Darcy Jo Woods v. State ( 2006 )

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-06-095 CR ____________________

DARCY JO WOODS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 252nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 93741

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant Darcy Jo Woods pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court found Woods guilty and assessed punishment at two years of confinement in a state jail facility. However, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed Woods on community supervision for four years, and assessed a $500 fine. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke community supervision, which alleged that Woods had violated various conditions of her community supervision, and Woods pleaded "true" to some of the alleged violations. The trial court then revoked Woods's community supervision and assessed punishment at two years of confinement in a state jail facility. The trial court ordered that Woods's sentence would run consecutively to her two-year sentence in another case. In this appeal, Woods contends the trial court abused its discretion by stacking her sentences. We affirm.

Woods asserts that section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code "prevents the stacking of these offenses." Woods also argues that each case was called individually, "but all matters for each appearance were handled in the same setting for each phase." Section 3.03(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides as follows: "When the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single criminal action, a sentence for each offense for which he has been found guilty shall be pronounced. Except as provided by Subsection (b), the sentences shall run concurrently." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 3.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

Woods cites Ewing v. State, 157 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) as support for her argument that the procedure followed by the trial court constituted a prosecution of all of the cases in a single action as contemplated by section 3.03(a). See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 3.03(a). However, Ewing does not support the proposition for which Woods cites it. In Ewing, the Court of Appeals held that section 3.03(a) limits the trial court's authority to order consecutive sentences when multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode are tried in a single criminal action. Ewing, 157 S.W.3d at 870.

Here, the trial court called each of Woods's three pending cases individually, disposed of the motions to revoke separately, and pronounced sentence in each case individually. We find that both Ewing and section 3.03(a) of the Texas Penal Code are inapposite. See id.; Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 3.03(a). Rather, article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs this case. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Article 42.08(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that when a defendant has been convicted in two or more cases, the trial court may order the sentences to run either consecutively or concurrently. ⁽¹⁾ Id. Woods was convicted in three cases. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Woods's sentence in one case to run consecutively with that in another case. See id. We overrule Woods's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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CHARLES KREGER

Justice

Submitted on November 21, 2006

Opinion Delivered December 13, 2006

Do not publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.

1. Woods cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court's sentence of two years in each case, to run consecutively, constitutes a single four-year sentence. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h) (Briefs must contain appropriate citations to authorities supporting the contentions made.).