in Re Juan Herrera ( 2015 )


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  •                                  NUMBER 13-15-00337-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    IN RE JUAN HERRERA
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Perkes
    Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam1
    Relator, Juan Herrera, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of mandamus on
    July 24, 2015. Through this original proceeding, relator requests that we direct the trial
    court to rule on relator’s motion to “inspect, retain, and/or purchase” a copy of the
    appellate record pertaining to relator’s conviction for murder. This Court previously
    affirmed that conviction by direct appeal. See Herrera v. State, No. 13-11-00084-CR,
    
    2012 WL 2861673
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.,
    1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
    required to do so.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
    not designated for publication). Relator contends that the record is necessary so that he
    can prepare a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus.        For the following
    reasons, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
    To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show: (1) that he has no
    adequate remedy at law, and (2) that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act. In re
    State ex rel. Weeks, 
    391 S.W.3d 117
    , 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). If
    relator fails to meet both of these requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus
    should be denied. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of App. at Texarkana, 
    236 S.W.3d 207
    , 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding).
    It is the relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus
    relief. Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re
    Davidson, 
    153 S.W.3d 490
    , 491 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding); see
    Barnes v. State, 
    832 S.W.2d 424
    , 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.
    proceeding) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled
    to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”). In addition to other requirements, the relator must
    include a statement of facts supported by citations to “competent evidence included in the
    appendix or record,” and must also provide “a clear and concise argument for the
    contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the appendix or record.”
    See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3. The relator must also file an appendix and record
    sufficient to support the claim for mandamus relief. See 
    id. R. 52.3(k)
    (specifying the
    required contents for the appendix); 
    id. R. 52.7(a)
    (specifying the required contents for
    the record); see also 
    Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837
    ; In re 
    Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661
    .
    2
    Consideration of a request or motion that is properly filed and before the court is a
    ministerial act. State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 
    726 S.W.2d 125
    , 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
    (orig. proceeding); see White v. Reiter, 
    640 S.W.2d 586
    , 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
    Stated otherwise, a trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule, within a
    reasonable time, on motions properly filed and pending before the court. See In re
    Layton, 
    257 S.W.3d 794
    , 795 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, orig. proceeding). Thus, in
    proper cases, mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act. See In re Blakeney,
    
    254 S.W.3d 659
    , 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding).
    As an initial matter, we address our jurisdiction to consider the mandamus petition.
    Generally, an intermediate court of appeals has no jurisdiction over post-conviction
    applications for writ of habeas corpus in felony cases. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
    art. 11.07 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 2015 R.S.); see also Ex parte Martinez, 
    175 S.W.3d 510
    , 512–13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, orig. proceeding); Self v. State, 
    122 S.W.3d 294
    , 294–95 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.). Similarly, an intermediate
    appellate court has no authority to compel a trial court to rule on matters related to a
    petition for writ of habeas corpus. See In re McAfee, 
    53 S.W.3d 715
    , 717–18 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding). However, the court of criminal appeals has
    held that its “exclusive Article 11.07 jurisdiction [does not] divest[ ] an appellate court of
    jurisdiction to decide the merits of a mandamus petition alleging that a district court is not
    ruling on a motion when the relator has no Article 11.07 application pending.” Padieu v.
    Ct. of Apps. of Tex., Fifth Dist., 
    392 S.W.3d 115
    , 117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig.
    proceeding). Relator’s mandamus petition indicates that he has not yet filed a petition for
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    writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to hear this petition for writ of
    mandamus. See 
    id. We next
    turn to the merits of relator’s claim.
    According to the documents attached to relator’s petition, he filed a “second”
    motion to “inspect, retain and/or purchase” the trial court record on December 9, 2014.
    On June 2, 2015, relator sent a letter to the district clerk asking if the motion had been
    presented to the trial court for its consideration. Relator thereafter, on June 25, 2015,
    filed an objection to the trial court’s failure to rule on the motion. The record before this
    Court fails to contain file-stamped copies of any of these documents.
    Filing a motion with the district clerk does not establish that the motion was brought
    to the attention of the trial court because the clerk's knowledge of the motion is not
    imputed to the trial court. In re Chavez, 
    62 S.W.3d 225
    , 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001,
    orig. proceeding). In this regard, the mere filing of a motion does not equate to a request
    that the trial court rule on the motion. In re Sarkissian, 
    243 S.W.3d 860
    , 861 (Tex. App.—
    Waco 2008, orig. proceeding); In re Hearn, 
    137 S.W.3d 681
    , 685 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio 2004, orig. proceeding); In re 
    Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228
    ; 
    Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426
    ; cf. In re Shredder 
    Co., 225 S.W.3d at 680
    (“Relator has made repeated requests for
    a ruling on its motion.”). Here, there is nothing in the limited record before this Court to
    establish that relator has ever requested a ruling on his motion or otherwise called the
    motion to the respondent’s attention.       See 
    Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426
    (denying
    mandamus petition where relator did not ask for a hearing on his motions or take any
    action to alert trial court that it had not yet considered his motions). Accordingly, relator
    has not furnished an appendix sufficient to support his claim for relief insofar as he has
    not demonstrated that his pleadings were presented to the respondent and the
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    respondent has refused to rule on them. See In re Dimas, 
    88 S.W.3d 349
    , 351 (Tex.
    App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding); In re 
    Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228
    .
    The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus
    and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relator has failed to establish his entitlement
    to mandamus relief. Therefore, we DENY relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. We
    dismiss as moot relator’s motion for leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus because
    the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure no longer require the relator to file a motion for
    leave to file an original proceeding. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52 & cmt.
    PER CURIAM
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    28th day of July, 2015.
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