Steven Rockwall Lowery v. State ( 2015 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-13-00195-CR
STEVEN ROCKWELL LOWERY, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 320th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 64,196-D, Honorable Don R. Emerson, Presiding
January 29, 2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant Steven Rockwell Lowery appeals his conviction for possession of
marijuana and resulting sentence of confinement in a state jail for six months, fine of
$1,500, and restitution of $140. Through a single issue appellant challenges the trial
court’s order overruling his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. We will affirm.
Background
The Amarillo Police Department received an anonymous tip that marijuana was
growing in the area of a residential address in Amarillo. Officers were dispatched to
investigate.
Reaching the address, the officers found a manufactured home with a shed to
the rear. They parked their vehicles in front of the property next door. An officer saw
appellant walking from the back of the manufactured home toward the back of the shed.
Believing appellant was a resident of the manufactured home, the officers approached
him to make contact. He stood near growing plants. As the officers reached appellant
they recognized some of the plants were marijuana. Appellant volunteered that the
marijuana plants were his.
It developed that appellant lived in the shed.1 Appellant received the Miranda2
warnings and gave consent to search the shed. An officer found marijuana at several
locations in the shed. Police seized items found in the shed along with six marijuana
plants.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence which the trial court denied
after a hearing. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed. Appellant plead
guilty to the charged offense, retaining the right to challenge the trial court’s suppression
1
Other individuals occupied the manufactured home.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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ruling on appeal.3 The court then assessed punishment according to the parties’
bargained recommendation. This appeal followed.
Analysis
Through his sole issue on appeal appellant asserts the trial court reversibly erred
by failing to grant appellant’s motion to suppress because the officers were trespassing
when they contacted appellant and discovered the marijuana plants.
Our review of an order denying a motion to suppress is under the abuse of
discretion standard. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(citing State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In so doing, we
afford “almost total deference to a trial court’s express or implied determinations of
historical facts [while] review[ing] de novo the court’s application of the law of search
and seizure to those facts.” Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
ruling of the trial court. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(quoting State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
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Concerning preservation of appellant’s complaint, the record does not contain a
signed order denying appellant’s motion to suppress. However, based on the trial
court’s detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, a docket sheet entry concerning
the motion that states “motion denied,” and the trial court’s certification of appellant’s
right to appeal matters raised by a “written motion filed and ruled on before trial,” we
conclude appellant’s motion was implicitly denied and the complaint thus preserved.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 104 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006) (holding trial court “implicitly” ruled on motion to suppress under appellate rule
33.1(a) as record indicated trial court took motion to suppress under advisement, docket
sheet stated “appeal preserved as to issues presented,” and notice of appeal contained
trial court’s certification of defendant’s right to appeal on matters “raised by motion and
ruled on prior to trial”); Flores v. State, 888 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, pet. refused) (holding signed docket entry evidenced trial court’s ruling on
motion to suppress and was sufficient to preserve error).
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Based on the substance of appellant’s motion to suppress and the arguments of
the parties to the trial court, the issues for determination at the suppression hearing
were whether the officers trespassed on the curtilage of appellant’s residence and
whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of the growing
marijuana. Because the officers did not first obtain a search warrant, the State
assumed the burden of proof at the suppression hearing as to appellant’s Fourth
Amendment complaint. Sieffert v. State, 290 S.W.3d 478, 484 & n.8 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (citing Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002)).
Trespassory Invasion of a Constitutionally Protected Space
The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012) the Supreme Court explained that the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” formulation of Fourth Amendment protection stated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) adds to, and
does not provide a substitute for, that Amendment’s protection against governmental
trespasses. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. It reiterated this precept in Florida v. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013); see State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399,
407 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Court in Jardines found a Fourth Amendment
violation because a sniff by a drug dog occurred on the front porch of a residence, a
location within the curtilage of the home. “[The curtilage] enjoys protection as part of
the home itself . . .when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among
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equals.” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. “Curtilage is the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984).
Extent-of-curtilage questions are generally analyzed under the factors expressed
in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326
(1987) (considering the proximity of the area to the home; the inclusion of the area
within an enclosure surrounding the home; the nature of the uses of the area; and steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by passersby). However,
“these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they
bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—whether the area in question is so
intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of
Fourth Amendment protection.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301.
