for a new
trial.4 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 89, 55 S. Ct. at 663 (“[S]uch misconduct was
4
Although the general rule is that a timely and specific objection, a request
for an instruction to disregard the matter improperly placed before the jury, and a
request for a mistrial are required to preserve a complaint of prosecutorial
misconduct, when “prosecutorial misconduct that undermines the reliability of
the factfinding process . . . result[s] in deprivation of fundamental fairness and
due process of law, the defendant is entitled to a new trial even though few
objections have been perfected.” See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 764 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995) (recognizing general rule); Johnson v. State, 432 S.W.3d 552,
561 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) (same); Jimenez v. State, 298
S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (recognizing
exception); see Rogers v. State, 725 S.W.2d 350, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1987, no pet.) (“[B]ecause fundamental fairness was vitiated, the present
case is an exception to the general rule that improper questions and arguments
by a prosecutor cannot constitute reversible error unless the error is properly
preserved.”).
Because of the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred, and the resulting
deprivation of Appellant’s rights to due process and a fair trial, I would hold that
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pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which
cannot be disregarded as inconsequential. A new trial must be awarded.”);
Bautista, 363 S.W.3d at 263 (“To warrant reversal, the question or comment
must be harmful to the defendant and of such a character so as to suggest the
impermissibility of withdrawing the impression produced”) (internal quotation
omitted). Because the Majority reaches this disposition, albeit for different
reasons, I respectfully concur.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PUBLISH
DELIVERED: November 3, 2016
Appellant’s failure to request a mistrial does not constitute a waiver of his right to
raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. See Berger, 295 U.S. at
89, 55 S. Ct. at 663; Jimenez, 298 S.W.3d at 214; Rogers, 725 S.W.2d at 358.
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