Mayor Annise Parker and City of Houston v. Jack Pidgeon and Larry Hicks ( 2015 )


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  • Reversed and Remanded and Per Curiam Opinion filed July 28, 2015.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-14-00899-CV
    NO. 14-14-00932-CV
    MAYOR ANNISE PARKER AND CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellants
    V.
    JACK PIDGEON AND LARRY HICKS, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 310th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2014-61812
    PER CURIAM OPINION
    Appellees Jack Pidgeon and Larry Hicks (collectively, Appellees) sued to
    enjoin Mayor Annise Parker and the City of Houston (collectively, the City) from
    providing employee benefits to the same-sex spouses of employees legally married
    in another state. Appellees relied on provisions of the Texas Constitution and
    Family Code banning recognition of same-sex marriage in Texas, declaring same-
    sex marriages against public policy and void, and prohibiting political subdivisions
    from giving effect to same-sex marriages from other states. See Tex. Const. art. I,
    § 32; Tex. Fam. Code § 6.204. The trial court signed a temporary injunction
    requested by the Appellees,1 determining that:
    4. Spending funds in that manner will recognize a union between two
    people of the same sex as a status identical to the Texas Constitution’s
    definition of marriage. That expenditure is thus barred by the Texas
    Constitution.
    5. Spending funds in that manner recognizes and validates a marriage
    between persons of the same sex. That expenditure is thus barred by
    the Family Code.
    6. Spending funds in that manner gives effect to a right or claim to
    benefits asserted as the result of a marriage between persons of the
    same sex. That expenditure is thus barred by the Family Code.
    7. Spending funds in that manner will furnish employment benefits to
    persons who are not an employee’s legal spouse or dependent
    children. That expenditure is thus barred by the City’s charter.
    Thus, the trial court concluded that “[t]he City is prohibited from furnishing
    benefits to persons who are married in other jurisdictions to City employees of the
    same sex.”
    In light of recent decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2 we conclude that we must
    reverse the trial court’s injunction. In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court
    determined that “same sex couples may exercise their fundamental right to marry
    1
    The City challenged Appellees’ standing to sue. Appellees’ pleading that they are
    residents of Houston, Texas, Harris County, and “taxpayer[s] . . . residing within the boundaries
    of the City of Houston and Defendants are expending significant public funds on an illegal
    activity,” construed liberally, supports Appellees’ standing to sue as taxpayers without showing a
    particularized injury. See Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex. (IRCOT), 
    418 S.W.3d 263
    , 267–68, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).
    2
    See Obergefell v. Hodges, 
    135 S. Ct. 2584
    (2015); DeLeon v. Abbott, No. 14-50196, —
    F.3d—, 
    2015 WL 4032161
    (5th Cir. July 1, 2015).
    2
    in all States.” Obergefell, 
    135 S. Ct. 2584
    , 2604–05, 2607 (2015). The United
    States Supreme Court held that “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
    recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of
    its same-sex character.” 
    Id. at 2607–08.
    Further, in DeLeon, a federal district
    court found that article I, section 32 of the Texas Constitution and Texas Family
    Code section 6.204 are unconstitutional and enjoined the State of Texas from
    enforcing them; the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
    the trial court’s determination in light of Obergefell. DeLeon, No. 14-50196, —
    F.3d—, 
    2015 WL 4032161
    , at **1–2 (5th Cir. July 1, 2015).
    Because of the substantial change in the law regarding same-sex marriage
    since the temporary injunction was signed, 3 we reverse the trial court’s temporary
    injunction and remand for proceedings consistent with Obergefell and DeLeon.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Boyce, McCally, and Donovan.
    3
    We have broad discretion to remand a case in the interest of justice after reversing the
    trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3(b); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 
    261 S.W.3d 190
    , 196
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Chrismon v. Brown, 
    246 S.W.3d 102
    , 116
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). We may exercise our discretion to remand as
    long as there is a probability that the case, for any reason, has not been fully developed. See
    
    Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d at 196
    .
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-14-00899-CV

Filed Date: 7/29/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/29/2015