State v. Lee Ann Lovington ( 2009 )

NO. 07-08-0313-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
NOVEMBER 4, 2009
______________________________
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT
V.
LEE ANN LOVINGTON, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 54,854-A; HONORABLE HAL MINER, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s ruling granting appellee’s motion to
suppress. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this judgment.
Background
On December 5, 2006, Amarillo police officers were attempting to execute an arrest
warrant. In their search for the suspect, two police officers, Marshall Wade Pennington
and Kyle Hawley saw a car parked near the apartment complex of the suspect’s girlfriend
and went to speak to the two individuals in the car. The two individuals were Juan Daniel
Ramirez, the driver, and appellee, Lee Ann Lovington, the passenger. As Pennington and
Hawley neared the car, Pennington noticed Ramirez “messing around” in the center
console. As Pennington arrived at the car, Ramirez rolled down the window and positioned
himself, according to Pennington, to obstruct Pennington’s view into the car. At this time,
Pennington realized that neither occupant was the person subject to the arrest warrant.
As Pennington continued speaking with him, Ramirez switched his position again
and moved his leg, according to Pennington, as to hide something between the seat and
console. Pennington asked the driver for ID and, when Ramirez could not produce any ID,
asked Ramirez to step out of the car. As Ramirez stepped out, appellee laid a newspaper
over the console area. After Pennington handcuffed Ramirez for safety purposes,
Pennington had Hawley take Ramirez to the patrol car. Pennington stayed at the car and
removed the newspaper that appellee laid out and saw a handgun between the seat and
console area. Concurrent with Pennington’s observation, as Hawley took Ramirez to the
patrol car, Hawley asked Ramirez if there was anything illegal in the car. Ramirez
responded, “a gun.” Upon learning that a gun was located in the vehicle, Hawley placed
Ramirez in the patrol car and returned to the vehicle to search it, including appellee’s purse
located on the floorboard of the passenger side. Hawley “frisked” the purse for weapons
but instead found a set of scales. After asking appellee if he could continue to search the
purse, appellee answered yes and further directed Hawley to “stuff in the black bag.”
Inside the purse, Hawley found a black bag containing marijuana and methamphetamine.
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Ramirez was arrested for unlawfully carrying a weapon and appellee was arrested for
possession of methamphetamine.
At a suppression hearing, appellee contended that the trial court in this case was
collaterally estopped from admitting the evidence of the methamphetamine because
another trial court had held that the detention of Ramirez and subsequent search of the
vehicle was illegal and had suppressed the evidence. See State v. Ramirez, 246 S.W.3d
287 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2008, no pet.). After hearing testimony on the issue, the trial court
ruled that the State was estopped from maintaining the lawfulness of the search and
seizure and suppressed the evidence seized during the search of Lovington’s purse. In
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that “[b]y operation of
either the ’law of the case’ or estoppel doctrines, this Court concludes that the officers’
continued detention . . . was unlawful.” Appealing the trial court’s suppression of the
evidence, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing the
evidence in light of the trial court’s own findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree.
Collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by
a valid and final judgment and that issue cannot again be litigated between the same
parties. See Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Collateral
estoppel deals only with specific factual determinations, not legal claims or legal
conclusions. Guajardo v. State, 109 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). When the
sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer and the trial court
files findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only question before us is whether the trial
court properly applied the law to the facts it found. See Ballman v. State, 157 S.W.3d 65,
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69 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). Because the trial court entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law and because the trial court accepted virtually all of the officers’
testimony, we must give that court almost total deference in reviewing those historical facts
found but review de novo the application of the law to those facts. See id.
In this case, we note that the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the
trial court demonstrate that the trial court believed that
[t]he Seventh Court of Appeals upheld [a previous] court’s
order suppressing evidence seized from Ramirez . . . .
Established, then, is the ‘law of the case’ that the seizure of
evidence respecting both defendants in the companion cases
was unlawful. The State is estopped from here maintaining the
lawfulness of the search and seizure.
However, collateral estoppel does not apply because the parties differ in the companion
case. In the previous case, Ramirez was the person contesting the legality of the
continued detention. See Ramirez, 246 S.W.3d at 289. In this case, Lovington is the
party seeking to have the evidence suppressed. Furthermore, the determination of
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the encounter after Pennington
discovered that neither Ramirez or appellee were the subject of the arrest warrant is a legal
conclusion and, thus, not subject to collateral estoppel. See Guajardo, 109 S.W.3d at
460. Thus, the factual determinations made by the previous trial court in Ramirez apply
only to that case. Id. We hold that the trial court erred in ultimately concluding that the
State was estopped from maintaining the lawfulness of the search and seizure.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting appellee’s
motion to suppress and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
Quinn, C.J., dissenting.
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