Cristal Gail Stowe v. State ( 2009 )

NO. 07-08-0412-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

APRIL 20, 2009

______________________________

CRISTAL GALE STOWE, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 121ST DISTRICT COURT OF TERRY COUNTY;

NO. 4833; HONORABLE KELLY G. MOORE, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Pursuant to a plea bargain, in 2002, Appellant, Cristal Gale Stowe, was convicted of endangering a child, a state jail felony, and was sentenced to twenty months confinement, suspended in favor of four years community supervision. The State filed a motion to revoke community supervision in 2005 for numerous violations of the conditions thereof; however, that motion was dismissed and community supervision was extended for another year in addition to amendments to the conditions. On November 14, 2006, the State filed another motion to revoke community supervision again alleging violations of the conditions thereof. After a hearing on the State’s motion, Appellant’s community supervision was revoked and punishment was assessed at the original sentence of twenty months confinement. In presenting this appeal, counsel has filed an Anders brief in support of a motion to withdraw. We grant counsel’s motion and affirm.

          In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Counsel has candidly discussed why, under the controlling authorities, the appeal is frivolous. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Counsel has also demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to Appellant, (2) notifying her of her right to file a pro se response if she desired to do so, and (3) informing her of her right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408. By letter, this Court granted Appellant thirty days in which to exercise her right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should she be so inclined. Id. at 409, n.23. Appellant did not file a response. Neither did the State favor us with a brief.

          By the Anders brief, counsel asserts the trial court properly ruled on all matters raised and finds no reversible error. We have independently examined the entire record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues which might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We have found no such issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that there are no plausible grounds for appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).  

          Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.   

                                                                           Patrick A. Pirtle

                                                                                 Justice

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