Telles Bail Bonds v. Samaniego, Leo, Sheriff of El Paso County ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TELLES BAIL BONDS,                             Appellant, v. LEO SAMANIEGO, SHERIFF OF EL PASO COUNTY,                             Appellee.

' ' ' ' '  '

No. 08-01-00156-CV Appeal from 346th District Court of El Paso County, Texas (TC# 97-103)

OPINION ON REHEARING

On the Court=s own motion, we withdraw our opinion of April 25, 2002 and substitute the following.

Telles Bail Bonds appealed the trial court=s order denying its motion for partial summary judgment and granting Leo Samaniego=s motion for summary judgment.  Samaniego filed a motion for rehearing after we reversed the trial court=s actions.  Because we find that Telles lacked standing to bring suit and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we withdraw our earlier opinion and dismiss the cause.

Facts

Telles Bail Bonds was licensed to execute bail bonds in El Paso County, holding power of attorney for International Fidelity Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey (IFI).^[1]  On December 31, 1996, Telles attempted to post a bail bond, but the El Paso Sheriff=s Department refused the bond.  Telles was informed that the County Attorney=s office had instructed the Sheriff=s Department not to accept any bonds from it.

Telles brought suit against Leo Samaniego, the elected sheriff of El Paso County, alleging that Samaniego=s failure and refusal to accept bonds from Telles prevented it from exercising its constitutionally protected right to earn a living by writing bail bonds.  Telles argued that by denying its right to post bail bonds, Samaniego caused it a loss of income.  Telles sought a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, and a permanent injunction enjoining Samaniego from unlawfully refusing to approve and accept bail bonds from it and any damages, fees, and costs to which it might be entitled.

Samaniego asserted the affirmative defenses that Telles had an adequate remedy at law and was not entitled to injunctive relief, that an injunction would destroy the status quo and result in further indebtedness to him, that Telles was not entitled to equitable relief because it was guilty of unclean hands, and that Telles had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.

On October 25, 2000, Telles filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding Samaniego=s liability.  Citing the bail bond provisions of the Occupations Code, Telles argued that there is a specific process for the suspension or revocation of bail bond licenses that the bail bond board of a county^[2] must follow before acting against a license. It argued that if a license has not expired or been suspended or revoked, the sheriff must accept or approve a bail bond and that such duty is mandatory and ministerial.

On November 6, Samaniego filed a motion for summary judgment, citing the Revised Civil Statutes and arguing that because IFI was a corporate surety in default on at least five bonds, he was correct in not accepting Telles=s bonds.  In fact, Samaniego argued, he was required to refuse bonds from Telles.

Samaniego filed his response to Telles=s motion for partial summary judgment on November 20, stating that his authority to refuse bonds was discretionary.

On November 30, Telles filed an amended motion for partial summary judgment, changing its citations from the bail bond provisions in the Occupations Code to the parallel provisions in the Revised Civil Statutes and, notably, deleting any mention of problems that might arise if a surety was in default of at least five judgments.

Samaniego filed a supplement to his response to Telles=s motion for partial summary judgment on December 1, claiming that Telles=s claim that the statute requires a particular procedure be followed before a sheriff can refuse bonds was a misstatement of the statute.

On December 7, the day before the summary judgment hearing, Telles filed a motion for leave to amend its motion for partial summary judgment; Samaniego filed a motion to supplement his answer.

A hearing was held on December 8, at which time the trial court denied Telles=s motion for leave to amend its partial summary judgment.  Telles=s motion for partial summary judgment was denied, and Samaniego=s motion for summary judgment was granted.

We reversed the trial court=s ruling on appeal.  Samaniego brought his motion for rehearing thereafter.

Standing

On rehearing, appellee argues that appellant did not have standing to file suit.  He states that appellant, acting as an agent for its corporate surety, did not have authority to bring suit.  We agree with this contention.

Appellee first questioned appellant=s standing in the trial court below, where he brought a motion to show authority pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 12.  There is no conclusive evidence in the record regarding any action taken on the motion. At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, there was confusion about what had occurred, and the trial court judge decided the issue was moot.  We disagree and believe appellee appropriately raises standing here, as standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction that can be raised at any time and cannot be waived, Texas Assoc. of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993).

In examining a party=s standing for the first time on appeal, the appellate court must construe the petition in favor of that party and, if necessary, review the whole record to determine whether there is any evidence supporting standing.  Id. at 446; see also Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000) (AIn sum, a court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction is not required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.@). The general test for standing requires that there be a real controversy between the parties that can be determined by the judicial declaration sought.  Texas Assoc. of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; see also The State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994).  There must be a restriction of the plaintiff=s rights--not of another=s, Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180, 184-85 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. denied); that is, the party must have a justiciable interest.

