James Douglas Slagle, II v. State ( 2009 )


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  •                                    NO. 07-08-0171-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL B
    JUNE 5, 2009
    ______________________________
    JAMES DOUGLAS SLAGLE, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
    NO. 18727-C; HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant James Douglas Slagle appeals from his conviction by jury of sexual
    assault and the trial court’s sentence of twelve years’ confinement in the Institutional
    Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant's attorney has filed a brief
    in compliance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
    (1967) and In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) and certifies that there
    are no non-frivolous issues to appeal. Agreeing with appointed counsel’s conclusion the
    record fails to show any arguably meritorious issue that could support the appeal, we affirm
    the trial court’s judgment.
    Appellant was charged by indictment with sexual assault.1       The indictment also
    contained a second count for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault.
    Appellant plead not guilty. The evidence at trial showed that during the late evening or
    early morning hours of February 7, 2008, a female victim, sleeping in her bed in her
    apartment, awakened to find a man on top of her. Appellant was a friend of the victim’s
    brother, and she identified him as her assailant. She testified she recognized his voice
    when he spoke and recognized his figure as he left her bedroom. A sexual assault nurse
    examiner testified she found minor injuries to the victim consistent with forced penetration.
    No physical evidence tied appellant to the attack.
    Appellant later gave a recorded statement to police, denying he had assaulted the
    victim. Appellant told police he had engaged in consensual intercourse with the victim two
    weeks before. During her testimony, the victim denied any consensual relationship with
    appellant. He did not testify at trial, but presented the testimony of a friend who said
    appellant was in a nearby apartment at the time of the assault. Other witnesses also
    testified appellant was in the nearby apartment at various times during the evening.
    1
    See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon 2005). This is a second degree
    felony punishable by imprisonment for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2
    years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003).
    2
    The jury found appellant guilty of sexual assault and sentenced him to imprisonment
    for a term of twelve years. The trial court certified appellant’s right of appeal and this
    appeal followed.
    Thereafter, appellant's appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw and
    a brief in support pursuant to Anders in which she certifies that she has diligently reviewed
    the record and, in her professional opinion, under the controlling authorities and facts of the
    case, there is no reversible error or legitimate ground on which a non-frivolous appeal can
    arguably be predicated. The brief discusses in detail the procedural history of this case and
    the events at trial. Counsel discusses the applicable law and sets forth the reasons she
    believes there are no arguably meritorious issues on which to appeal. Counsel has certified
    that a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw have been served on appellant, and
    that counsel has advised appellant of his right to review the record and file a pro se
    response. Johnson v. State, 
    885 S.W.2d 641
    , 645 (Tex.App.–Waco 1994, pet. ref'd). By
    letter, this Court also notified appellant of his opportunity to submit a response to the Anders
    brief and motion to withdraw filed by his counsel. Appellant has not filed a response.
    In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we will
    not rule on the motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record in each
    matter. Nichols v. State, 
    954 S.W.2d 83
    , 86 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1997, no pet.). If this
    Court determines the appeal has merit, we will remand it to the trial court for appointment
    of new counsel. Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
    3
    In her brief, appellate counsel discusses several grounds on which a meritorious
    appeal might lie. Counsel first addresses potential issues concerning the factual sufficiency
    of the evidence to support appellant’s conviction. We agree the record does not support
    an arguably meritorious contention with regard to the jury’s resolution of the conflicting
    testimony.
    Secondly, counsel notes potential abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing the
    introduction into evidence of the record of the victim’s 911 call. We review a trial court’s
    decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Shuffield v.
    State, 
    189 S.W.3d 782
    , 793 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). The trial court abuses its discretion only
    when the decision lies “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Walters v. State,
    
    247 S.W.3d 204
    , 217 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007).         After a complete review of the record, we
    agree with appellate counsel that the ground identified does not arguably support an
    appeal.
    Lastly, counsel identifies the possibility that appellant might argue he had received
    ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel allowed appellant’s recorded
    statement to be admitted into evidence without objection. See Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984) and Hernandez v. State, 
    726 S.W.2d 53
    , 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (establishing standard for ineffective assistance of counsel).
    We agree with counsel that the record contains no support for such a contention.
    4
    We note also we see no appealable issues with regard to appellant’s assessed
    punishment.      The jury assessed punishment at twelve years of confinement in the
    Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, a term within the
    permissible range. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon 2005); Tex. Penal Code
    Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 2003). It is the general rule that a sentence within the proper range
    of punishment will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 
    680 S.W.2d 809
    , 814
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Rodriguez v. State, 
    917 S.W.2d 90
    , 92 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1996, pet.
    ref’d).
    Our review convinces us that appellate counsel conducted a complete review of the
    record. We have also made an independent examination of the entire record to determine
    whether there are any arguable grounds which might support the appeal from appellant’s
    conviction and sentence. We agree the record presents no meritorious grounds for review.
    Accordingly, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw2 and affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    James T. Campbell
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    2
    Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send her client
    a copy of the opinion and judgment, along with notification of the defendant’s right to file
    a pro se petition for discretionary review. Tex. R. App. P. 48.4.
    5