Adam Lamar Brooks v. State ( 2015 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-13-00409-CR
ADAM LAMAR BROOKS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 1
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court No. 11-01734-CRM-CCL1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Adam Lamar Brooks was convicted of indecent exposure and sentenced to 120
days in jail with a $1,000 fine. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (West 2011). He was
also required to surrender his peace officer license. Because the trial court did not err in
denying Brooks’ motion to suppress, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Rebecca Bosquez saw a green SUV pull into a parking space near her at the Post
Oak Mall. She saw the driver of the vehicle put up shades in the front window of the
SUV, expose his penis, and begin to masturbate. Because she did not have a phone, she
asked another person in the parking lot to summon mall security. When the man in the
SUV decided to leave, she followed the vehicle and saw the license plate, which read
MRADAM. After another incident was reported at the same mall several months later
involving the same vehicle, a College Station Police officer made contact with the driver
of the SUV who was identified as Brooks. Brooks was a City of Bryan police officer.
Brooks was later asked to go to the College Station Police Department where he spoke
to Sgt. Craig Boyett. Although he admitted that he went to the Post Oak Mall regularly
and that no one, even relatives, drove his green SUV, Brooks denied masturbating in
the mall parking lot. Bosquez could not identify Brooks from a photo line-up; so Boyett
decided to fabricate a photo line-up and have a department secretary indicate on the
line-up that Brooks was identified, “100%.” Boyett confronted Brooks with the
fabricated line-up and told him numerous times that Brooks had been identified as the
perpetrator. Brooks and Boyett discussed the help that would be available to Brooks,
but then Brooks left the police station still denying that he committed the offense.
About 15 minutes later, Boyett called Brooks, again mentioning that Brooks had been
identified as the perpetrator. After a series of dropped calls and call-backs, Brooks
confessed.
In his written motion to suppress, Brooks contended his oral statements were
inadmissible pursuant to articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal
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Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.22, 38.23 (West 2005).1 The trial court
heard and denied Brooks’ motion to suppress prior to trial. Then, on the day of trial,
Brooks moved to reopen his motion to suppress so that he could testify. The trial court,
a different judge than the judge who heard the initial motion to suppress, allowed
Brooks to reopen and heard Brooks’ testimony. The court took the testimony under
advisement, and the issue of the admissibility of Brooks’ statements was retried before
the jury. Each time testimony regarding Brooks’ admission of the offense was
presented, Brooks objected and the trial court overruled each objection.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Robinson, 334
S.W.3d 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). If the trial court makes findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence
supports those findings. Id. We then review the trial court's legal rulings de novo
unless the findings are dispositive. Id.
A defendant who moves for suppression under Article 38.232 due to the violation
of a statute has the burden of producing evidence of a statutory violation. State v.
Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767, 772
1Brooks does not complain on appeal about the admission of statements, if any, in violation of article
38.22.
2TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005) ("No evidence obtained by an officer . . . in violation
of . . . [the] laws of the State of Texas . . . shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of
any criminal case.")
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Only when this burden is met does the State bear a burden to
prove compliance. Id.
Further, a defendant must show a causal connection between a statutory
violation and the obtaining of evidence before the evidence is rendered inadmissible.
Pham, 175 S.W.3d at 772-773. If the defendant produces evidence that there is a causal
connection, the State may either try to disprove this causal evidence, i.e. disproving that
there is a causal connection in existence at all, or, the State may make an attenuation-of-
taint argument. Evidence is not obtained in violation of a provision of law if there is no
causal connection between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence.
Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, the evidence would
not be excluded pursuant to article 38.23.
Relying on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d
452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), Brooks argues that Boyett violated section 37.09 of the Texas
Penal Code, “Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence,” by fabricating a photo
line-up and telling Brooks numerous times that he had been positively identified as the
person masturbating in the mall parking lot. The State argues that Wilson was wrongly
decided and should be overturned. We are not in a position to overturn an opinion by
the Court of Criminal Appeals. Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that
fabricating a photo line-up violates section 37.09, we still must decide whether there
was a causal connection between the line-up and Brooks’ confession.
Brooks testified at the reopened suppression hearing that he confessed because
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of Boyett’s use of the fabricated photo line-up. This is at least some evidence of a causal
connection between the violation of article 37.09 and obtaining Brooks’ confession
which shifts the burden to the State to disprove the connection. The State produced
evidence that when Boyett called Brooks to tell him that a warrant had been issued for
Brooks’ arrest, Brooks told Boyett that Brooks did not confess because of Boyett’s
interviewing techniques but because the spirit of God touched Boyett to call Brooks
after Brooks left the station at a time when Brooks had decided to tell Boyett the truth.
In findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that Brooks’ suppression
hearing testimony was not credible and concluded there was no causal connection
between the fabricated lineup and Brooks’ confession. The record supports this finding
and conclusion. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding and conclusion
regarding the lack of a causal connection, we need not discuss whether any “taint” of
the confession was attenuated. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling
Brooks’ motion to suppress by overruling Brooks’ objections and admitting testimony
regarding Brooks’ confession in evidence.
Brooks’ sole issue is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed July 23, 2015
Do not publish
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