Jay Gid Bryan v. State ( 2009 )


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  •                                   NO. 07-08-0174-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL A
    JANUARY 28, 2009
    ______________________________
    JAY GID BRYAN, APPELLANT
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
    NO. B14776-0301; HON. ED SELF, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Before CAMPBELL, HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Jay Gid Bryan filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating
    him guilty of endangering a child,1 revoking his community supervision and sentencing him
    to two years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
    1
    See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.041(c) (Vernon 2007). This offense is a state jail
    felony, punishable by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years
    or less than 180 days and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.35
    (Vernon 2007).
    Justice. We have considered the appeal without briefs and affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    Appellant’s brief was due to be filed on June 20, 2008, but was never filed. By letter
    dated July 3, this Court notified appellant’s retained attorney of the failure and also
    explained that if no response was received by July 14, the appeal would be abated
    pursuant to Rule 38.8(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. On July 8, we
    received a document wherein counsel explained he was never retained or appointed to
    represent appellant on appeal. On August 19, we abated this appeal to the trial court and
    ordered the trial court to utilize whatever means necessary to determine: (1) whether
    appellant truly desires to prosecute the appeal; and (2) whether appellant is indigent and
    entitled to appointed counsel. See Bryan v. State, No. 07-08-0174-CR, 
    2008 WL 3863473
    (Tex.App.–Amarillo Aug. 19, 2008) (order, not designated for publication).
    The trial court conducted a hearing on September 5, 2008, and issued the following
    findings: (1) a representative of appellant’s bondsman appeared, asking that a warrant be
    issued for appellant because he had failed to comply with the conditions of his contract;
    appellant’s bond was reset and a warrant was issued for appellant’s arrest; (2) appellant’s
    case was first called at 1:00 p.m. and appellant failed to appear; (3) appellant’s case was
    called again at 1:04 p.m. and 2:10 p.m. and each time, no one responded; (4) appellant
    is a fugitive; (5) the trial court is unable to determine if appellant truly desires to prosecute
    the appeal; and (6) the trial court is unable to determine if appellant is indigent.
    2
    On September 29, we again abated the appeal pending further order of the Court
    in an attempt to afford appellant the opportunity to pursue his appeal. See Bryan v. State,
    No. 07-08-0174-CR, ____ WL ____ (Tex.App.–Amarillo Sept. 29, 2008) (order, not
    designated for publication). On December 8, we were notified that the warrant for
    appellant’s arrest remained outstanding. On December 11, we reinstated the appeal. On
    that same date, we reviewed both the reporter’s and clerk’s records and found references
    to appellant’s connection with six separate addresses. We sent notice to appellant at each
    of those addresses in an attempt to determine his intent in this appeal. To date, we have
    not received appellant’s brief or any communication from appellant. Our attempts to
    communicate with appellant have been unsuccessful. The trial court and this Court have
    made every effort to protect appellant’s rights. We find further abatement of the appeal
    would be futile. Carroll v. State, 
    75 S.W.3d 633
    , 634 (Tex.App.–Waco 2002, no pet.).
    We also find that because appellant has done nothing to prosecute the appeal and
    has not kept this Court or the trial court informed of his whereabouts, appellant no longer
    desires to prosecute this appeal. We further find that good cause exists to suspend the
    requirement of Rule 38.8(b)(4) that the finding be made by the trial court. See Tex. R. App.
    P. 2.     See also Gonzalez v. State, No. 01-05-01155-CR, 
    2007 WL 3227686
    ,
    (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007, no. pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication). Accordingly, we have submitted this cause without briefs and have reviewed
    the record for fundamental error. 
    Carroll, 75 S.W.3d at 634
    , citing Lott v. State, 
    874 S.W.2d 687
    , 688 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994).
    3
    Our review of the record discloses no “unassigned fundamental error.”            See
    
    Carroll, 75 S.W.3d at 634
    ; Ashcraft v. State, 
    802 S.W.2d 905
    , 906 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth
    1991, no pet); Meza v. State, 
    742 S.W.2d 708
    , 708-09 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no
    pet.). See also Gonzalez, No. 01-05-01155-CR, 
    2007 WL 3227686
    . The record here
    comprises the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record of the hearing on the State’s motion
    to proceed to adjudication of guilt.
    We review the trial court’s judgment revoking community supervision under an
    abuse of discretion standard, Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006),
    and indulge all reasonable inferences in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling, Jones
    v. State, 
    589 S.W.2d 419
    , 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (panel op.).                 Proof by a
    preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of
    supervision is sufficient to support a revocation order. Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    ,
    926 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (panel op.); Leach v. State, 
    170 S.W.3d 669
    , 672
    (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). At the January 2008 hearing on the State’s motion
    to proceed to adjudication, the court heard evidence from appellant’s community
    supervision officer of appellant’s failure to report as required for the months of February
    through November 2007. We find no fundamental error here, and affirm the judgment.
    James T. Campbell
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    4