Nancy S. Morrison v. Sheriff Wesley Crites, Deputy D.B. Marcolesco ( 2015 )


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  •                                   In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    No. 07-14-00317-CV
    NANCY SUE MORRISON, APPELLANT
    V.
    SHERIFF WESLEY CRITES AND
    DEPUTY D.B. MARCOLESCO, APPELLEES
    On Appeal from the County Court
    Wheeler County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 1963, Honorable Jerry Dan Hefley, Presiding
    July 28, 2015
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
    Appearing pro se, appellant Nancy Sue Morrison challenges an order of the
    county court dismissing her appeal of an order of the justice court. On our own motion
    we conclude we lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits of her challenge.
    We will vacate the county court’s order and dismiss the attempted appeal.
    Background
    On December 4, 2013, Morrison obtained a default judgment in justice court
    against Sandy Castillo for $1,819.30. Neither party appealed the judgment to county
    court.       The justice of the peace issued a writ of execution on January 8, 2014,
    returnable in thirty days. Morrison apparently filed an instrument in the justice court on
    March 19, 2014, complaining of the execution procedure. Following a March 26, 2014
    hearing, the justice of the peace granted Morrison a “refund” of $150 and a “new
    properly executed writ of execution in the amount of $150.00. If [Morrison] so chooses
    to file.”
    On April 7, 2014, Morrison then filed in the justice court a pleading entitled
    “motion to recover full amount of judgment.” Citing Civil Practice and Remedies Code
    sections 34.064 and 34.065,1 she alleged the actions and inactions of appellees
    1
    In her attempt to recover the full amount of the judgment, Morrison mistakenly
    relied on the former versions of sections 34.064 and 34.065, which provided:
    34.064 Improper Return of Writ. If an officer neglects or refuses to return
    a writ of execution as required by law or makes a false return on a writ of
    execution, the officer and his sureties are liable to the person entitled to
    receive the money collected on the execution for the full amount of the
    debt, plus interest and costs. The total amount is recoverable on motion of
    the plaintiff filed with the court that issued the writ, following five days’
    notice.
    34.065 Failure to Levy or Sell. If an officer fails or refuses to levy on or sell
    property subject to execution and the levy or sale could have taken place,
    the officer and his sureties are liable to the party entitled to receive the
    money collected on execution for the full amount of the debt, plus interest
    and costs. The total amount is recoverable on motion of the party filed with
    the court that issued the writ, following five days’ notice to the officer and
    his sureties.
    2
    Wheeler County Sheriff Wes Crites and a deputy, D.B. Marcolesco, prevented her from
    recovering the full amount of her judgment against Castillo. She prayed for recovery of
    this amount from the sheriff and deputy.          In other filings, Morrison also mentions
    recovery from the officers’ sureties. The motion was denied by order of the justice
    court.
    On April 7, Morrison filed a notice of appeal in the justice court challenging the
    denial of her motion. She filed the same instrument in the county court on April 17. It is
    undisputed that Morrison did not, and has not, properly perfected an appeal from justice
    court to county court in the manner required by rule. 2 In July 2014, Sheriff Crites and
    deputy Marcolesco moved the county court to dismiss Morrison’s case against them.
    ____________________________
    The Legislature rewrote these sections in 2007 effective for duties performed
    after September 1, 2007. See Act of May 17, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S, ch. 421, §§ 4, 8, 9,
    2007 Tex. Gen. Laws, 750, 751, 753 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
    ANN. §§ 34.064 & 34.065 (West 2015)). In their current form, these sections apply to
    Morrison’s case. Under section 34.064 an officer who refuses to amend or file a return
    of writ may be subject to an order of contempt and fine ranging from $10 to $100 under
    Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 7.001(b). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    § 7.001(b) (West Supp. 2014) & § 34.064(c) (West 2015). Morrison did not seek an
    order of contempt, but as noted, argued for recovery of the full amount of judgment.
    Under current section 34.065, if an officer fails or refuses to levy on or sell property
    subject to execution, and the judgment creditor seeking relief under the section proves
    certain enumerated facts, the officer and his sureties are liable to the judgment creditor
    only for actual damages suffered.
    2
    See TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(h) (“An appeal [from justice court to county court] is
    perfected when a bond, cash deposit, or statement of inability to pay is filed in
    accordance with this rule”). Because of our disposition, we do not consider the
    jurisdictional question whether Morrison made a bona fide attempt to invoke the county
    court’s jurisdiction. See Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners ex. rel. St. Paul Fire &
    Marine Ins. Co. v. Park Warwick, L.P., 
    244 S.W.3d 838
    , 839 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam)
    (quoting Walker v. Blue Water Garden Apartments, 
    776 S.W.2d 578
    , 581 (Tex. 1989))
    (“the factor which determines whether jurisdiction has been conferred on the appellate
    court is not the form or substance of the bond, certificate or affidavit, but whether the
    instrument was filed in a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction”
    (quotation marks omitted)).
    3
    The basis of their complaint was Morrison’s asserted failure to have them served with
    citation. The motion was heard and granted by written order of the county judge.
    Analysis
    As noted, by seeking to recover by motion the full amount of her justice court
    judgment from the sheriff and deputy, Morrison relied on a superseded statute, and
    sought a post-judgment remedy not provided by current law. Claims for damages under
    section 34.065 must be brought as a separate lawsuit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
    CODE ANN. § 34.068(b) (West 2015) (a claim for damages under, inter alia, section
    34.065 “shall be brought in the form of a lawsuit filed against the officer in the county in
    which the officer holds office”); § 34.076 (subchapter D of chapter 34 “is exclusive
    remedy for violations of an officer’s duties with regard to the execution and return of
    writs”).
    Statute also establishes which judgments of a justice court are appealable to
    county court. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.001(a) (West 2015) (“In a case
    tried in justice court in which the judgment or amount in controversy exceeds $250,
    exclusive of costs, or in which the appeal is expressly provided by law, a party to a final
    judgment may appeal to the county court”). The justice court’s denial of Morrison’s
    motion was neither a final judgment nor an order made appealable by statute or rule.
    Her motion, unauthorized by statute, was merely a post-judgment motion incident to the
    writ of execution. “Neither a writ of execution nor an order incident to a writ of execution
    is appealable.” Wolter v. Donaldson, 
    79 S.W.3d 160
    , 162 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002,
    no pet.) (citing Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 
    810 S.W.2d 738
    , 740 (Tex.
    4
    1991), abrogated on other grounds by In re Sheshtawy, 
    154 S.W.3d 114
    (Tex. 2004)
    (per curiam)); see Fuller v. Harrell, 07-05-00322-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4263 (Tex.
    App.—Amarillo May 17, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for want of
    jurisdiction when appellant failed to obtain an appealable order from justice court before
    appealing to county court at law).
    Accordingly, Morrison did not invoke the jurisdiction of the county court when she
    attempted to appeal the justice court’s order. An appellate court considers the question
    of its jurisdiction even if not challenged by a party. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas
    v. Loutzenhiser, 
    140 S.W.3d 351
    , 358 (Tex. 2004), superseded by statute on other
    grounds, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2013). Because the county court
    lacked jurisdiction to consider Morrison’s attempted appeal, we vacate the order of the
    county court and dismiss her attempted appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e); see State ex
    rel. Kelly v. Baker, 
    580 S.W.2d 611
    , 612-13 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1979, no writ).
    James T. Campbell
    Justice
    5