The Dunn analysis of the area the officers entered to encounter appellant is
complicated by several factors, among them the fact appellant’s “house” actually was
the shed. The trial court’s findings of fact do not include findings thoroughly addressing
the Dunn factors. There was no complaint in the trial court or on appeal of the court’s
failure to address those factors. Omitted findings of fact are implied in favor of the trial
court’s ruling if the evidence supports the implied findings. See Gutierrez v. State, 221
S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Given the state of the record we are
presented, and the “almost total” deference we must give the trial court’s implied
determinations of historical fact, we conclude its ruling on this issue was within its
discretion.
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Appellant’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
“[P]roperty rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations”
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[T]he reach of that [Fourth]
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure”). Specifically, “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test has been
added to . . . the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment[.]”
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (discussing Katz) (internal quotation marks and italics
omitted). We next consider then whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the location of the growing marijuana plants. The touchstone of the Katz
privacy-based analysis is whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177. The analysis is two-part: whether the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search and whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986); Katz,
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984); see Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1983) (“If the inspection
by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no
‘search’. . . .”).
Here appellant was growing marijuana in a location the trial court found was
“clearly visible” from a public alley. Based on the trial court’s findings, we find appellant
could have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the location of his marijuana-growing
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endeavor. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”); Id. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain
view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited”); McCall v. State, 540 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (“What a
person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection”); see also Wilkerson v. State, 644 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1983, pet. refused) (holding defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in backyard marijuana plants visible from the street); State v. Paulson, 98-1854 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 5/18/99), 740 So. 2d 698, 701 (holding defendant had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in marijuana plants whose cultivation was visible from the non-
gated driveway of his home); State v. Curto (1991), 73 Ohio App. 3d 16, 18, 595 N.E.2d
1038, 1040 (holding defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in marijuana
plants growing in his backyard when tops of plants were visible from a public sidewalk
and public street).
Trespassing as a Violation of Law under Article 38.23
Appellant makes passing reference in his brief to the Texas statutory
exclusionary rule, article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005). But he does not present a clear and concise
argument explicating his apparent contention that the officers committed a criminal
trespass, or possibly a common-law civil trespass, requiring suppression of any
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evidence seized under article 38.23. The argument was thus waived. TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(i).4
Moreover, even had the issue been adequately briefed, we would be unable to
sustain it. Assuming that a finding the officers committed a violation of the criminal
trespass statute would have required the exclusion of the evidence eventually seized, a
holding we do not reach, it was appellant’s burden, as the movant for an order
suppressing evidence obtained in violation of the law under article 38.23, to produce
evidence demonstrating the statutory violation. State v. Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776,
779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Pham v. State, 175 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005)). As applied here, proof of a criminal trespass requires proof the violator
entered or remained on residential land without effective consent and had notice that
entry was forbidden or received notice to depart but failed to do so. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 30.05(a),(1),(2) (West Supp. 2014). “Notice” means: (A) oral or written
communication by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner;
(B) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders . . . ; (C) a sign or
signs posted on the property or at the entry to the building, reasonably likely to come to
the attention of intruders, indicating that entry is forbidden; (D) identifying paint marks
on trees or posts; or (E) the presence of a crop grown for human consumption that is
under cultivation, being harvested, or marketed. The officers approached appellant
from the front of the property and did not notice his marijuana plants until they contacted
4
Appellant relies heavily on a statement of one of the officers to the effect he
assumed the man he was approaching in the area behind the manufactured home was
its resident because otherwise the man had no reason for being there. According to
appellant the officer described himself as a trespasser at that location, presumably
because he was not a resident. The trial court was not required to agree with
appellant’s characterization of the officer’s testimony.
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him and saw the contraband. The officers’ movement toward appellant was not
prevented or deterred by fencing, signs, or communication. The record thus does not
demonstrate the officers had notice their entry onto the property was forbidden or were
notified to depart but failed to do so. Further, a common law or civil trespass is not a
violation of law for the purposes of article 38.23. Floyd v. State, No. 07-99-0299-CR,
2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 2818, at *7-10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 30, 2001, no pet.) (not
designated for publication). Appellant has not demonstrated a violation of the law
requiring exclusion of the challenged evidence under article 38.23.
Conclusion
We overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
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