From a review of the record in the present case, we believe appellant lacked standing to bring suit.

Appellant brought its suit pursuant to its license as an agent for IFI, the corporate surety.  Appellee argued that appellant was pursuing suit in its capacity as agent for IFI and that IFI was not involved in the lawsuit. Appellant agreed and stated it was suing on its own behalf for its own damages arising under the license.

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 7 is the provision enacted to deal with corporate sureties.  Tex. S.B. 727, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 312, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 875, 881.  Under subsection (c), a corporation acting as a surety is required to file a power of attorney designating and authorizing the named agent of the corporation to execute bail bonds.  Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 7(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (now contained in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. ' 1704.211(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).  There must be a separate license for each agent acting under a corporate power of attorney.  Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 7(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (now contained in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. ' 1704.154(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).  Appellant was acting pursuant to one such license from IFI. 

As its agent, appellant was authorized to act for IFI.  It essentially consented to act on behalf of, and subject to, the control of IFI, which had manifested consent that it so act. See Robles v. Consolidated Graphics, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (citing Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483, 493 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).  It was authorized to execute bonds on behalf of the corporation.

Appellant was also given qualifying power of attorney.  As IFI=s attorney in fact, appellant was appointed for a definite purpose.  See Harkins v. Murphy & Bolanz, 112 S.W. 136, 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ dism=d).  Specifically, appellant was given limited authority to

[S]ign, execute, acknowledge, and deliver for and on [IFI=s] behalf as Surety, subject to the limitation as herein set forth, any and all papers and documents necessary or incidental to making of Bail Bonds in Judicial Proceedings, whether criminal or civil; supersedeas bonds, peace bonds, appeal bonds or any other kind of appearance bond in any State Court, County Court or Municipal Court, and in all U.S. Federal Courts, and all U.S. Federal Agencies . . . .

Telles was not given authority to pursue this suit.  The pursuit of the cause was not incidental to Telles=s making bonds.  Moreover, no explicit authority was given from the principal for appellant to bring suit.^[3]  The refusal of the bonds was really a possible infringement on IFI=s rights and the cause of action belonged to IFI.

IFI was a necessary and indispensable party to the suit.  DeLoach v. Moore, 185 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1944, no writ) (AAll persons who have or claim a direct interest in the object and subject matter of the suit and whose interest will necessarily be affected by any judgment that may be rendered therein are necessary or indispensable parties plaintiff or defendant.@).  The bail bond agreements were under its license and defaults related back to it, yet it was not joined in the action.

In contrast, appellant was affected only in its capacity as a representative for IFI.  Appellant had no greater interest in the dispute than the proceeds arising from its use of the license.  IFI had several agents under its power as a corporate surety, as was allowed by statute, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 7(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (now contained in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. ' 1704.211(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002)); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 7(c) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (now contained in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. ' 1704.154(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).  If any combination of the agents was in default on five judgments, appellee could have ceased accepting bonds from any of them, not only appellant.  Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 14A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (now contained in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. ' 1704.212(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).  The bail bond agreements did not belong to appellant but to IFI, and IFI was ultimately liable for them.  Id.; see also Harris County Bail Bond Bd. v. Blackwood, 41 S.W.3d 123, 125 (Tex. 2000) (suggesting that under Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 6(f)(3), an agent is not personally liable for bonds). The suit could only have been brought by Telles on IFI=s behalf.  Thus, appellant wrongfully pursued the action on its own.

Conclusion

Appellant lacked standing to bring suit, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss this cause for lack of jurisdiction.  Appellee=s motion for rehearing is overruled.

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice

August 1, 2002

Before Panel No. 4

Barajas, C.J., Larsen, and McClure, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

---

^[1]As of January 6, 1999 (before the hearing on the summary judgment motions), Telles was no longer licensed through its relationship with IFI.

^[2]El Paso County is under the jurisdiction of a bail bond board.  See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2372p-3, ' 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (now contained in Tex. Occ. Code Ann. ' 1704.051 (Vernon Supp. 2002)).

^[3]Appellee=s motion to show authority asserted that there was no authorization for the suit.  The motion stated that authority was sometimes granted for such suits but that such authority was required to be in writing by the company.  No such evidence is in the record.  We also note that as of January 6, 1999, before hearing on the motions, all of appellant=s authority through IFI was withdrawn.