Michael Raynard Speace Jr. v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00445-CR
NO. 02-14-00446-CR
NO. 02-14-00447-CR
MICHAEL RAYNARD SPEACE JR. APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1368270D, 1350042D, 1350041D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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The trial court placed Appellant Michael Raynard Speace Jr. on deferred
adjudication community supervision for three offenses. After finding Appellant
had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision, the trial
court adjudicated Appellant guilty of all three offenses and sentenced him to two
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
years’ imprisonment in a state jail facility for each of the two state jail felonies and
eight years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice for the second degree felony offense. Asserting the trial court
erred by finding he violated the terms and conditions of his community
supervision, Appellant appeals the trial court's judgments. We affirm.
Background
On February 4, 2014, the trial court placed Appellant on deferred
adjudication for five years in cause number 02-14-00446-CR (trial court cause
number 1350042D) for the offense of theft of a firearm and in cause number 02-
14-00447-CR (trial court cause number 1350041D) for the offense of burglary of
a habitation. Several months later, on July 28, 2014, the trial court placed
Appellant on deferred adjudication for five years in cause number 02-14-00445-
CR (trial court cause number 1368270D) for the offense of debit card abuse.
Approximately one month later, on August 29, 2014, the State filed a
petition to proceed to adjudication in all three cases. In each of the three
petitions, the State alleged Appellant violated the same four terms and conditions
of his community supervision by (1) committing a new offense on June 12, 2014;
(2) using marijuana on February 12, 2014; (3) not permitting a supervision officer
to visit him during a scheduled home visit on or about February 13, 2014; and (4)
failing to complete the total number of hours of community service as ordered by
the court at the rate of no less than ten hours per month. The first three
allegations involved dates (June and February 2014) that preceded Appellant’s
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placement on community supervision (July 2014) in the third case—the debit-
card-abuse case.
At the hearing on the State’s petitions, Appellant pled not true to the first
allegation, that is, he denied committing a new offense on June 12, 2014.
Appellant pled true to using marijuana on February 12, 2014—the second
allegation. Appellant pled not true to the allegation that he did not permit the
supervision officer to visit him on February 13, 2014, which was the third
allegation. Finally, Appellant pled true to the fourth allegation—that he had not
completed his community service.
In the burglary-of-a-habitation case and in the theft-of-a-firearm case, the
trial court found all four allegations true. All the allegations occurred after
Appellant was placed on community supervision on February 4, 2014. In the
debit-card-abuse case, the trial court found the allegation that Appellant
committed a new offense not true “because the dates [were] wrong” but found
the other three allegations true. The trial court then found Appellant guilty of all
three offenses.
Appellant’s Complaints
In his first point, Appellant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support
the allegation that he committed a new offense. This argument would apply only
to the theft-of-a-firearm and the burglary-of-a-habitation cases because the trial
court found the allegation not true in the debit-card-abuse case. In his second
point, Appellant maintains the second and third allegations predate his placement
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on community supervision and are, therefore, improper bases for his revocation.
This argument would apply only to the debit-card-abuse case because that is the
only case in which the dates in the allegations predate Appellant’s placement on
community supervision. Finally, in his third point, Appellant argues that the
evidence is legally insufficient to find true the allegation that he did not complete
his community service. This argument applies to all three cases.
Discussion
We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).2 In a
revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172,
174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of
2
To the extent we rely on cases involving regular community supervision,
regular and deferred adjudication community supervision cases proceed in the
same way. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, §§ 3, 5(b), 21, 23 (West
Supp. 2014); Escochea v. State, 139 S.W.3d 67, 77 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2004, no pet.).
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proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking the community supervision.
Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged
violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a
revocation order. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1980). A single violation of a condition of community supervision is sufficient to
support revocation. Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871; Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d
669, 672 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d); see also Cole v. State, 578
S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Consequently, when there
is one sufficient ground, we do not need to address the other contentions. See
Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871; Long v. State, No. 02-12-00090-CR, 2013 WL
1337975, at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 4, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication).
We focus on the fourth allegation as it is dispositive of all three of
Appellant’s appeals. Appellant pled true to the fourth allegation. A plea of true,
standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision.
Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128. Appellant testified and acknowledged the allegation
regarding the community service was true, but he maintained that his supervisor,
Keely Williams, told him he did not have to start his community service until after
he finished his weekends in jail. Williams did not testify to corroborate
Appellant’s explanation. Mary Jo Gutierrez, the senior probation officer assigned
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to the trial court, testified that Appellant did not perform any community services.
A finder of fact is not required to believe a witness, even when that witness’s
testimony is uncontradicted. See Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). We hold the trial court was within its
discretion to rely on Appellant’s plea of true, to rely on Gutierrez’s testimony that
Appellant had not performed any community services, and to disbelieve
Appellant’s testimony that some other probation officer, who did not testify, had
excused his compliance. See Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493 (holding that the trial
court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony and that appellate courts review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling). Because a single violation of
community supervision is sufficient to support revocation, and because the trial
court found the fourth allegation true in all three cases, we need not address
Appellant’s other contentions. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871. We overrule
Appellant’s third point on its merits and do not reach his first and second points.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
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Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s third point and determined it was dispositive
of his appeals, we affirm the trial court’s three judgments.
/s/ Anne Gardner
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 23, 2015
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