Vicente Casas v. State ( 2009 )


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  •                                    NO. 07-08-0297-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL A
    JUNE 24, 2009
    ______________________________
    VICENTE CASAS, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2005-411,025; HONORABLE JIM BOB DARNELL, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Vicente Casas, appeals his conviction for the offense of burglary of a
    habitation with intent to commit sexual assault and the resulting punishment of 50 years
    confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
    Through three issues, appellant contends that the evidence was both legally and factually
    insufficient and that if appellant is guilty of a crime it is the lesser included offense of
    criminal trespass. Concluding that appellant’s positions are incorrect, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    On November 9, 2005, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Lenice Littlejohn awoke to find
    appellant standing near her side of the bed in her bedroom. Upon realizing that the person
    standing there was neither her son or her husband, Lenice woke her husband, Steve
    Littlejohn, telling him someone was in the room. As soon as Steve realized what was
    taking place, he jumped across the bed and accosted appellant. Steve quickly subdued
    appellant and, upon turning on a light in the bedroom, discovered appellant was nude
    except for socks and a condom. Steve tied appellant’s hands behind his back and took
    him downstairs, sitting him on the front porch while awaiting the arrival of the Lubbock
    County Sheriff’s deputies. Within moments of being downstairs and sat on the porch,
    appellant got free and escaped from Steve. A deputy sheriff later found appellant hiding
    in a tree line near the Littlejohn’s home.
    Deputy sheriffs recovered all of appellant’s clothing, personal items including ten
    unopened packages of condoms, and identification at the scene. Appellant’s shoes were
    found immediately beside the door going into the bedroom of Lenice and Steve.
    Appellant’s clothes were found at the foot of the bed. A condom was found on the grass
    immediately next to the porch where appellant had been taken to await the arrival of the
    deputies.
    At the conclusion of the testimony but before the reading of the court’s charge,
    appellant requested that the trial court include a charge on the lesser included charge of
    criminal trespass. The trial court granted this request, however, the jury rejected the lesser
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    included offense and found appellant guilty of the offense of burglary of a habitation with
    intent to commit sexual assault.       The appellant elected to go to the trial court for
    punishment and the judge, after hearing evidence on the issue of punishment, assessed
    appellant’s punishment at confinement for a period of 50 years in the Institutional Division
    of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. It is from this judgment and sentence that
    appellant appeals. We affirm.
    Legal and Factual Sufficiency
    Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove
    appellant either committed a sexual assault or attempted to commit a sexual assault.
    Initially, we note that appellant was not charged with burglary by entering a habitation and
    committing or attempting to commit a sexual assault. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . §
    30.02(a)(3) (Vernon 2005).1 Rather, appellant was charged with burglary of a habitation
    with intent to commit sexual assault. See § 30.02(a)(1). We further note, the court’s
    charge defined the offense as burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault
    and appellant did not object to this charge. We will however, review the legal and factual
    sufficiency of the evidence for the offense charged.
    Standard of Review
    Appellant challenges both legal and factual sufficiency. Therefore, we are required
    to conduct an analysis of the legal sufficiency of the evidence first and then, only if we find
    1
    Further reference to Texas Penal Code Annotated will be by reference to “section
    ___” or “§ ___.”
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    the evidence to be legally sufficient, do we analyze the factual sufficiency of the evidence.
    See Clewis v. State, 
    922 S.W.2d 126
    , 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).
    In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
    found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
    (1979); Ross v. State, 
    133 S.W.3d 618
    , 620 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, an
    appellate court may not sit as a thirteenth juror, but rather must uphold the jury’s verdict
    unless it is irrational or unsupported by more than a mere modicum of evidence. Moreno
    v. State, 
    755 S.W.2d 866
    , 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). We measure the legal sufficiency
    of the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).
    When an appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
    conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether, considering all the evidence in a
    neutral light, the jury was rationally justified in finding the appellant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See Watson v. State, 
    204 S.W.3d 404
    , 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In
    performing a factual sufficiency review, we must give deference to the fact finder’s
    determinations if supported by evidence and may not order a new trial simply because we
    may disagree with the verdict. See 
    id. at 417.
    As an appellate court, we are not justified
    in ordering a new trial unless there is some objective basis in the record demonstrating that
    the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury’s verdict. See 
    id. Additionally, an
    appellate opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion
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    of the most important evidence that appellant claims undermines the jury’s verdict. Sims
    v. State, 
    99 S.W.3d 600
    , 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals has
    recently declared that when reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, the reviewing
    court should measure the evidence in a neutral manner “against a hypothetically correct”
    jury charge. Vega v. State, 
    267 S.W.3d 912
    , 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (citing Wooley v.
    State, 
    273 S.W.3d 260
    , 260-61 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008)).
    Legal Sufficiency Analysis
    Appellant’s contention regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence is that the
    evidence was insufficient to prove a completed or attempted sexual assault. As stated
    above, appellant was charged with burglarizing the habitation with intent to commit sexual
    assault. As charged by indictment, intent is an essential element of burglary in the case
    before us. See §30.02(a)(1); see also McGee v. State, 
    923 S.W.2d 605
    , 608 (Tex.App.–
    Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.). As such it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    
    Id. The intent
    can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the appellant. See
    Wilkins v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 701
    , 704 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (citing Beltran v.
    State, 
    593 S.W.2d 688
    , 689 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980)).
    The facts before us show that appellant entered the home of the victims at or near
    3:00 a.m. and did so in such a manner as to arouse no one, not even the family dog.
    Further, the record reflects he did not have consent to be in the home. Additionally, upon
    entering the home, appellant stopped and took his shoes off outside the door to the
    bedroom of Lenice and Steve. As appellant approached Lenice’s side of the bed,
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    appellant disrobed completely and placed a condom over his penis. Of course he was
    prevented from acting further when Lenice was awakened. When we review all of the
    above evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we cannot say that the jury
    acted irrationally in finding that the appellant entering the habitation with the intent to
    commit sexual assault. Accordingly, appellant’s issue regarding the legal sufficiency of the
    evidence is overruled.
    Factual Sufficiency Analysis
    This same evidence, even when viewed in a neutral light, still leads to the
    conclusion that the jury was acting rationally when it found appellant guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault. 
    Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415
    . We are required to discuss the evidence that appellant contends casts
    doubt on the jury’s decision. See 
    Sims, 99 S.W.3d at 603
    . Appellant points to no
    particular evidence that casts doubt on the jury’s decision, rather, he continues to point to
    the fact that there was no completed or attempted sexual assault. This position in no way
    relates to the element of intent and does nothing to undermine the confidence of the court
    in the jury’s verdict. 
    Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415
    . Accordingly, appellant’s issue regarding
    the factual sufficiency of the evidence is overruled.
    Guilty of Only the Lesser Included Offense
    Appellant’s final issue contends that the appellant is guilty of only the lesser included
    offense of criminal trespass. As the State points out, this is simply an attempt by appellant
    to attack the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of burglary of a habitation with
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    intent to commit the offense of criminal trespass. As such, this argument has been
    answered above. Appellant’s third issue is overruled.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled appellant’s issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Mackey K. Hancock
    Justice
    Do not publish.
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